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Abstract 
 
Banks have a central role and importance in all commerce and hence in all societies.  
This thesis investigates the ethical basis of banking practice with the aim of 
developing an account of the virtues appropriate to bankers and banking.  One central 
issue concerns a conflict between the interests of banks and their customers, and how 
this conflict plays out in relation to the lending policies and fee structure of banks.  
Such lending policies can have a significant effect on banks, their customers and a 
range of stakeholders.  This research project investigated empirical evidence through 
qualitative interviews with senior bankers in two locations, Australia and Hong Kong, 
to elicit their thoughts on banking areas that involve customer interaction, namely, 
deposit-taking, credit cards, home mortgage loans, corporate finance, and foreign 
exchange.   The institutions selected hold a substantial segment of banking business 
in their respective countries and are thus representative of bankers’ perspectives.  The 
dissertation also entailed a case study of the causes and consequences of the 
American sub-prime crisis that was precipitated by the financial sector.  The 
interviews revealed an assertion of good ethical conduct based on adherence to peer-
determined codes of conduct and compliance with regulations.  There was also a 
common predisposition to claims of corporate social responsibility and reputation 
preservation but these have tended to mask the powerful underlying sales thrust.   A 
key finding of the study points to a lapse in ethical values in banks due to excessive 
reliance on self-interest.  Although self-interest is not in itself wrong, there has been a 
lack of moderation vis-à-vis the interests of less powerful customers.  A related 
finding is a prevailing resistance to regulation that is necessary to curtail selfish and 
2 
irresponsible behaviour by banks.  The interview subjects prefer industry self-
regulation to government supervision.  However, the banks in Australia and Hong 
Kong, which have been subjected to tighter regulation, have survived the global 
financial crisis better than their American counterparts despite complaints about the 
severity of their regulatory climate.  There is a strong case to ascribe ethical failure to 
American practices that triggered the sub-prime calamities, which have devastated 
homeowners and the global economy.  American banks and regulators both operated 
on the erroneous supposition that the quest after extreme profits would be restrained 
by free market forces.  The conclusions allude to virtues that are necessary for banks 
to espouse moral conduct.  These virtues can be embedded through leadership and 
cultural change. 
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Part A.  Approaching Banking from a Philosophical 
Perspective 
 
CHAPTER 1.  GLOBAL CREDIT CRISIS  
 
A.  Apocalypse 
The credit crunch that had first manifested itself in August 2007 was accelerating 
briskly during the summer months in the northern hemisphere, though much of the 
population outside mainstream finance in America and England was oblivious to this 
ominous tidal event.  By September 2007 the U.S.  Federal Reserve Bank had started 
to slash interest rates so dramatically that economists expressed concern that such 
action might spark off a downturn.  The American central bank had taken this action 
to avert some of the harmful consequences on the economy,1 but even then it could 
not stop the tidal wave.  As the Economist reported at that time:  
But trouble may be coming anyway.  The housing market’s malaise is deepening 
all the while.  This week’s symptoms were a 12-year low in housing starts and a 
doubling of foreclosures in a year.  No wonder house builders are at their 
gloomiest since the 1991 recession.2 
 
                                                
1 Editor, "Will the Credit Crisis Trigger a Downturn?," The Economist, 22 September 2007, 
www.economist.com (accessed 29 September 2007). 
2 Ibid. 
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Despite the rapidly spreading distress, bankers still had a sanguine outlook in 
November 2007, proclaiming circumstances would be different this time.3  Bankers 
had been responsible for the circumstances that instigated the collapse of credit but 
they failed to appreciate the full ramifications.  Several top bankers would soon be 
fired and leading financial institutions would collapse, eventually requiring 
government rescue.  As the analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 will highlight, the roots of 
the troubles lay in the flawed ethos of sub-prime loans, which were characterised by 
irresponsible lending.  Most of these loans subsequently became delinquent, and by 
July of 2007 the affected banks were required by regulations and accounting 
convention to set aside commensurate loan loss provisions.  These substantially 
impaired their equity position and compelled them to raise funds in the capital and 
money markets.  As in any panic-driven rush, many would be crushed along the way 
while only a few banks would survive the credit squeeze. 
Central banks around the world responded to this credit crisis with 
unprecedented interest rate cuts in order to restore liquidity in the financial markets, 
but the problems were the collapse of trust among banks in each other (as will be 
probed in Chapter 7) and the defensive reaction of banks to discontinue lending to 
most of their customers.  Even after central banks continued to drop interest rates, 
banks would either not resume lending or would do so at higher interest margins to 
preserve profits.  The cycle of trust that is so essential to banking had been ruptured. 
What were the immediate and continuing repercussions?  Firstly, as later 
chapters will show, millions of homeowners lost their homes and incurred substantial 
financial costs.  Secondly, countless companies that could not get hold of 
economically viable financing were forced to cut production and employment.  Many 
                                                
3 "Loss Leaders," The Economist, 3 November 2007, www.economist.com (accessed 10 November 
2007). 
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major industries would suffer economic hardship, for example, automobiles, airlines, 
heavy equipment, consumer goods, department stores, and restaurants, among others.   
 
B.  Paradise Lost 
Despite attempts to find other scapegoats, most economists agree that the blame for 
the global financial crisis lies with the banks. 
Banking is the industry that failed.  Banks are meant to allocate capital to 
businesses and consumers efficiently; instead, they ladled credit to anyone who 
wanted it.  Banks are supposed to make money by skilfully managing the risk of 
transforming short-term debt into long-term loans; instead they were undone by 
it.  They are supposed to expedite the flow of credit through economies; instead 
they ended up blocking it.4 
 
Having broken down as an industry, America’s financial-services companies were the 
earliest ones to suffer, slashing nearly half a million positions since the heights of 
December 2006, more than half of them in the seven months prior to mid-May 2009.  
Many jobs were permanently eliminated.5 
The financial disaster started with the asset bubbles created through excessive 
and irresponsible lending that inevitably had to burst.  But this was a crisis not just of 
money but also of confidence because the problems had been greatly magnified 
through certain unique aspects of modern finance, which we will further examine in 
Chapter 7.  These included the innovation of synthetic derivatives to create exposure 
to risk without actually having to own the underlying assets; the application of fair-
value accounting, which compelled financial institutions to constantly evaluate assets 
                                                
4 "Special Report: Rebuilding the Banks," The Economist, 14 May 2009, www.economist.com 
(accessed 20 May 2009). 
5 Ibid. 
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on the basis of current market prices that could activate signals to dispose of 
investments, further pushing down prices, until the process became a vicious circle.  
The principal accelerant was excessive leverage.6 
The amplifiers noted above could have been kept under control if banks had 
exercised better governance under sound ethical principles or if regulators had acted 
judiciously to prevent negligent bank practices.  Alan Blinder, a professor of 
economics at Princeton and former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve, raised the 
same criticism and especially found fault with government regulators for allowing 
sub-prime loans to flourish and for its failure to contain home foreclosures.7This crisis 
is acutely severe because of the unique characteristics of banks.  A Special Report on 
International Banking explains why banks are special: 
The first reason…is the inherent fragility of their business model…Even the 
strongest bank cannot survive a severe loss of confidence, because the money it 
owes can usually be called in more quickly than the money it is owed.  The 
second reason banks are special is that they do lots of business with each other.  
The third and most important reason is the role that the banks play as the wheel-
greasers of the economy, allocating and underwriting flows of credit to allow 
capital to be used as productively as possible.  That process has now gone into 
reverse.8  
 
After the crisis erupted in the banking sphere, it gradually spread to non-
financial businesses with the onslaught of recession at the end of 2007.  From that 
time till May 2009 America had shed 5 million jobs.  It was estimated that more than 
15% of the workers were either jobless or underemployed.  The market value of listed 
                                                
6 "Paradise Lost: A Special Report on International Banking," The Economist, 17 May 2008, 
www.economist.com (accessed 24 May 2008). 
7 Alan S. Blinder, "Six Errors on the Path to the Financial Crisis," The New York Times, 25 January 
2009, www.nytimes.com (accessed 27 January 2009). 
8 "Paradise Lost: A Special Report on International Banking." 
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shares in American companies tumbled 57% from its high point in October 2007 to a 
low in March 2009, with some recovery thereafter.9  
Since the credit squeeze had progressed to a global recession, the industry 
slowdown was felt in all countries.  On 26 January 2009 major multinational 
companies that included, among others, Caterpillar, ING, Pfizer and Sprint Nextel 
announced several thousands of job cuts each; the International Labour Organisation 
issued a gloomy forecast of an upsurge in the global jobless rate to 7.1% this year or 
230 million people, which is a significant growth from 179 million in 2007.10 Such 
large-scale unemployment is a cruel penalty on innocent victims. 
In the spring of 2009 both General Motors (GM) and Chrysler, which had 
once been respectively the largest and the third biggest carmakers in America, were 
forced into bankruptcy proceedings because they were slowly haemorrhaging due to 
the drastic collapse of their sales.  Though the fundamental reason behind the failure 
of both firms was inefficiency and overproduction, the immediate factors behind their 
demise were the higher cost of finance11, which was extremely difficult to obtain, and 
the sudden reduction of the take-home pay of American consumers.  Many 
individuals had lost their jobs while others were constrained to embrace a more frugal 
lifestyle that meant either not regularly changing cars or buying cheaper and fuel-
efficient imports.  The American car manufacturers had reacted defensively to the 
influx of better and more efficient Japanese cars in the 1970s by lobbying for 
government protection instead of responding in kind; in addition, their ill-conceived 
                                                
9 "Special Report: Surviving the Slump," The Economist, 28 May 2009, www.economist.com (accessed 
1 June 2009). 
10 "Swinging the Axe," The Economist, 29 January 2009, www.economist.com (accessed 31 January 
2009). 
11 "At the Gates of Hell," The Economist, 24 November 2007, www.economist.com (accessed 29 
November 2007).  “It was disclosed that bankers of Cerberus, the private equity investor that had 
bought control of Chrysler, abandoned efforts to sell US$4 billion of debt it had incurred for the 
purchase.  In 2006 Cerberus had also bought 51% of GMAC (the financing arm of General Motors) for 
US$14 billion but this had lost US$1.6 billion just for the third quarter of 2007.” 
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agreement on benefits with the unions saddled them with a heavy cost structure.  
GM’s bankruptcy will result in the loss of 14 factories, 29,000 workers and 2,400 
dealers in America;12 it will also involve the sale of the European operations. 
 
C.  Banks and Household Debt 
Household savings have traditionally provided a strong impetus to economic growth 
in many countries, but conditions have changed in recent years.  In the American 
situation personal indebtedness rose steadily, from less than 80% of disposable 
income in 1986 to nearly 100% in 2000 and by 2007 it had climbed to 140%.13 
Looking at actual numbers, the financial historian Niall Ferguson noted that by 2007 
American consumer debt had soared to a record US$ 2.5 trillion.14  A study entitled 
“For a New Thrift: Confronting the Debt Culture” commented that the reckless debt 
culture trapped individuals in a morass of poverty and destroyed lives.  Statistics 
showed that credit-card debt nearly tripled between 1989 and 2001, increasing from 
US$ 238 billion to US$ 692 billion; by 2008, it grew to US$ 937 billion.15  The debt 
was in the main issued by banks though there were also non-bank financial 
institutions to blame. 
Debt can be a good thing because it enables people to purchase homes, buy 
goods that contribute to a better quality of life, or embark on business ventures.  But 
                                                
12 Editor, "Detroitosaurus Wrecks," The Economist, 4 June 2009, www.economist.com (accessed 8 
June 2009).  It was estimated that, “until an agreement in 2007 with the union, each car in Detroit 
carried about $1,400 in extra pension and health-care costs compared with the foreign-owned 
competitors in America.”  
13 "When Fortune Frowned: A Special Report on the World Economy," The Economist, 18 October 
2008, www.economist.com (accessed 25 October 2008). 
14 Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (London: Penguin Group, 
2008), p. 61. 
15 David Brooks, "The Great Seduction," The New York Times, 10 June 2008, www.nytimes.com 
(accessed 12 June 2008). 
9 
consumer credit cuts two ways.  It brings convenience and expanded options, but, if 
its promoters are deceptive, it can encourage reckless behaviour and lead to tragedy, 
as the sub-prime mortgage foreclosures have excruciatingly demonstrated.16 The 
mortgage loan problems will be examined in Chapter 6. 
The study cited above stated that the percentage of American families with 
debt-service obligations in excess of 40% of their income increased to 12.2% in 2004.  
Delinquencies on household debt also rose during this period.  Late fees on credit 
cards totalled US$ 17.1 billion in 2006.17 
The credit crisis did not just impact on bank customers; it also affected whole 
societies.  Unwitting municipalities suffered investment losses; suburbs declined in 
value as property foreclosures proceeded; cities and states faced declining tax 
revenues due to the misfortunes of their constituents; countries suffered drastic 
financial straits (Iceland would be virtually bankrupted).  The shaping force of money 
on society is manifest in all activities.  And banks as the mediator of money have an 
enormous impact on human lives in all countries.   
 
D.  Judgment on the Banks 
Given the great importance of banks and the fears about the consequences of their 
failure, governments throughout the world have committed to saving the financial 
system.  Many of the institutions that failed were judged too big to fail because there 
was anxiety that their demise could cause the collapse of the global economy.  A 
massive bank rescue has therefore been launched.  In May 2009 it was still highly 
                                                
16 Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, "A Nation in Debt," The American Interest July / August (2008): 
http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=458 (accessed 2 November 2008). 
17 Ibid. 
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uncertain what form and size of support governments would eventually extend to 
their banks.  Nonetheless governments are already heavily involved in banking 
systems.  They are guarantors of far more retail deposits than prior to the crisis.  They 
guarantee new debt issues of banks.  Governments have acquired and own preferred 
shares in many banks, common equity in some and are prepared to infuse capital in 
others if necessary.  Banks that have not sought any government funds still benefit 
from their reassuring presence.  “We all exist at the largesse of the government right 
now,” says a bank boss.18   
But what caused the banks to fail?  The American evidence indicates an 
ethical failure, which was demonstrated through irresponsible lending, a lack of 
concern for the plight of borrowers, and a lack of transparency.   
The empirical research of this thesis examines the conduct of banks in their 
day-to-day activities to identify the values and principles underlying their actions.  
The focus is on those areas of banking directly affecting customers, because that is 
where banks demonstrate deep-rooted ethical views.  The thesis also presents a case 
study of the American sub-prime mortgage loan crisis, in which its causes and 
consequences are analysed in order to draw some lessons for the future.  Moral 
deficiencies are revealed as the grounds that instigated the crisis.   
                                                
18 "Special Report: Rebuilding the Banks." 
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CHAPTER 2.  VIEWS OF BANKING ETHICS 
 
A.  Development of Modern Banking 
Much of the current financial structure can be traced to three innovations in the 17th 
century.  The first of these was the establishment of a system of bank transfers that 
has survived to this day in the form of cheque issuance and inter-bank transfers.  The 
second was the foundation of fractional reserve banking that enabled banks to lend 
substantially more than the amount of deposits they carried on their books.  The third 
was the creation of the Bank of England as the official issuer of bank notes, which 
were initially backed by gold bullion, and the keeper of bank reserves.  The modus 
operandi of banking was twofold: on the one hand, a bank had to be able to guarantee 
its depositors that they could withdraw their money whenever they wanted; on the 
other hand, the same bank had to lend the funds out so it could generate income in 
order to be able to pay interest to encourage the depositors to place their funds.  The 
three innovations were the original measures that made possible the institution of 
modern banking.1  Essentially reserve banking means that, if the reserve requirement 
is, for example, 10%, a bank can lend out 90% of say $100, that is $90, to another 
person who may deposit that amount at another bank, which in turn can lend out $81 
to a third person, and this goes on to the next bank and borrower.  The initial deposit 
of $100 has created loans of $171 and is capable of creating even further loans, so this 
is called the ‘multiplier effect’ in money creation, and this allows banks to greatly 
expand lending.   
                                                
1 Ferguson, The Ascent of Money, p. 47. 
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The institution of reserve banking did not completely eliminate the possibility 
that most depositors in any given bank might want to withdraw their funds at the 
same time and, if the affected bank had insufficient cash on hand because it had 
loaned out most of its deposits or if the bank had uncollectible loans, then the bank 
suffered a bank run.2  The introduction of deposit insurance in certain countries has 
protected depositors in affected banks in those countries and given peace of mind to 
others.  Banking regulators have sought to prevent such eventualities through close 
supervision to ensure a stable banking system and adherence of banks to prudent 
practices.   
 
B.  Necessity for Banks in Contemporary Period 
It is crucial to have a robust and sound banking structure because of the central role of 
banks in every society.  Economic growth has witnessed the constant flow of money 
through banks, and a breakdown of the financial system as witnessed in the 
contemporary period 2007 – 2009 creates havoc throughout society because everyone 
is reliant on banks.   
Workers in many service and manufacturing entities receive their salaries or 
wages from their employers through direct credit transfers to their respective bank 
accounts.  While there are some instances of cash payment, compensation for 
employment is normally effected through banks.   At a minimum, employers would 
probably maintain accounts at banks out of which they pay salaries, rental and 
                                                
2 Most bank runs are instigated by rumours of bank insolvency, which may not always be grounded on 
true circumstances, but in a panic situation most people do not usually bother to ascertain the facts. 
13 
utilities, as well as taxes.  Employees would likely have at least savings accounts and 
possibly current accounts in order to facilitate their own regular payments to others. 
More importantly, people in most countries have also relied on banks for 
issuance of credit cards, housing mortgage loans to acquire homes, and personal loans 
to purchase consumer durables such as motorcars, boats, and household appliances.3  
Once individuals have assumed a debtor relationship with banks, as a rule they are 
obliged to establish deposit accounts with the same banks. 
Companies, which may range from sole proprietorships to partnerships to 
corporations, avail of bank services to ensure they earn competitive interest rates on 
deposits and also receive financing to meet standard operating requirements and 
further needs such as trade finance to support imports of raw materials and exports of 
finished goods as well as foreign exchange transactions to shield them from the 
potential losses of unfavourable currency fluctuation.  The large companies are 
especially reliant on corporate finance to support new capital expenditures. 
It is therefore indisputable that all members of society are dependent on banks, 
which are expected to serve the function of intermediation.  It is equally important to 
stress that banks require customers, if they are to earn any income and attain profits, 
so the question is how ethically banks deliver their services.  The argument is that 
banks are indispensable members of their respective communities and therefore have 
moral obligations towards their constituents and customers. 
The question now turns to the ethical framework that guides policies and 
procedures in banks.  What are the values and motivation of bankers that shape their 
                                                
3 This is certainly the case in the two countries selected for the empirical research, Australia, and Hong 
Kong, and also in America, which is the location of the case study.  In contrast, many people in 
Germany are reluctant to use credit cards or obtain mortgage loans to buy homes; they prefer to rent 
even for extended periods of time. 
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actions?  In the effort to identify these values it is beneficial to review some 
philosophical views that may be relevant to the analysis.   
Since the dawn of civilisation numerous moral thinkers, who will be discussed 
in subsequent sections, have proffered ethical theories pertaining to money and 
banking customs.  Some of these are deontological in prescribing duty or forbidding 
certain acts; one enduring concept lasting several centuries argued against charging 
interest on money.  Another contentious debate was directed at the morality of the 
profit motive, which was again raised during the current global financial crisis.  One 
ethical approach that continues to hold sway is utilitarianism, which seeks to evaluate 
the morality of an act according to its contribution to overall utility, defined as 
pleasure or happiness of people.   On the other hand, the Kantian categorical 
imperative stresses the use of reason to discern moral obligations.  Other theories, 
which are especially relevant in the current period, stem from the idea of the social 
contract and focus on justice and what we owe to each other.  The evaluation of the 
empirical research on banks and the case study on the sub-prime crisis will seek out 
the pertinent ethical concepts applied by the respective actors.  Unlike theorists, banks 
might not subscribe to a single ethical approach but instead rely on a plurality of 
ethical norms. 
The public image of banking is usually manifest in the statements of corporate 
principles that individual banks release.  These normally stem out of perceptions of 
duty, which could be attempts of legal compliance but there might also be 
motivational factors arising out of inherent moral values.  The ensuing review 
commences with a discussion of some earlier ethical concepts that have influenced 
attitudes towards banking, in particular the issue of usury.  Nowadays there is fierce 
resentment against banks charging excessive interest; long ago, there were religious 
15 
and philosophical arguments against paying any interest at all.  Receiving interest 
earnings is, of course, the fundamental method whereby banks earn income, and this 
is directly related to the subsequent topic of profits.  
 
C.  Usury 
Banking would not have been possible before the transformation of beliefs about 
usury.  There was a prohibition against usury or the payment of interest in ancient and 
early medieval times (which was stricter than the current meaning of usury implying 
excessive interest rates4), because it was deemed wrongful to charge any interest at 
all.  There were religious strictures explicitly pronounced in the Old Testament: 
35 If one of your brethren becomes poor, and falls into poverty among you, then 
you shall help him, like a stranger or a sojourner, that he may live with you.  36 
'Take no usury or interest from him; but fear your God, that your brother may 
live with you. 37 'You shall not lend him your money for usury, nor lend him 
your food at a profit.5  
 
19 You shall not charge interest to your brother -- interest on money or food or 
anything that is lent out at interest.  20 To a foreigner you may charge interest, 
but to your brother you shall not charge interest, that the LORD your God may 
bless you in all to which you set your hand in the land which you are entering to 
possess.6 
 
There were many more references in the Old Testament, which, as the basis of 
the Mosaic Law, was obligatory for all Jews but the above passage from Leviticus 
laid the foundation for the proscription against charging interest in the relationships 
                                                
4 Many countries have lending regulations against usurious rates that are sometimes defined as 
exceeding 48 % p.a.   
5 Leviticus 25:35-37.   
6 Deuteronomy 23:19-20. 
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between Jews although the second passage from Deuteronomy was interpreted to 
grant permission to charge interest to non-Jews or Gentiles.  One must understand 
these biblical instructions within the historical context of the newly formed Jewish 
people who were emerging from a more primitive nomadic subsistence into an 
agricultural society.  Living in a society required standards and laws to govern 
relationships.  The coming of Jesus as portrayed in the New Testament paved the way 
for the overturn of the Mosaic Law.  As two gospel writers wrote relating to interest: 
Wherefore then gavest not thou my money into the bank, that at my coming I 
might have required mine own with usury?"   
Finally the master said to him "Why then didn't you put my money on deposit, so 
that when I came back, I could have collected it with interest?7 
 
Thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to the exchangers, and then at my 
coming I should have received mine own with usury.8 
 
Although the New Testament passages cited above allude to a favourable reception 
towards payment of interest, resistance to the practice continued and the First Council 
of Nicea meeting in the year 325 enacted Canon 17, which prohibited clergy from 
receiving interest on loans.9 The ban by the Church on usury or interest would 
eventually be extended to the laity commencing in the year 750.10 
The Jews continued the practice of lending money with interest to Gentiles 
despite the ban by the Christian Church on usury.  Therefore the stereotype of the 
Jewish lender charging Gentiles interest persisted in literature as found in the fictional 
Shylock of The Merchant of Venice, the drama by Shakespeare.11 
                                                
7 Luke 19:23. 
8 Matthew 25:27 
9 Timothy D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1981), p. 536. 
10 John T.  Noonan, The Scholastic Analysis of Usury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1957), p. 11. 
11 Ferguson, The Ascent of Money, p. 33-35. 
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While there were religious arguments against charging interest on money, 
there was forceful long-lasting opposition emanating from the Greek philosopher 
Aristotle, who declared in The Politics:  
The trade of the petty usurer is hated with most reason: it makes a profit from 
currency itself, instead of making it from the process which currency was meant to 
serve.  Currency came into existence merely as a means of exchange; usury tries 
to make it increase.  This is the reason why it got its name; for as the offspring 
resembles its parent, so the interest bred by money is like the principal which 
breeds it, and it may be called ‘currency the son of currency.’  Hence we can 
understand why, of all modes of acquisition, usury is the most unnatural.12 
 
This is the argument of the sterility of money that would be espoused during the 
Middle Ages by Aquinas, the theologian and advocate of Aristotelian philosophy.  
According to the philosopher Adrian Walsh this is a rare example of a joke from 
Aristotle.13 The explanation comes from the Greek word tokos, which signifies both 
token or currency and offspring.  Therefore, as Walsh explicates, Aristotle’s remarks 
about money being unable to produce offspring and therefore an unnatural (and 
immoral) activity, may be regarded as a play on the dual meaning of the original 
Greek word.  The metaphysics of Aristotle revolved around the distinction between 
the natural and the unnatural (amongst other things), so it was logical in The Politics 
for him to describe money and interest thereon in naturalistic terms.  Due to the 
stature of Aquinas as a Church Father and the impact of Aristotle’s thinking, this 
objection to usury continued for centuries.  There were supplementary opinions for 
opposing usury, but this doctrine was eventually abandoned. 
The key figure in dismissing the objection against charging interest on money 
was Calvin, a theologian who contended in 1545 that it was not contrary to religious 
                                                
12 Aristotle, The Politics, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995), p. 30. 
13 Adrian Walsh and Tony Lynch, The Morality of Money: An Exploration in Analytic Philosophy 
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 95. 
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teaching or unlawful to receive payment for the use of money and that therefore 
capital was productive.  However Calvin elaborated that there were instances where 
demanding interest would be sinful, such as the situation of the poor suffering from 
disasters or charging excessive interest.14 It is clear that condemnation of exorbitant 
rates has long been part of religious and philosophical tradition. 
While the practice of interest payment is generally accepted in modern times, 
it is still prohibited in fundamentalist Islamic societies and is treated instead as a 
rental or hire purchase transaction.15  However, the apprehension in non-Islamic 
societies is about the level of interest rates that have sometimes been described as 
exploitative; Walsh maintains that, even if interest is acceptable, moral considerations 
must prevail in order to avoid taking advantage of helpless borrowers.16 This 
dissertation will examine loan situations approaching usury in the current 
environment when the case study discusses the sub-prime crisis and predatory lending 
in chapter 6.   
 
D.  Profit Motive 
If one accepts that earning interest on money is legitimate and since interest is the 
primary income and cost of a bank, then the topic of the profit motive becomes an 
important moral issue.  There have been widely differing philosophical stances on this 
matter that date back to the ancient Greeks and persist to the present time.  The 
principal disapproval of the pursuit of the profit motive comes from those who equate 
                                                
14 Ibid., p. 102.   
15 In such cases the Islamic financial institution does not pay interest on deposits but rather a share of 
profits; in housing loans the institution buys the property in its own name and the individuals pay 
regular rental for a pre-agreed duration at the end of which the titles are transferred to the individuals. 
16 Walsh and Lynch, The Morality of Money, pp. 112-13. 
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this with selfishness.  However Antony Flew, a philosopher, says this is wrong 
because self-interest is not identical with selfishness.  As an illustration he points out 
that eating one’s meals regularly is in one’s self-interest but is not selfish.  However, 
taking another person’s dinner in addition to one’s own is selfish.  Although “selfish 
actions are perhaps always interested, only some interested actions are also selfish.”17  
According to Flew the long-standing antagonism towards the profit motive is 
due to three fallacies that stem from Aristotle, one of which is his objection to ‘usury’ 
as discussed earlier.  Another is the view of trade as exploitation in the sense of it 
being a zero-sum game with one party always a winner and the other a loser.  The 
error here is in failing to recognise the essential element of reciprocity in trade.  
Finally there is the distinction made between obtaining goods for one’s own use as 
opposed to a desire for financial earnings.18  The argument is described as faulty 
because one would not make a profit if nobody wants what one is selling and, if they 
are buying, it must mean that one is satisfying a need.  This is the underlying basic 
assumption behind a market-based economy versus a centrally planned regime.  
However, when the inquiry shifts to the sub-prime crisis in Chapters 6 and 7, one will 
take note of the divergence of motives between the sub-prime lenders who wanted to 
earn huge profits and the borrowers who signed up for the loans that they would 
eventually be unable to repay. 
A moral philosopher and early political economist championed by 
contemporary free market advocates is Adam Smith, whose ‘invisible hand’ theory 
from the Wealth of Nations is cited by economists James Tobin and Frank Hahn as 
                                                
17 Antony Flew, "The Profit Motive," Ethics 86, no. 4 (1976): p. 314. 
18 Ibid.: pp. 314-19. 
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“surely the most important contribution of economic thought.”19 The passage most 
often cited reads as follows:  
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest.  We address 
ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love; and never talk to them of 
our own necessities, but of their advantages.  Nobody but a beggar chooses to 
depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens.20 
 
Commentators have referred to that passage to emphasise that individuals who seek 
their own self-interest are guided by an ‘invisible hand’ such that their actions result 
in the common good.  However, in her treatise on Adam Smith’s thoughts, the 
economic historian Emma Rothschild (interestingly, she is a member of the 
prominent Rothschild banking family of England and is married to the development 
economist Amartya Sen, a Nobel Prize laureate) puts forward the view that the widely 
held notion of the ‘invisible hand’ only arose in the 20th century and Smith himself 
did not seriously endorse in 1776 what has become the standard current reading as 
advocacy of laissez-faire.  She refers to three divergent occasions when he used the 
term:21 firstly, in a mocking tone when he described superstitious people ascribing 
unusual events to supernatural forces in the History of Astronomy; secondly, in the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments wherein he wrote that the rich “are led by an invisible 
hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life…and thus without 
intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society…”22 Thirdly, she 
mentions that the reference in the Wealth of Nations  should be viewed within the 
                                                
19 Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment, first 
paperback edition ed. (Boston: Harvard UP, 2002), p. 116. 
20 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: George 
Routledge & Sons, 1776; reprint, 1893), p. 11. 
21 Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment, p. 117. 
22 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D. D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, 7 vols., vol. I, 
The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (London: Oxford UP, 1976), 
pp. 184-85. 
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context of that period as Smith’s defence of free international trade vis-à-vis 
government imposition of tariffs and import controls.  Rothschild finds Smith 
protesting against import restrictions and against the supporters of such restrictions, 
who lobby the legislature.  In her reading, Smith finds domestic monopolies 
favourable for certain industries, but not for the country as a whole. According to 
Rothschild, Smith believes that, in the absence of restrictions, the merchant would 
still choose to support domestic industry for his own security and unwittingly 
promote the interest of the whole society. The merchant is therefore led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end that was not part of his intention. 
This interpretation by Rothschild makes the case that Smith was not proposing 
that individualistic self-centredness or unrestrained market forces should serve as the 
recommended norm because these would be constrained by some invisible hand and 
thus result in the common good.  More importantly one must bear in mind that Adam 
Smith was a moral philosopher who was more concerned about the right actions that 
men should adopt; he was not a supporter of free market capitalism that some modern 
economists strongly support.   
In the Theory of Moral Sentiments that arguably is his best work and where 
his views remained constant through various editions, Smith unequivocally affirms 
(Part III Chapter III) the significance of duty and a person’s conscience, when he 
extols the power of conscience in the inner being that serves as the voice of reason 
and the judge of our conduct.  He ascribes to it a sense of justice that prevents us from 
acting in ways that can cause unhappiness or harm in others.  Through our conscience 
we realise why it is right to be generous and wrong to be unjust, and we learn to love 
honour and dignity.  Most notably Smith wrote the following words in the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments: 
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One individual must never prefer himself so much even to any other individual, so 
as to hurt or injure that other, in order to benefit himself, though the benefit to the 
one should be much greater than the hurt to the other.23 
 
From a contemporary philosophical view it is evident that a careful reading of 
the Theory of Moral Sentiments supports Rothschild’s insightful economic historical 
analysis of Wealth of Nations that Adam Smith was not an advocate of unconstrained 
free enterprise but rather an objector to government taxation on imports.  Moreover it 
comes across consistently that Smith was staunchly ethical in insisting that rational 
men should act in such a manner so as to cause no harm to fall on others. 
According to Rothschild, the understanding by Smith of the invisible hand 
might have been developed in three ideas: that human action frequently results in 
unintended consequences, that there is logic or rationality in events, and that the 
unintended consequences of individual actions sometimes encourage the interests of 
communities.24  This is certainly a credible view, and the next section will examine 
the notion of consequentialism.   
Before moving on to other perspectives, one should note that Smith extolled 
the virtue of justice in his chapter on duty in Theory of Moral Sentiments:  
There is, however, one virtue of which the general rules determine with the greatest 
exactness every external action which it requires.  This virtue is justice.  The rules 
of justice are accurate in the highest degree, and admit of no exceptions or 
modifications…25 
 
These words came from the same man who wrote about the invisible hand.  Yet the 
modern economic interpretation of the term posits a free market where consumers 
choose the lowest prices and entrepreneurs opt for the highest prices, where there are 
                                                
23 Ibid., p. 137. 
24 Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment, p. 121. 
25 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 137. 
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no regulations or references to justice, yet the unintentional outcome benefits all 
parties.  To place Smith’s thoughts in the context of banking, one would say that it is 
proper for banks to pursue profits provided that they act justly and do not cause harm 
to other people.  Justice is a central focus in social contract theories that will be 
explored later. 
 
E.  Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism is the ethical theory that was initially formulated by Jeremy Bentham 
and later developed further by John Stuart Mill; it has gained wide acceptance even 
till modern times.  This is the belief which declares that the foundation of morals is 
‘utility’ or the ‘greatest happiness’ principle and contends that actions are right to the 
extent they tend to maximize happiness; wrong if they lead to the reverse of 
happiness.26 This theory states that the determination of whether an act is morally 
right depends on its consequences, thus giving it the name of consequentialism.  
There are several varying approaches that essentially come under the categories of act 
consequentialism and rule consequentialism.   
Act-consequentialist theories initially indicate some principle for ranking 
overall situations from best to worst from an objective perspective, and then require 
the agent in every case to act in such a way as to produce the highest-ranked situation 
he can produce.  All such theories share the same concept of what is right which 
requires each agent to generate the best possible overall outcome.27 An act is 
considered morally right if the sum total produces a greater amount of good after 
subtracting the bad consequences.  What distinguishes this approach is that bad 
                                                
26 Stephen Darwall, Consequentialism, ed. Stephen Cahn, Blackwell Readings in Philosophy (Malden, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 33. 
27 Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (London: Oxford UP, 1982). 
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results are not excluded but are simply outweighed by the aggregate amount of good 
consequences.  The problems one finds with this approach are, firstly, the question of 
which standard of morality the agent has chosen and whether it is truly objective and 
applicable in all instances, and, secondly, the issue of expected versus actual 
consequences.   
Consequentialist tenets serve as justification for most banking products, such 
as deposit services, electronic payment services, credit cards, and housing loans.  The 
conventional wisdom in banks is that the more of these products they can sell, the 
happier the customers will be.  Nonetheless unforeseen outcomes do occur, and, as 
the case study of the sub-prime crisis will reveal, there are frequently unexpected 
consequences of catastrophic proportions.   
The other approach, rule consequentialism, chooses the rules that would bring 
about good consequences.  Brandt states the principle in the following manner: 
An act is right if and only if it conforms with that learnable set of rules the 
recognition of which as morally binding -– roughly at the time of the act — by 
everyone in the society of the agent, except for the retention by individuals of 
already formed and decided moral convictions, would maximize intrinsic value.28 
 
However, Brandt also commented on the above principle that the identified intrinsic 
value may not necessarily be just and that, if it is correct, there is still a need to be 
able to explain to a person the rationale for observing the rule if it clashes with his 
self-interest.  Finally, he considered that the application of the principle, even if it 
need not be required in every instance for all people, would be useful in looking at 
difficult situations.29 
                                                
28 Darwall, Consequentialism, pp. 232-33. 
29 Ibid. 
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One area, which is aptly named motive utilitarianism, looks at the connection 
between the morality of motives and the morality of actions.30  Intentions and actions 
can separately be ethical or not and, even if they are both ethical, they could also be 
incompatible.  According to Adams, individualistic motive utilitarianism stipulates 
that a person’s motivation at any given moment is better, the greater the utility of his 
having it at that moment, while universalistic motive utilitarianism is the concept that 
“motives are better, the greater the utility of everybody’s having them on all 
occasions.”31 However, even if one has a good motive that brings utility to another 
person, there could be circumstances that an act with the motive to bring happiness to 
another is unethical.  To take an example in banking, a young teenager in school may 
be very happy to receive a credit card in his own name so he can buy desirable 
consumer items such as the latest recorded music and designer clothes, but, if he has 
no job or independent source of income other than a regular allowance from his 
parents, he may be unable to repay his debt, so it is unethical to provide him a credit 
card for his own account. 
It would be a correct observation that utilitarianism is a key guiding principle 
for banks and their managers, since much of their product advertising highlights 
attainment of happiness as the principal benefit for customers. 
 
F.  Categorical Imperative 
While consequentialist theories focus on bringing the greatest amount of utility or 
happiness to others, they do not tell us why we should be ethical and what our 
                                                
30 Ibid., p. 236. 
31 Ibid., p. 248. 
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obligations are.  Kant’s important contributions to moral philosophy lay in his 
argument that through our a priori reasoning moral duties present themselves to us as 
absolute.  All human beings have categorical imperatives that do not command 
hypothetically (such as, pay your taxes if you do not want to be penalised), but 
obligate unconditionally (such as, never tell a lie).  Some ethicists emphasize the 
relevance of this Kantian approach to business ethics.32  A review of this theory will 
reveal its applicability.  The following is Kant’s first principle of the categorical 
imperative: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that 
it should become a universal law.”33  This is distinguished from a hypothetical 
imperative whose content we realise only after we have set an objective or a pre-
condition.   
But how does a person know if she can will her maxim as a universal law?  
Kant said the test is whether she can exercise her will without contradiction.  She has 
to be able to will her maxim into the whole world as a universal maxim.  Certain 
actions by their nature are appropriate cases for illustration.  Consider, for instance, 
that an individual has the habit of telling lies and personally believes this is 
acceptable conduct.  But if that if lying were to be established universally nobody 
would believe anybody at all because they would know or expect that everybody is 
telling a lie.34 
Christine Korsgaard, a leading Kantian scholar, uses as an example of the first 
contradiction a man whose guideline is to give a false undertaking in order to obtain 
some money that he knows he cannot repay.  To see whether this can be willed as a 
                                                
32 Norman E. Bowie, Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective (Malden, MA; Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 
1999). 
33 Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law or Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. 
Paton (London: Hutchinson, 1948), p. 88. 
34 Ibid., p. 91. 
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universal law, Korsgaard asks us to picture a world where this is the normal practice 
for borrowing money - anyone needing money acts this way.  It would be difficult to 
envisage that a man, whose basic principle is to lie in order to be able to borrow 
money, could insist that his guideline become worldwide practice.35 If one looks at the 
reverse situation where banks lend money to individuals even if they know the 
borrowers will not be able to repay, but do so in order to earn profits from the 
increased interest earnings, and they try to make this a widespread maxim, then one 
realises the resulting chaos when borrowers could not, or did not, repay their loans.  
This is evidently a violation of the universality law, which will be investigated further 
in the chapter on the sub-prime crisis.   
Kant wrote that in “practical philosophy we are not concerned with accepting 
reasons for what happens, but with accepting laws of what ought to happen, even if it 
never does happen – that is, objective practical laws.”36  Korsgaard explicates Kant’s 
thesis by stating that each of us always acts with some objective in mind.  These may 
be positive ends, as goals to be achieved, or negative ends, as things we must avoid 
doing.  If there is a categorical imperative, this will be the end we envision.  What 
would this end be?  According to Kant  “man, and, in general, every rational being 
exists as an end in himself.”37  
This gives rise to Kant’s second principle, the Formula of Humanity: “Act in 
such a way to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”38  Korsgaard 
applies this principle to condemn institutions and individuals who employ tools of 
                                                
35 Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), p. 14. 
36 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 94. 
37 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, p. 16. 
38 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 96. 
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deceit or coercion to compel people to act in a way that violates free choice.39  In her 
book she denounces compulsion and fraudulent practice as the worst offences against 
others.40 Kant’s second principle is worthy of being enshrined in banking codes of 
ethics.  Chapter 6 will probe into misleading and deceptive procedures that have been 
perpetrated in some of the American banks.  These would run counter to the 
categorical imperative. 
Having proffered the first two tenets, Kant presents the third principle, the 
Formula of Autonomy: 
…the ground for every enactment of practical law lies objectively in the rule and 
in the form of universality which (according to our first principle) makes the rule 
capable of being a law…; subjectively, however, it lies in the end; but (according 
to our second principle) the subject of all ends is to be found in every rational 
being as an end in himself.  From this there now follows our third practical 
principle for the will – as the supreme condition of the will’s conformity with 
universal practical reason – namely, the Idea of the will of every rational being as 
a will which makes universal law. 41  
 
As Korsgaard points out, we rational humans decide our ends, and since a rational 
creature cherishes rational nature as a goal in itself and with this objective in mind we 
only act on principles that could become universal laws, we are therefore the ones 
who legislate these laws for ourselves.  This is our autonomy.42  
In Kant’s view the formula of autonomy is fundamental to the categorical 
imperative because moral obligation is unconditional.  Duty cannot be heteronomous, 
because, if the command is hypothetical or premised on a condition, either of a 
reward or a punishment, we have the option of complying due to our accord with the 
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proposed condition or rejecting it due to our refusal of the condition.  “There can only 
be one condition why human beings must obey the moral law, and that is that we give 
that law to ourselves.”43 
Kant then progresses to his concept of the Kingdom of Ends by which he 
means: 
A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member, when, although he 
makes its universal laws, he is also subject to these laws.  He belongs to it as its 
head, when as the maker of laws he is himself subject to the will of no other. The 
practical necessity of acting on this principle – that is, duty – is in no way based 
on feelings, impulses, and inclinations, but only on the relation of rational beings 
on one another, a relation in which the will of a rational being must always be 
making universal law, because otherwise he could not be conceived as an end in 
himself. 44 
 
Kant presents us this ideal concept to which all of us must aspire as rational beings, 
because constant observance of the three categorical imperatives with the full 
understanding that they would govern everyone in society, including ourselves, would 
lay the groundwork of morality. 
 
G.  Categorical Imperative in Banking Ethics 
The review of Kant’s Categorical Imperative can lead one to advocate it as a means of 
defining obligations and duties for bankers, who may choose to incorporate them in 
their codes of banking practice.  They are especially relevant for enactment of 
banking regulations.  The business ethicist Norman Bowie wrote of the high 
suitability of employing Kant’s practical philosophy to business conduct.  As a 
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demonstration of the universal model Bowie referred to the nearly complete reliance 
on contracts in the modern world.  Contracts are agreements on performance between 
various parties, which may be between companies and their customers, management 
and employees, purchasers and suppliers, landlords and tenants, corporations and 
governing states.  If a maxim allowing infringement of contracts were to be endorsed 
as a universal law, it would spell the end of contracts.  A universal maxim sanctioning 
breach of contracts would be destructive and therefore untenable.45  
Contracts are, of course, the very foundation of all banking: taking deposits 
from the public, extending personal and home mortgage loans, foreign exchange 
dealing among dealers in multitudinous financial institutions, and corporate finance.  
When individuals place savings deposits at a bank, they enter into a contract with the 
institution in the form a passbook assuring them that they will receive defined interest 
earnings and also that they can withdraw their funds anytime.  They trust the bank to 
honour its commitment under the contract.  When they lose their trust in the bank’s 
ability to perform under this contract, they rush to pull out their funds and, as we have 
seen repeatedly during the financial crisis that commenced in 2007 and continued to 
rage in 2009, runs on bank have proliferated.46  An essential moral duty of a bank is 
therefore one of abiding with all its contracts, which denotes that it must fulfil all its 
obligations to its customers and necessitates that the bank adhere to all prudential 
guidelines to ensure it is able to do so.  This means avoiding precarious situations, or 
at least maintaining adequate controls, so that the funds under its management are 
always protected. 
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A vital categorical imperative for a bank is to always act honestly.  The 
requirement is for transparency in its dealings with customers, staff, and all other 
stakeholders.  In a world where dishonesty could evolve into a universal maxim, 
customers would no longer trust banks, and banks would not trust one another. 
The Kantian method of analysing whether a maxim can be universalised is 
therefore an approach that we can intuit and confirm in our everyday lives.  The 
world would not function if we accepted that people do not have to keep their 
promises or tell the truth, because in that situation nobody would trust each other and 
there would be no interpersonal exchange.  Corporations and banking would not even 
exist.  Our reason and experience tell us that the reverse is true, that trustworthiness in 
keeping our word and honesty are ethically good. 
Another principle that we all accept as vital in all human action is fairness, 
whether we consider sports, schools, government services or the business 
environment.  In most of these endeavours we have to compete among each other for 
scarce resources and rewards, such that some are more successful than others, but we 
must do so fairly.  In sports there is normally one victor and several losers in a given 
event; even though in business competition there can be several winners, there is 
usually one firm that fares better than the rest.  Regardless of the outcome the 
participants must avoid all forms of cheating. 
With regard to Kant’s Formula of Humanity Bowie noted that merely 
abstaining from coercion and trickery is inadequate because this is negative freedom.  
“Positive freedom…means developing one’s rational and moral capacities.  In 
interacting with others, we must not do anything to diminish or inhibit these uniquely 
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human capacities.”47 The dignity of persons arises from their autonomy and reason, 
which is the reason that Kant says we must always treat persons as ends-in-
themselves.  Bowie expounded on the need to respect persons in the organizational 
structures of workplaces in such a way that they are encouraged to grow to their full 
potential.  He wrote on the application of this maxim in labour contracts, designing 
meaningful work, and a morally based profit sharing plan.48 
We are conscious of the reality of this principle in our daily lives when we 
treat our spouses, partners, children, friends and relatives as persons whose identities 
we respect and love, and when we show consideration for work colleagues and 
strangers because they are fellow human beings.  The contradiction, disrespect for 
persons, if it were a universal principle, would make life intolerable.  It is clear that 
respect for persons is a moral obligation for all. 
Looking at the situation of banks, one would refine the maxim so that banks 
should make it their duty to develop and enhance the rational and moral capacities of 
their employees, who in turn will be motivated to act in similar manner towards all 
their customers.  In this way banks can respect the humanity in all people.   
The British philosopher Onora O’Neill raised an important practical measure 
of treating others as persons in whether they give their “actual consent to actions that 
affect them as morally significant.”49 As O’Neill points out, obvious cases of false 
consent occur under duress such as in rape or seduction.  But even in formal 
procedures, such as affixing signatures, consent can be voided even if the intent of the 
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documents does not conform to the understanding of the persons concerned.  This 
could arise due to misrepresentation on one side or ignorance on the other side.50  
Another difficulty “arises when the consent does not match the activities it 
supposedly legitimates.”  O’Neill gives an example of women in modern societies 
who have chosen marriage but have not really consented to a restriction of their life.51   
She also cites the problems of patients in medical ethics whose “abilities to consent 
and dissent are impaired.”52 
All these difficulties transpire regularly in banking situations, so it is critical 
that bankers always deal with customers as persons.   It is hypothesized in this thesis 
that a significant number of bank customers, especially those who are vulnerable due 
to economic, social, or age factors, are not able to give full consent to many contracts 
required in banking transactions.   
For the third formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative Bowie proposed the 
establishment of the business firm as a moral community modelled according to the 
kingdom of ends.  He suggested seven principles in the structure of such a company 
of which the most important are consideration of the interests of all stakeholders in 
every decision, primacy of the first two categorical imperatives in adopting any 
policies, and supremacy of justice in stakeholder relationships.53 While the kingdom 
of ends might have been construed as an ideal, several of the tenets put forward by 
Bowie have been espoused by some of the most admired corporations in their codes 
of ethical conduct.   
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Altman objected to a Kantian construct in business ethics because he 
contended that only persons could be moral agents with intentions and therefore a 
corporation, which, according to him, lacks intentionality and the capacity to reason, 
cannot be held morally accountable from a Kantian perspective.54 However, Peter 
French has taken the contrary position that corporations are intentional actors, which 
is necessary and sufficient for them to be deemed morally responsible.55  French 
contends that all corporations have well-defined internal decision-making systems 
that set the ground for ascribing moral agency to them.56 Soares agrees that 
corporations are morally responsible: 
corporations have rational reasons for behaving in certain ways because they have 
interests in pursuing their established corporate goals despite the temporary, 
conflicting self-interests of managers and directors…corporations are intentional 
actors, capable of being motivated to respond not only to internal challenges, but 
also to external ones.57 
 
The observation of Soares is especially relevant to the banking sector where a 
corporation through its board of directors deliberates and promulgates policies and 
procedures for implementation throughout the institution, but these issues are usually 
debated vigorously by the different competing groups before decisions are taken that 
reflect the most convincing arguments.  Such a decision system reflects rational 
behaviour. 
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H.  Social Contract Theories 
H.  1.  Contractarianism 
Although theories of the social contract, also known as contractarianism, were 
principally advocated by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, the ideas of Kant also had 
significant influence.58  Contractarianism is a normative approach to development of 
moral action.  As initially formulated, contract theories sought to explain the 
legitimacy of governments that stemmed from the consent of those governed 
formulated in a social contract, which becomes the foundation of moral norms.  The 
key elements are the initial imaginary position, when mutual agreement was reached 
between people and those who would govern them, and the portrayal of the parties to 
the pact in terms of reason and inclination to reach an accord. 
While the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ and the Rawlsian ‘original position’ are 
hypothetical and the social contract theory has generated the greatest impact on 
political philosophy, it is applicable as well to business ethics.  It is well suited to an 
analysis of ethical behaviour in banking because banks perform a vital function in 
every society and therefore operate under both implicit and explicit contracts vis-à-vis 
all stakeholders, who include, among others, customers, employees, the community, 
and shareholders.  Since the start of banking history people have turned to banks to 
deposit their savings, which have been derived from earnings from their labour or sale 
of their production or rental from their properties; in turn, the banks accept their roles 
as custodians of individuals’ wealth and undertake an explicit contract of 
responsibility to safeguard those assets.  On the other hand, banks seek their income 
by lending out these funds to other members of society who lack savings and, in these 
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dual roles, carry out the crucial function of financial intermediation between sources 
and users of money.  In their lending task they continue to retain explicit 
responsibility for prudently managing the assets with which they are entrusted and in 
addition assume prudential accountability for selecting appropriate borrowers.  
Therefore banks are expected to carefully screen prospective borrowers to ensure they 
have the financial capability to repay their debt.   
Contractarian theories assume that the contracting parties are rational and self-
interested without necessarily caring about the welfare of others.  There is 
furthermore the presupposition that such persons desire social interaction provided 
there is no requirement for self-sacrifice.   
Since its inception the banking state of affairs has always involved, on the one 
hand, powerful banks which have had access to significant capital in order to 
demonstrate trustworthiness and, on the other hand, customers who either have 
surplus funds or need thereof.  Even within a contractual agreement this has primarily 
been a relationship between unequal parties, so therefore regulatory authorities have 
been involved as participants in this social contract since early historical episodes in 
order to protect the interests of individual depositors and borrowers.  Relying upon 
both the explicit and implicit social contracts between banks and society, most 
national regulators have either written well-defined rules and guidelines or 
implemented a less rigid consultative system with recurrent reporting requirements.59 
The problems with the contractarian theory are highlighted by counter-
arguments of potential dilemmas arising out of either passions or rationality.  Jean 
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Hampton in commenting about rational choice noted the assumption of self-interest in 
contract theory when she compared the approaches of Hobbes and Kant. 
…whereas the Hobbesians’ use of contract language expresses the way in which 
moral and social policies should be rationally defined and defended, based on the 
interests people happen to have, the Kantians’ use of the contract is a way of 
expressing the idea that moral and social policies should be both rational and 
respectful of each person’s equal, autonomous nature.  For Kant, what is moral 
should also be rational; but what is rational may not be moral, and thus he insists 
that our social and political life should insure that rationality prevails within moral 
constraints…Kant insists that moral constraints are generated by the equal 
importance each of us has as end-in-ourselves…60 
 
When one views banking practices from Hampton’s perspective, it seems obvious 
that most firms normally operate with the objective of profit optimisation, which in 
some circumstances is detrimental to the interests of their customers, so this provides 
the rationale for introducing consumer protection.  
In his essay “Reason and Maximization” David Gauthier argues for moral 
constraint.  He acknowledges that economic man normally assumes a system of 
straightforward maximization, but, if we distinguish him as a rational creature, we 
must instead expect that he agree to restraints.  If one accepts that morality is rational, 
or at least does not go against reason, and morality implies some constraint on one’s 
designs, then the only option is to consent to limits on optimisation.  On such a basis 
of constrained maximization, as Gauthier asserts, “it is rational to restrain one’s 
pursuit of one’s own aims to fulfil an agreement to seek an optimal outcome 
unattainable by independent utility- maximization.”61  Such optimal behaviour might 
be described as the desired outcome in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.62 There are several 
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situations in life where straightforward optimisation is not the best solution, and the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is a good illustration. 
A very important insight provided by Gauthier is that “morality arises from 
market failure.”63 He argues that the world might be a better place if it were a 
perfectly competitive market, which indeed cannot be found in the real world.  In an 
idealistic laissez-faire there would be no need for moral constraints.  As the actual 
evidence will demonstrate in the case study, the problem of American bank regulators 
for at least the decade until 2007 was their unequivocal faith in the power of free 
market forces.  As Gauthier says: “Conceived as an ideal type, the perfect 
market…guarantees the coincidence of equilibrium and optimality, and so its 
structure is the very antithesis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.”64 
 
H.  2.  Contractualism 
A different approach to the social contract has been labelled contractualism.  A 
contractarian would seek to maximize his own interests in dealing with others.  A 
contractualist pursues his own goals in a manner that he can justify them to others 
who are seeking their own goals. 
                                                                                                                                       
“The prisoner’s dilemma (attributed to A.  W.  Tucker) is an illustration of a two-person, non-
cooperative, nonzero-sum game; non-cooperative because agreements are not binding (or enforceable), 
and nonzero-sum because it is not the case that what one person gains the other loses.  Thus imagine 
two prisoners who are brought before the attorney general and interrogated separately.  They both 
know that if neither confesses, they will receive a short sentence for a lesser offence and spend a year 
in prison; but that if one confesses and turns state’s evidence, he will be released, the other receiving a 
particularly heavy term of ten years; if both confess each gets five years.  In this situation, assuming 
mutually disinterested motivation, the most reasonable course of action for them – that neither should 
confess – is unstable.  To protect himself, if not to try to further his own interests, each has a sufficient 
motive to confess, whatever the other does.  Rational decisions from the point of view of each lead to a 
situation where both prisoners are worse off.”  
63 David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986), p. 84. 
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Under the Kantian perspective we must always treat persons as ends and not 
merely means, whereas contractualists try to identify moral doctrines that all rational 
agents would accept under certain conditions.  Two contemporary philosophers, 
Thomas Scanlon and John Rawls, present varying contractualist systems.  Rawls 
speaks of justice as fairness for which he states two principles. 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both 
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to 
positions and offices open to all.65 
 
The first principle makes a case for providing fundamental rights and liberties to 
every person without encroaching on anybody’s liberties.  Under the second principle 
according to Rawls “the distribution of wealth and income…must be consistent with 
both the liberties of equal citizenship and equality of opportunity.”66 
Rawls employs a unique approach whereby he formulates an assumption that 
the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance. 
They do not know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case 
and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general 
considerations…no one knows his place in society, his class position or social 
status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and 
abilities, his intelligence and strength…nor his conception of the good, the 
particulars of his rational plan of life, or even …his aversion to risk or liability to 
optimism or pessimism...the parties do not know the particular circumstances of 
their own society…its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization 
and culture…(nor) to which generation they belong. 
…the only particular facts which the parties know is that their society is subject to 
the circumstances of justice and whatever this implies.67 
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When people situated in the ‘original position’ behind a veil of ignorance are forced 
to negotiate a social contract, they must ask themselves how to distribute the benefits 
and burdens of social cooperation given that they are ignorant of who they are and yet 
are members of this society.  Because each individual realises he could turn out to be 
anyone, he would be inclined to care for all people.  According to Rawls, self-interest 
is transmuted by a veil of ignorance into a commitment to justice, which he takes to 
mean as fairness to all.  Indeed, if all bankers were to think that they could be on the 
receiving end of actions they carried out, then they would be highly inclined to ensure 
fairness at all times. 
Scanlon differs in that his theory does not bring a veil of ignorance into play.  
The individual is aware of his personal circumstances but in lieu of self-interest has a 
compulsion to justify himself to everyone else.  According to Scanlon there is a 
fundamental moral impulse behind the need of individuals to justify themselves to 
others. 
Scanlonian contractualism varies from utilitarianism in several respects.  It 
concerns itself with what we owe to each other, not with all questions of morality.  It 
also looks at individuals rather than net results for a total population.  Instead of 
looking at happiness or well being as the basis for a moral code, it acknowledges 
personal reasons.  While utilitarianism looks at aggregating utilities to evaluate if 
there might be greater happiness than harm caused, contractualism looks at each 
unique individual.  As Scanlon says: 
…our thinking about right and wrong is structured by a different kind of 
motivation, namely the aim of finding principles that others, insofar as they too 
have this aim, could not possibly reject.  This gives us a direct reason to be 
concerned with other people’s points of view: not because we might, for all we 
know actually be them, or because we might occupy their position in some other 
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possible world, but in order to find principles that they, as well as we, have reason 
to accept.68 
 
The actions of contractualist individuals stem out of self-regard as well as respect for 
others.  A component of what we owe others is support for their interests. 
Some bankers might suppose that they have adopted an analogous process 
through their corporate social responsibility programmes, but these fall short of true 
contractualist principles.  These activities are intended to provide support to the 
communities but many of them appear to be public relations exercises, some of which 
entail sponsorship of musical performances and sporting events.  It would seem to 
external observers that there is only nominal effort at some banks to find out what 
would truly benefit each person, in contrast to an aggregative utilitarian approach of 
funding for entertainment, which has its appeal in producing more ‘happy’ people 
than ‘unhappy’ ones.  However, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, there are some 
financial institutions that profess contractualist principles and seem to genuinely care 
for all stakeholders.  
 
H. 3.  Social Contract Methodology in Business Ethics 
Tom Donaldson was the first one in 1982 to apply the social contract approach to 
business ethics in his inquiry into the features of corporate obligations.  He found that 
only contractarianism could serve as a practical concept in business ethics, while 
other philosophical ethical theories were too general for application to the business 
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environment.69  Donaldson and Dunfee subsequently modified their concept into the 
Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT), which relied on a “hypothetical social 
contract used as heuristic device and extant social contracts based within living 
communities.”70 
Donaldson made two assumptions in the ISCT.  Firstly, he assumed that the 
contracting parties are aware and supportive of “bounded moral rationality”, which 
brings the concept of bounded economic rationality to the ethical level.71  This is 
similar to the position of Gauthier that we saw above wherein he said that rational 
man would accept a constraint on economic maximization. 
The second assumption in the ISCT is that global contracting parties would, in 
acknowledgement of bounded moral rationality, appreciate the “need for a 
community-based moral fabric for both the generation of wealth and the maintenance 
of an environment conducive to a good and productive life.”72  Given these two 
assumptions the important questions are whether the members of the community have 
truly consented to the terms of the covenant and whether their consent was freely 
given, with sufficient information and no intimidation. 
Since the terms of such a covenant in a corporation would be embodied in a 
corporate code of ethics, the question therefore arises as to how well such a code 
represents the ethical norms of that community.  Donaldson believes that the social 
contract approach is compatible with other ethical theories, including utilitarianism, 
deontology, and virtue ethics. 
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Marens recently commented on the methodology supported by Donaldson and 
Dunfee, arguing that there was a need to revert to the Rawlsian intent of justice as 
fairness that requires active government involvement in order to promote social 
justice.   Marens observed that the norms and values in the financial industry did not 
avert socially damaging conduct as soon as enforcement of regulations was 
downgraded and government assumed a permissive attitude.  He claimed therefore 
that active involvement of government is necessary in order to ensure social justice 
and safeguard the interests of the weaker members of society.73 
 
I.  Virtue Ethics 
Several philosophers assert that ethical theories and codes of conduct derived from 
them are not much help on the practical level, that universal knowledge of what is 
right has limited value74 and that Aristotelian Phronesis or practical wisdom is the 
essential virtue because, according to Aristotle, it is “concerned with action about 
things that are good or bad for a human being…Virtue is intrinsic to the human being 
and comes naturally without application of ethical rules.”75  Moberg defined practical 
wisdom as “a disposition toward cleverness in crafting morally excellent responses to, 
or in anticipation of, challenging particularities.”  He relies on Aristotle’s meaning of 
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moral excellence as that established by moral communities consisting of individuals 
who strive to lead good lives.76 
Along this line of thinking Moberg wrote: “Morally excellent action requires 
doing the right things in the right way to the right extent to the right person at the 
right time for the right reason.”77  This approach tells us that the importance lies in a 
person’s character, in what he or she has made a habit in day-to-day living.  The 
average person does not need to have studied or learned ethics in a classroom or in a 
corporate seminar to know that it is wrong to do certain actions:  to lie, to steal, to 
cheat others on the basis of rules and regulations everyone has accepted, to cause 
injury to others.  In fact, most people would not have studied ethical principles before 
embarking on their careers or during the course of their lives, but they know 
intrinsically what are good and bad actions. 
Since virtue is developed through habitual action, Nyberg conducted his 
empirical research on everyday work practices at two Australian call centres to 
determine how the employees handle routine tasks that require ethical responses.  He 
found that it is possible to inculcate phronesis or practical wisdom in the work place 
when workers discuss cases, share experiences, and evaluate alternative solutions.  He 
discovered that these situations encouraged people to choose ethical conduct whereas 
ethical codes and regulations only gave rise to compliance but could not cover all 
possible dilemmas.  He concluded that companies should develop practical wisdom 
among employees by having them question and reflect upon ethical codes so that they 
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understand good action and take responsibility for making their own moral 
decisions.78 
Moberg stated that practical wisdom must be grounded in a person’s “desire 
for moral excellence…that the person has a strong moral self, i.e. the person highly 
values integrity as a self construal…[and has] a disposition to take responsibility for 
the good in situations.”79  
 
 J.  Specific Concerns in Finance and Banking Ethics 
Although not much has been published exclusively about banking ethics on its own, 
John Boatright,80a business ethicist, has written several critical analyses of finance 
ethics, which encompasses three spheres of activity: financial markets that are 
comprised of trading in all forms of currency, debt, equity, and hybrid or synthetic 
instruments; financial services that are offered by financial intermediaries such as 
commercial and investment banks; financial management which is the role in a 
corporation concerned with boosting shareholder wealth. 
The entire arena of finance impacts on the economy and society and is 
therefore closely regulated in all countries.  However not all ethical concerns can be 
covered by laws.  In financial markets legal provisions are concerned with ensuring 
fairness and preventing fraud.  In financial services the ethical concerns relate to 
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fiduciary responsibilities.  Financial management issues relate to good corporate 
governance that considers all stakeholders.81 
Boatright noted that a principal cause of unethical behaviour in financial 
intermediaries is conflict of interest when banks and their employees place their own 
interests ahead of those of their customers.  He pointed out that trust is critical in 
financial services.82  The empirical research and the case study in this thesis certainly 
validate the persistence of conflicts of interest in banks and the frequent breaches. 
Duska and Clarke agreed that a major apprehension in financial services stems 
from conflicts of interest.83  They drew attention to two important ethical principles 
that ought to be practised in most cases of financial services, namely: avoid deception 
and fraud, and honour one’s commitments.84 
The philosopher Robert Solomon emphasized the importance of trust in all 
human relationships, asserting “the fact that trusting is an ongoing process, a 
reciprocal (and not one-way) relation in which both parties as well as the relationship 
(and the society) are transformed through trusting.”85  He went on to elucidate that 
trust is often confused in business with a contractual relationship.  Solomon criticised 
the business practice of thinking of contracts as the basis of trust because it could be 
argued that contracts often indicated lack of trust.  Solomon pointed out that with the 
inclusion of enforcement provisions and sanctions, “it would seem that a contract is 
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both more and less than merely a trusting agreement.  It is protection based on 
distrust.”86 
Trust is extremely important in banking because people must place their trust 
in a financial institution before they accept any financial services; banks must 
likewise trust their customers and treat them as persons when they offer their services, 
whether taking deposits or extending loans; banks should earn the trust of other 
financial institutions if they are to successfully obtain funding in the inter-bank 
market.87  As Chapters 6 and 7 will demonstrate, a breakdown of trust was part of the 
reason for the collapse of the global credit system. 
This chapter has discussed how philosophers have viewed ethical theories on 
money and endeavours to earn profits thereon.  There was the ancient proscription by 
Aristotle against receiving interest on money that continued into the Middle Ages in 
the Christian churches and till the present time in the Islamic faith.  With the spread 
of banking services interest payments gradually became more socially and religiously 
accepted (though not in Islamic fundamentalism).   
Ethical theories were investigated: some defined the right action in terms of 
the maximum amount of utility and happiness it could bring, or what became know as 
utilitarianism, which sought to establish moral conduct for individuals; some 
approaches argued for freedom from government controls in favour of the pursuit of 
self-interest with the contention that good consequences would inevitably result from 
laissez-faire; others invoked universal principles that could be gleaned through reason 
in the Kantian tradition that sought to identify duties that were incumbent on 
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individuals.  Finally there were arguments in favour of virtue ethics or practical 
wisdom as a necessary virtue that ought to be encouraged in workplaces.   
While the aim of this thesis is to determine the ethical underpinning of banks, 
there is a realization that many philosophers and ethicists advocate specific theories 
that ought to govern the conduct of firms and banks.  In trying to discover the ethical 
considerations, there is the recognition that pluralistic ethical motives might be 
operative in the actual way of thinking and practices of bankers.  This might suggest 
that individuals and institutions rely on a combination of varying ethical perspectives 
that include, for example, deontological considerations in designing codes of conduct, 
utilitarianism in planning products, virtue ethics in situational problems.  The 
empirical research and the case study will highlight different ethical concerns, many 
of which are the same across the various theories that have been discussed.  Many of 
the concerns will reappear in the empirical material independently of their ethical 
elaboration.  This implies a basic ethical framework is in place that is relatively robust 
even in the face of variations in metaethical position.  Therefore a framework of three 
principal values is proposed as essential for a bank that truly espouses ethical 
conduct: responsibility, fairness, and honesty.   
Banks have diverse obligations: to the regulators in terms of compliance, to 
shareholders in observing good corporate governance and achievement of corporate 
goals including profitability, to other stakeholders including employees and 
communities so that their needs are satisfied and they are adequately protected.  
Above all, a strongly held opinion is that most important is the moral responsibility of 
a bank towards its customers.  The next chapter will explain that, on the one hand, 
individuals need and trust their bank, and, on the other hand, a bank would not exist 
without its customers.  A responsible institution must therefore consider possible 
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future eventualities that could affect its customers because only by looking after 
customers can it maintain its integrity and demonstrate its trustworthiness. 
A bank should treat all its customers fairly so that no individual or entity is 
disadvantaged.  It is an economic reality that there are gross economic inequalities 
among individuals, corporations, and nations.  The gravest drawbacks afflicting 
individuals are economic hardship, which renders them prone to manipulative 
practices by unscrupulous bankers, and financial illiteracy that could lead to their 
inability to comprehend the intricacies of financial packages being offered to them.88 
Transparency or honesty is a value that everyone regards as highly important 
in any bank, in its reporting to its shareholders, in its interaction with its community 
and employees and other stakeholders, and most specially in its dealings with its 
customers.  A bank should clearly explain the risks and returns, benefits and potential 
losses of every financial product it proposes to each and every customer.  As an 
integral component of this transparency the bank and its employees should declare 
their actual and prospective financial interests, that is, how much they would receive 
by way of commissions and bonuses if the customers were to accept the financial 
products on offer.89 
The above-stated values of responsibility, fairness, and transparency are what 
would be expected of ethical persons and institutions in every society.  Therefore the 
same principles should be applied in examining banking conduct, and higher 
standards should be demanded due to the trust that customers place in banks. 
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89 There will be references to excessive bonuses in the chapter on the crisis. 
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Part B.  The Idea of Ethics in Banking: Self Conceptions and 
Critique 
CHAPTER 3.  ETHICAL UNDERSTANDING IN THE 
BANKING SECTOR 
Chapter 2 discussed the development of modern banking and the case was made that 
banks occupy a central role in society and that their services are essential to 
communities.  The previous chapter also briefly reviewed the dominant ethical 
theories as they relate to the banking sphere.  Part B will examine the way in which 
the bankers themselves view their activities.  Before and after the interviews 
undertaken with bankers much publicly available material has appeared in press 
releases from the banks or speeches or interviews given by prominent bankers.   
Certain banks also publish reports on their corporate social responsibility activities.  
Therefore the general public has been regularly treated to stories that banks’ 
publicists wish to circulate.  On the other hand, some investigative reporters have 
frequently unearthed and written about alleged unethical conduct of banks.  The 
purpose of these interviews was primarily to engage with senior bankers in an earnest 
dialogue about their views on banking and about actual banking conduct.  In view of 
the vast scope of banking a decision was made to limit the focus to banks in Australia 
and Hong Kong for the interviews.  Two sets of common interview questions were 
designed that were submitted in advance to the selected banks.  One set was intended 
for chief executives or other senior line executive officers.90  The other set was geared 
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to operational staff executives responsible for back-up or support operations.91  Both 
questionnaires are attached as appendices.  In some instances written responses had 
been prepared prior to the meetings.  In many situations there was a lively interactive 
discussion with the bankers.92   
Many institutions were highly cooperative in providing the opportunity to 
meet with several individuals who each had varying organisational responsibilities 
and consequently diverse perspectives.  Although most of the organisations 
interviewed were long-established banks, a few were not.  These included a credit 
union (which would later merge with another one), a former community bank that has 
evolved into a full-service commercial bank (and would later acquire another 
institution), a major international non-bank lender that did not depend on customer 
deposits for its funding, senior bank association representatives from Hong Kong and 
Australia, a banking ombudsman, and key officers of a banking regulator.  The 
ensuing discussion shall analyse each of the key product areas and services covered 
during the interviews. 
 
A.  Retail Deposits 
The interviews commenced with reviewing retail deposits because this is one product 
used by all individuals who avail themselves of banking services.  One could actually 
say that it is a necessity for all people.  This is the primary product that truly requires 
trust on the part of customers.  Although most people in developed economies might 
assume that money and banking are stable, this has not been the historical experience, 
                                                
91 Appendix B. 
92 The transcripts of the actual interviews, which are listed in Appendix C, have been retained by the 
author, but excerpts can made available upon request.. 
52 
and it is instructive to review the situation in Hong Kong, which has witnessed 
significant volatility over the recent quarter century, namely, 1981: interest rate of 
22% (considered very high at that time); 1982: interest rate of 17 % (still high); 1983: 
Sino-British agreement on hand-over of Hong Kong and the steep drop of the HK$; 
1987: stock market crash; 1991: bank runs on Citibank and Standard Chartered Bank; 
1997: the Asian financial crisis and start of property collapse; 1998: the Hong Kong 
government’s intervention in the stock market; 2000: the bursting of the Internet 
bubble, 2003: the SARS respiratory disease epidemic.93  These were economic crises 
that precipitated financial panic on the part of bank customers and investors, and in 
having undergone and survived these numerous crises, the people of Hong Kong have 
matured.94  During this process of maturation, a senior banker attested that many 
individuals have come to understand the nature of risks and are therefore very careful 
in their selection of banks. 
In the view of some interviewees the banks in Hong Kong have emerged quite 
strong in coming through the disasters.  The local individuals have also been imbued 
with the intangible notion that China supports the continuing stability of Hong Kong, 
an idea that was absent prior to the hand-over in 1997.  This implicit understanding 
has been gradually cultivated as Hong Kong has drifted closer towards China in terms 
of trade and investments in both directions, and Chinese companies issuing initial 
private offerings on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  A degree of comfort with the 
Chinese mainland has been nurtured among the Hong Kong people. 
Within this context individuals have regained trust in banks.  They have had 
good reason to trust the HSBC and the Standard Chartered, because these have both 
                                                
93 The global credit crisis that first struck America in September 2007 quickly spread to Europe and 
Asia, including Hong Kong and Australia.  At the time of writing in April 2009 the whole world was in 
the grip of the worst recession since the Great Depression of 1930. 
94 Transcript HK 7.   
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been in existence in the previous colony for more than a century and a half, and they 
have come to accept that the Bank of China is fully backed by the Chinese 
government.  They have also welcomed the small and medium-sized banks because 
the introduction of deposit insurance further solidified confidence in the banking 
industry.  In the view of a former chief executive of Dragon Bank, Hong Kong has 
come out of these calamities as a major international financial centre; whereas it was 
previously considered as a rival of Singapore, it has emerged much stronger.95  
 
A.  1.  Trust 
The Dragon Bank CEO in Hong Kong commenced the discussion with the avowal 
that the entire culture of the bank is founded on ethics and integrity; he recollected his 
first day in the bank some thirty years ago when he was taught that personal integrity 
is everything.96  Over the years this current Dragon chief executive has often 
reflected, in this age of commoditized banking products, on what banks have to offer, 
what distinguishes them from each other and why customers would select one over 
another, and he has concluded that the key lies in trust.  The task of a bank is to 
protect that trust. 
In this regard, this Dragon banker equates trust with reputation.  While he says 
that banks do a good job in managing risks, he deems the most important risk is that 
of loss of reputation.  Most institutions highlight credit risk, market risk, operational 
risks, but not many talk about reputational risk.  This CEO believes that Dragon 
Bank’s reputation is factored by investors into its share price, thus explaining its price 
differential with another similarly large global financial group.  The local institution 
                                                
95 Ibid. Code names are used if reference is made to interviewed banks.  
96 Transcript HK 8.  Code name = Dragon. 
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is not perceived as “progressive or dynamic” but rather as “conservative, safe, 
steady,” one that relies on solid results but is self-effacing. 
 
A.  2.  Product Differentiation  
One might think a retail deposit is a straightforward product that would be similar 
among all banks, but in reality each institution approaches it differently and offers a 
wide range of availability to suit a range of transactional needs of individuals.  Banks 
target deposits heavily because these represent the lowest cost of funding that enables 
them to extend personal credit, housing loans, and corporate finance to other 
customers.  These products come in various forms depending on the frequency of 
financial inflows and outflows for the depositors.  Those individuals who tend to 
enjoy steady inflows and do not require all or most of the money immediately are 
especially courted by the banks with offers of attractive interest rates.  These are 
frequently in the form of time deposits that require a reasonably sizeable minimum 
sum of money with a minimum deposit period.  These are savings products that are 
structured similarly as investments, and are widely promoted in print advertising.  
The problem with these is that the individual has to either read the brochures carefully 
or be sure that the sales representative explains the features in comprehensible detail.  
Such advertising could sometimes be deemed misrepresentation on the part of the 
bank involved if it lacks transparency or the offers are deceptive.  The depositor 
would normally forfeit the promised interest earnings if she were to withdraw funds 
prior to a pre-agreed termination date.  An example occurred in 2006 when a major 
Australian bank was sued over its misleading newspaper advertisement for such a 
time deposit, causing it to promptly withdraw the ad.  Many so-called higher yield 
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accounts allow the depositor to occasionally transfer a portion of the funds on term 
deposit to an operating account that she would use to make normal payments, but the 
higher interest rates are forfeited. 
Retail deposits have therefore become complex products requiring thick 
informational material so that their features can be adequately clarified.  Bank sales 
personnel also need to receive good training.  Marketing techniques are heavily 
utilised to promote the varying deposit types, which are typically provided attractive 
sounding brand names associated with the sponsoring financial institutions.  There is 
intense competition among the banks to set interest rates for maximum appeal to 
prospective depositors.  Reliance on a wide physical branch network has also been 
deemed a crucial factor in deposit gathering by most banks.  The conventional 
wisdom is that people like to see a branch near their place of work or residence even 
if they might never enter the bank’s premises.  One exception has been a foreign 
bank, ING Direct97, which has deliberately established itself as an online institution in 
Australia without any visible branches.  To compensate for its lack of a physical 
presence it has reportedly offered higher interest rates. 
The thinking of most banks is that products are commodities so they believe 
that decisions are based on price, which is why much bank advertising speaks about 
interest rates.  However, based on its research, Kangaroo Bank, one of the major 
banks in Australia believes that only 20 – 30 % of people make their decisions 
fundamentally on the basis of price, which means that 70 – 80 % of customers select 
financial services according to non-price variables.  This institution believes that 
other factors enter into these decisions.98 
                                                
97 This was not an interviewee. 
98 Transcript AU 4. Code name = Kangaroo. 
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The bank finds this an opportunity to do something for people (1) who find 
banking unnecessarily complex, or (2) who are time-poor.  These are customers who 
feel confused and frustrated about the level of service they receive in terms of the 
human connection.  This retail bank therefore stresses convenience, which is what 
clients experience when they are served well.  This is about making it easy for them: 
not just how long the process takes but how they feel about the process.  The head of 
consumer banking at Kangaroo Bank attributes the following line of thinking to retail 
banking clients: 
‘Do I feel I have been listened to?  Do I respect the company with which I am 
dealing?  Do I have to repeat myself all the time or do they remember things 
about me?  Are they nearby and available either physically or virtually when I 
want them to be?’99  
 
The bank tries to deliver a different experience to customers such that they genuinely 
feel it easy to deal with the institution.  There are several ways of demonstrating this: 
longer hours, more conveniently located branches, better trained staff in branches – 
more empathetic and good listeners, products that are simpler to understand.  Rather 
than merely making vague assertions about convenience, they give people tangible 
reasons to choose the bank that are not about price, such as (1) keeping a call centre 
open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, which has won them an award as the best call 
centre of any company in Australia for three years in a row; (2) extending hours in all 
branches at major shopping centres; (3) opening new branches (40 in the previous 2 
years, 40 more in 2006); (4) 500 new ATM’s; (5) simplifying products, such as the 
new Visa debit card for those who do not have credit cards. 
Kangaroo Bank has made its brochures slimmer by getting rid of excessive 
product complexity.  It prefers to reduce the number of products rather than add new 
                                                
99 Ibid. 
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ones.  In trying to simplify products it makes sure it addresses the core needs of 
customers and train their staff.  Kangaroo realizes that most people do not like 
reading brochures.  This bank has characterized its brand positioning in terms of 
convenience, simplicity, and responsibility. 
Another feature of deposit accounts is the use of ATM (automated teller 
machine) or EFTPOS (electronic funds transfer at point of sale) cards to access one’s 
account.  Australian banks restrict ATM withdrawals and EFTPOS transactions to a 
total maximum daily limit of A$ 1,000 – 1,5000 regardless of how much in balances 
there might be in the customer’s account.  The reason given is the desire to protect the 
depositor in case the card is lost or stolen.100  One might consider this unsympathetic 
to the individual customer and illogical because there is no such restriction on credit 
cards, which can likewise be lost or stolen. 
In contrast, Hong Kong banks generally allow each deposit customer to 
withdraw cash up to HK$ 20,000 per day and transact up to HK$ 50,000 per day 
through a debit card for each account.  Based on current foreign exchange rates on 5 
September 2008 that maximum daily limit is equivalent to A$ 10,965.61.  This is 
significantly higher than limits in Australia.    
Why do Hong Kong banks allow average deposit customers to withdraw cash 
and execute cash transfers at a level in excess of ten times the amount permitted by 
their Australian counterparts?  Perhaps the explanation comes from the practice of the 
motto KYC (Know Your Customer), which was mentioned by all the study 
participants in Hong Kong.  One could take the view that in the process of getting to 
know their customers these banks have also developed a relationship of trust.      
                                                
100 Ibid. 
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One major bank, Lion, considers its brand name vital and advertises it 
extensively; it promises to deliver on the brand promise of being the right partner.  
The bank describes its values, which are reinforced daily in the institution, as 
creative, courageous, responsive, international, and trustworthy.  Its self-image, the 
way it positions itself as being the right partner and leading the way in several 
continents, and these values are fundamental to the processes of the bank.101 
Thus, when a prospective client walks in through the door, they expect that 
person to be the right client who fits within the target market because their marketing 
is focussed on select customers; they are not a mass marketer.  Lion regards account 
opening a complex process because of strict procedures required for ascertaining 
identities and averting money laundering, but it has well-trained personnel who are 
able to assist new clients in picking the correct products. 
Another significant bank will not even entertain an application for a deposit 
without a letter of introduction from an existing well-regarded customer of the bank.  
Due to its strong reputation and active marketing this bank attracts numerous 
customers that are serviced by its trained personnel who explicate the numerous 
complex financial products on offer.  Having operated countless branches for a long 
period of time this group had developed strict internal standards on ascertaining the 
identities and states of affairs of their prospective clients before any requirements 
were embodied into guidelines or statutory rules.  Because of this process of getting 
to know their clients well, it was straightforward for them, on the one hand, to meet 
customer demands, and, on the other hand, to comply with regulations on anti-money 
laundering and prevention of corrupt practices, when these were enacted.  They 
believe that the bank has effective controls and monitoring procedures in place.  The 
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bank staff must develop the relationship with the new customers starting from the 
initial step of account opening while at the same time being fully aware of the 
customers’ rights as well as the need to preclude fraudulent transactions.  One would 
infer that it is this criterion and process of KYC that enables Hong Kong banks to set 
more generous cash withdrawal and transactional daily limits. 
Although it was not included as a topic for discussion, the Dragon Bank CEO 
referred to private banking as an area that is potentially troublesome from an ethical 
perspective.102  This belief probably stemmed from observations that private bankers 
tend to be obsequious toward their clients and inhibit themselves from asking 
questions on the origin or use of funds, which could very well be illicit. This CEO 
does not condone such practices.  At the time of the Hong Kong interviews some 
newspapers reported that authorities were investigating substantial (possibly 
illegitimate) bank deposits under fictitious names that allegedly belonged to the 
former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.   
One may well agree that the attention and explanation given by retail 
personnel in a bank branch is extremely important in enabling clients to select the 
correct deposit product given its features and costs.  An investigation of several 
branches of different banks will illustrate that there are frequent queues of people 
waiting for tellers so they can execute transactions.  There are occasionally customer 
service representatives who assist in account opening or specific problems, though 
there may also be queues.  The typical bank assistant could experience time pressure 
in having to attend to multiple tasks: getting to know the customers, not only in 
verifying identities but also in trying to learn about their financial needs and wishes; 
explaining product features, including costs and risks; effecting a sale of product or 
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service.   While handling all these tasks the representative must likewise look after the 
interests of everyone else waiting to be served.  There might be missed opportunities 
on the part of the banks because they never attempted to truly get to know the clients 
in order to understand how they could address their requirements.  Worse still, the 
explanation provided to them might be inadequate and lead to ill-considered 
decisions. 
One area where some banks display a pandering attitude towards depositors is 
the installation of ATM outlets at casinos and racetracks.  A retired chief executive of 
a major bank, Kangaroo, commented that the dilemma is between controlling problem 
gambling and the individual’s right to access his money when and if he wants it.  He 
is therefore in favour of setting up ATMs at casinos because in his view “it is difficult 
to protect people against themselves.”103  One may judge this as an ethically 
irresponsible attitude because it greatly facilitates gambling particularly for 
individuals who may not be aware of the risks or their possible addiction to this vice.  
Conversely it was appropriate ethical thinking behind the decision of a credit union to 
refuse to install ATMs at casinos; the institution considered it wrong to make it easy 
for customers to withdraw cash in order to gamble. 
Two Australian banks, which consented to interviews, were encouraging in 
the manner they differ from other institutions.  Quoll is a newly licensed medium-
sized bank catering principally to individuals and small and medium scale companies.  
Its distinguishing characteristic is its ownership by pension funds and employee 
groups, which shapes the underlying values of the organisation.104 
There are three principles that guide Quoll’s operations: 
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1. The payment of commissions is rejected in the remuneration of sales staff, 
so they are not compelled to achieve particular product sales targets. 
2. There is a proactive cultural alignment, which ensures that the sales staff 
understand that their specific market is very distinct, consisting of 
members of unions and super funds and their families, working 
Australians, and that it is a privilege to have this relationship with them.  
There is a commitment to work with these stakeholders.  This means that 
the sales personnel would not wish to tarnish their integrity or put it at risk 
by behaving in an unacceptable manner.  This culture means that, if they 
sell a product that is not suitable for the customer and that person 
complains to his union or super fund, it could prove damaging for the 
bank.  It is not in the bank’s interest to sell a client something that does not 
actually meet his needs. 
3. The bank is sufficiently confident about the structure and quality of its 
products and its values and business model so that it has no reservations 
about the appropriateness of its product offers for most people in most 
cases.  In this respect, independent rating agencies have evaluated 
individual products as very good. 
While keeping the above principles in mind, the bank competes with the 
market on interest rates.  Its products have to be competitive not just in structure but 
also on service and price.  One forms a positive view of this bank’s avowal that the 
products it offers to customers are simple, transparent and equitable.  This is an 
ethical stance that treats clients as persons.  The effort to achieve cultural alignment 
between bank employees and customers is praiseworthy because it helps to foster 
integrity in the bank. 
62 
The other institution operated as a successful building society in its 
community for well over a century but several years ago it embarked on an 
assessment of its future direction, analysing its strengths and weaknesses and its 
external perception.  The top executives desired a strategy that would differentiate the 
institution and provide added value to the customers and communities.  The outcome 
of that strategy has been a highly unique and thriving banking practice.  They felt that 
their strengths were the institution’s community values and customer focus, but the 
drawbacks included limited brand recognition, restricted distribution and coverage, 
and a relatively small size, which precluded a fully conventional approach to 
expansion.   
The building society’s strategic review led it to conclude that banks were 
originally formed to help build affluent towns by managing the funds of those with 
excess capital and channelling them to those with creative ideas and aspirations but 
little capital.  However research revealed that present-day customers felt the current 
banking system was focused on its own objectives rather than those of customers or 
individual communities. 
This bank’s CEO was aware that his institution’s success was inextricably 
linked to the success of its customers and communities, so if they could assist the 
development and success of each town they could secure their own future success.  
These community bankers therefore directed their attention to the concerns of 
Australian country towns.  They learned that most communities are exporters of 
capital and have little capacity and influence to retain or attract capital inflows.  The 
community bankers believed that a new business model was required that would 
involve greater community participation and actualise better capital flow strategies.  
They realised that they would need to help re-create more self-reliant communities.   
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The community bank opted to build a world-class banking organisation for all 
stakeholders with an aim on contribution and with a clear difference.  This gave birth 
to the concept of a community bank within a national network in which there are 
thousands of community directors and thousands more of ‘local’ shareholders.  Each 
community branch takes the form of a limited public company whose investors are 
local people from within the community who have committed to buying into their 
proposed branch.  One principal requirement of the bank is that the community 
demonstrate broad based community buy-in.  Typically 250 – 400 individuals invest 
in the local company to establish their branch.  The bank itself does not become a 
shareholder in this company but rather a highly committed business partner 
supporting the network.105 
This community bank structure has created new employment, attracted 
numerous customers, and in many cases generated local profits and dividends for 
local shareholders and the community.  While the community branches originate the 
business, loan officers in the bank proper make the credit decisions.  As a result of the 
achievements of the franchise branches, the communities have received additional 
revenues that have enabled them to provide additional financial support to local 
entities such as schools, fire brigades, aged care homes, and business districts to 
attract professional services. 
This is an example of a bank that has produced a triple bottom line success 
story as a result of its strategy to focus on the community while building a world-class 
bank with high-grade products.  Such an approach, which is predicated on 
sustainability of the communities and the environment, has also brought the bank 
financial returns. 
                                                
105 Information supplied in email.  Unfortunately there is no transcript because of the poor quality of 
the recording.   
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The chief executive stated that his bank does best in its being able to connect 
with its customers.  He considers the bank’s most important role is that of listening to 
what the customer needs.  In this respect they are able to offer the right products for 
all customers.  The community bank CEO proudly noted that in an earlier period they 
had introduced the access card or debit card to Australia, so that clients could easily 
gain access to their funds.  In other words, it promoted convenience rather than 
reliance on financing from credit cards.  This bank has been independently rated the 
highest in customer satisfaction among all financial institutions in Australia. 
In the analysis of bank practices relating to retail deposits in both Australia 
and Hong Kong, bankers stress the importance of getting to know their customers 
well, listening to them, and trying to understand their needs, but what seems to 
distinguish the admirable ones is that they have imbued a culture within the 
organisations that encourages management and employees to relate to, and empathize 
with, their customers.  These banks have cultivated trust. 
 
B.  Credit Cards and Personal Loans 
From one point of view credit cards have been prime instruments of heightened 
consumer spending and increased levels of consumer debt.  Banks and other financial 
companies compete fiercely for a slice of the credit card market with many of them 
freely giving away the cards with minimal credit checking on the prospective 
cardholders.  Many institutions offer credit cards to young individuals, who most 
likely would still be in school or university with little or no means of independent 
income and would therefore be at risk if they incurred financial obligations. 
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Senior Hong Kong bankers at Rooster admitted that credit cards are a difficult 
problem area because of high acquisition106 expenses of HK$ 400 – 500 per card, the 
servicing cost, and the write-offs which had risen to a peak of 11% of outstanding 
receivables but in late 2006 were at 3 – 4%.  The acquisition expense relates to gifts 
presented to all new cardholders.  Due to market competition and a desire to entice 
new customers they try to offer attractive gifts. 
The youngest cardholders are 18 years old, which is the minimum legal age.  
Rooster is active among students, claiming to be the second largest at universities.  
The key acquisitions occur at road shows at locations oriented towards young people.  
Much of this bank’s credit card income originates from the young customers, who 
tend to roll over their credit card obligations and are known as ‘revolvers’, unlike the 
professionals and mature ones, who normally pay their entire bills on time and are 
thus referred to as ‘transactors’.  The allusion here is that credit cardholders who are 
less capable of repaying the full amount of their obligations pay interest while those 
who earn more enjoy the benefits of interest-free credit during the period prior to the 
statement date.  Needless to say, those who are most financially disadvantaged 
probably default on their payments, are charged penalties, and have to pay higher 
interest rates.  This is a case of the poor subsidizing the rich.   
Problems could potentially develop with cardholders who lack the self-
restraint and overspend to the point that they have difficulty repaying their 
obligations, although these bankers commented that the Hong Kong customers used 
their credit cards primarily for convenience rather than borrowing.  Some banks stated 
that, due to fierce competition, annual fees were usually waived in Hong Kong in 
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order to attract customers.  But interest rates on credit card debt are very high in both 
Australia and Hong Kong and most other countries.  As an example, it is deemed 
illegal to lend money in Hong Kong at an interest rate exceeding 60% per annum 
under Section 24 of the Money Lenders Ordinance, while Section 25, which outlines 
procedures for court proceedings for both lenders pursuing delinquent obligors and 
aggrieved borrowers seeking debt relief, defines as extortionate any effective rate of 
interest exceeding 48% per annum.107  One would certainly consider rates at those 
ceilings to be usurious, but even the current effective interest rates can also be 
onerous.  As of 01 December 2006 interest rates on credit card purchases amounted to 
2 – 2.5% per month while those on credit card cash advances were set at 2 – 3% per 
month. 
One would consider it morally wrong of banks to offer credit cards to young 
people who are still students in universities and do not yet have independent sources 
of income.  They are also most vulnerable to the temptation to purchase consumer 
goods that they otherwise cannot afford, so there is a high probability of their 
encountering difficulties with paying their credit card bills in a timely fashion, thus 
being subjected to high interest rates.   
Some alternatives to credit card usage that were not explored in the interviews 
are reliance on overdraft and personal loan facilities.  An overdraft operates like a 
credit card whereby one draws on credit as one needs it, repays when one has funds, 
and it is a revolving facility, for which there is an initial charge upon its establishment 
and interest accrues on usage.  Some individuals prefer the discipline of personal 
loans, which require regular instalments of repayment for a limited period of time.  
However, both facilities are not as popular as credit cards because they require 
                                                
107 Hong Kong Legislature, "Money Lenders Ordinance - Chapter 163 Sections 24 and 25,"  (Hong 
Kong: 1997). 
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specific application, normally incur initial establishment charges, and attract 
immediate interest expense upon utilization.   
Ranking third in the number of cards issued and second in the level of 
outstanding receivables, Gorilla, which is a market leader in Hong Kong, considers 
this line of business a small profit contributor.  Cards are granted on the basis of a 
credit scoring formula assessing the applicants and positive input from an 
independent credit bureau.  In terms of personal profile, its credit card customers are 
better-established, middle-aged individuals who would typically be attracted to this 
particular bank.108 This probably explains the comment that credit cards only provide 
small profits, because well-established credit cardholders are more likely to be 
transactors who pay off their entire bills on statement due dates. 
The chief executive of Gorilla commented that people in Hong Kong were 
more inclined to save rather than spend by availing of credit card facilities or personal 
loans.  Consequently he opined that there had not been any problems with credit card 
receivables except during the deflationary period of 1997 – 2003 when property 
prices collapsed 70% from their peak.  During this difficult economic phase, people 
resorted to using their credit cards because they were unable to obtain other sources 
of financing.  Many of these were unable to repay their obligations.  A revision of the 
bankruptcy law, which allowed individuals to emerge from bankruptcy after four 
years, also caused some difficulties for the banking sector because this made it easier 
for individuals to declare themselves bankrupt, repudiate their debt, then after a short 
period of time be eligible for loans again.   Despite these previous twin problems this 
banker opined that credit card delinquencies have reverted to a low level.   
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 Gorilla does not charge annual fees for credit cards except for the so-called 
black card, which is an elite card offering exclusive services such as a personal 
secretary who can arrange car rentals, theatre tickets, flight bookings and even private 
jet hire.  Obviously those who require such services would not mind paying a fee. 
Lion, which is one of the top two issuers of credit cards in Hong Kong and 
clearly a market leader, regards this an important and excellent line of business, 
contributing 20% of the bank’s income.  Lion’s chief executive considers the local 
market developed and mature with sophisticated customers of a similar standard as 
those of the US, UK, and Europe, and therefore regards it as a fiercely competitive 
activity.109  They operate in all market segments with different cards aimed at varying 
types.  For instance, one card with a young flavour is targeted at the yuppie 
generation, others for the more mature individuals.  In addition, they have diverse 
plans for transactors and revolvers.110 
Even though the Lion banker was pleased with his bank’s credit card business, 
he remarked that he would be worried if a bank anywhere became heavily reliant on it 
because he anticipated substantial changes in the business over the next few years.  
Hong Kong had a consumer credit bubble in 2000 – 2002 whose origins lay with 
individuals, who obtained multiple credit cards from numerous financial institutions 
(unbeknown to each other), amassed large charges and walked away from their 
obligations.   This fiasco eventually led to the establishment of an independent credit 
bureau to keep track of credit facilities extended by financial institutions.  This bank 
enforces tough credit standards particularly for unsecured loans and credit cards, so 
its loan losses are lower than the industry average. 
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Another banker from Dragon commented that Hong Kong has had a well-
developed, mature, relatively finite market for credit cards for some time.  Numerous 
credit cards have been issued, but the local credit card culture compares favourably 
with that in other Asian countries such as Korea or China where skills and techniques 
for identifying danger signs are less well developed and therefore potential problems 
might be concealed.  In Hong Kong he believed that the customers are knowledgeable 
and credit cards are well understood, so when one takes a look at the incidence of bad 
debt in this segment, these are at manageable levels.111 
This senior Dragon banker noted that local cardholders are less prone to avail 
of credit than individuals in the US or the UK, where carrying cash has long been 
unfashionable and reliance on credit facilities has been endemic.  In contrast, savings 
continue to be a custom among Hong Kong families who by and large rebuff the 
advertisers’ exhortations to splurge and charge luxury items and vacations to their 
credit cards and worry about repayment later. 
A leading bank claims to have a very strong credit assessment approach that 
utilises historical inputs and sophisticated risk models to design application 
scorecards, which enables the institution to routinely underwrite a large volume of 
credit card applications and establish suitable credit limits based on an applicant’s 
personal risk profile.112  According to written comments this system relies on a 
comprehensive credit bureau that supplies up-to-date credit histories and outstanding 
loans from other financial institutions.  However, in an interview, the Chairman of 
Dragon bank bemoaned the lack of positive inputs to the credit bureau, that is, only 
delinquencies and defaults are reported, not total facilities extended to all clients.113   
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Thus it is possible for this system to inadequately verify an individual’s credit 
capacity and therefore grant an excessive credit limit.   
Nonetheless Dragon pursues a methodical approach of behavioural scoring to 
spot clients with a high risk of default based on their card usage.  Despite any 
systemic deficiencies the bank also receives from the credit bureau a monthly update 
on all its credit card customers.  Spending patterns are routinely tracked to detect 
customers with potential financial difficulties.   
Defaulting customers are handled by Dragon’s debt workout unit, which 
arranges debt restructuring for the customers.  The bankers assert that the Dragon 
staff members behave sympathetically toward those with financial problems and that 
their priority is to maintain the client relationship.  They consider this the optimum 
approach for amicably recovering their loans and preserving future opportunities to 
conduct business with the clients when they recover from their difficulties. 
The top executives stated that their credit card business is sound even if it 
brings in relatively low income.  The wide availability of cards has not altered the 
Hong Kong people’s spending habits and, in the aftermath of the numerous crises that 
befell Hong Kong, individuals waited several months after the SARS epidemic was 
over before they resumed spending with credit cards.  This seems to be evidence of 
growth in financial maturity of the population. 
The proliferation of credit cards was due to competition and, according to 
some observers, possibly good for cardholders who obtain rebates and are able to earn 
awards with their usage, but the worry is the potential reckless issuance of cards to 
individuals who are not in a position to borrow or service their liabilities, for instance 
students.  The bank regulator’s concern is that all banks conduct business prudently 
71 
so that it does not have to intervene.114  Since non-bank institutions that are not 
covered by banking regulations also issue credit cards, the regulator normally prefers 
to allow the market to instil discipline.  Its main anxiety concerns risk management, 
namely, that banks are issuing credit cards to the right people. 
Hong Kong has witnessed scores of problems that surfaced during the period 
of economic crises and the devastating SARS epidemic.  In the worst case scenarios 
credit card borrowers amassed debt exceeding 40 times their net income, leading to 
an extraordinary bankruptcy rate.  The banking regulator identified the need for 
sharing credit information so that every lender could be aware of the overall level of 
indebtedness of each potential borrower or credit card applicant.  The banking 
supervisor wished to ensure that banks take prudent risk and therefore encouraged the 
establishment of a credit bureau, which would be owned by the private sector. Since 
then, loan losses have dropped to comfortable levels.  Credit cards remain a profitable 
source of income for the entire banking system but not a big part of overall earnings.  
This suggests that people in the community use credit cards more for convenience 
than to obtain debt. 
In Australia it was reported in 2006 that the average household debt was 
comprised of housing loans (85%), credit cards (5%), and others, such as car loans 
(10%).  This implied that personal credit card loans were likewise small in proportion 
to total bank assets.115  According to an industry spokesman the evidence indicated 
that the majority of cardholders used their cards responsibly; the defaults were higher 
than those for housing loans but still at a low level.   
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Industry sources indicated there was a continuing attempt to improve lending 
standards.  For instance, if a card holder was discovered to be a recipient of 
Commonwealth government welfare benefits, then the banks would not grant that 
individual any credit limit increase.  As a consequence of more prudent credit 
processing, banks experienced reduced delinquencies, and charge-offs were stable at 
5%.  In addition, reports showed that cardholders were paying off more outstanding 
debt in the 12 months till November 2006 compared to the previous two to three years 
when they had been borrowing more on their cards.  From the standpoint of banking 
profitability the most costly clients were considered those who actively used their 
cards but paid the full amount of their statements every month, although these were 
the clients who did not present loan loss problems to the banks. 
   In the opinion of a bank CEO, Australia is a mature market for credit cards 
similar to Hong Kong and more advanced than most other Asian economies.  
However he said it was difficult to obtain credit information, so problems arose when 
individuals got caught in a ‘credit spiral’ as a result of obtaining credit facilities out of 
proportion to their personal income.  He cited the case of a woman in her mid-50’s 
holding a senior clerical job, who had outstanding credit card loans of A$ 120,000 
that she was unable to repay.  A quarter of this amount was owed on cards that had 
been extended by banks, while three-quarters was attributable to cards from non-
banking institutions.  It was apparently easy to obtain credit cards even for those with 
poor credit histories.116  
A senior retail banker at Kangaroo declared that they wrote off 2.5% (which 
was superior to the national average of 5%) of their credit card business against 
outstanding receivables, which explained why credit card interest rates were much 
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higher than open market rates, namely that they had to factor in the loan losses on 
these unsecured loans.  Nonetheless Australian bad debt experience with credit cards 
was much lower than in the US and the UK where the losses in 2006 averaged 4.5 - 
6.5%.117 
Although it has adopted a conservative approach to credit card approval, 
Kangaroo makes sure that the collection practices are appropriate and considerate 
towards delinquent clients.  They are reviewing and refining their hardship policies, 
so that customers who encounter personal difficulties have the opportunity to phone 
the bank and explain their situation, which could be the effect of a job loss or the 
trauma of a divorce.  The bank might then arrange a deferred payment plan inclusive 
of an interest holiday during that period.  The Kangaroo senior banker clarified that 
the bank is concerned about its reputation and does not want to be perceived as 
unduly aggressive in chasing debtors, so it makes an effort to discern if customers are 
undergoing genuine hardship or simply trying to swindle the bank.  Kangaroo claims 
to have a reasonable policy on cases of adversity. 
This institution states that it has implemented a responsible lending policy as 
evidenced in their refraining from offering credit increases to customers who receive 
government welfare benefits or fixed wages.  The bank likewise avoids placing 
people in situations where they could be at risk.  For this reason it normally does not 
issue credit cards to individuals under the age of 25 but instead offers a Visa debit 
card.  The assumption here is that most persons under that age are new in the work 
force and may not yet have regular, steady sources of income, so their capacity to 
incur debt is still limited.  But there are obviously exceptions that the bank would 
consider. 
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The observation was made that the Australian credit bureau operates 
negatively in that lenders only report people who miss payments or default, although 
it keeps track of how many credit applications a person has made.  However, the 
credit reports do not indicate how many loan facilities that person has obtained or 
how much credit is currently outstanding.  Nor does the bureau advise if that person 
has fully repaid his debt and should therefore be considered a good credit risk. 
In 2006 the total amount of credit card receivables in Australia stood at A$ 30 
billion compared to A$ 700 billion of mortgage loans, so cards reflected only a small 
share of household debt, though banks complained that problems in this sector 
attracted unduly harsh publicity in the press. 
A respected former chief executive of a major bank asserted that he did not 
like the credit card structure and considered it a bad business practice.  He found the 
fees acceptable but the interest rates inexcusable because the bad debt write-offs and 
fraud levels were being funded by an interest margin that he regarded much too high.  
Although it is a profitable business, he felt that it is pushed too hard.118  This is 
precisely the ethical argument one should have against excessive credit card interest 
rates. 
This retired CEO deduced that there is a section of the community that was 
prepared to pay high interest rates for what was basically an unsecured loan, which he 
assumed was probably cheaper than pawnshop loans.  He cited other markets such as 
Japan where the ability of individuals at the lower end to access credit was very 
limited other than through loan sharks operated by criminal elements, and he regarded 
such financial hardships as much greater.  This former CEO deems credit cards a 
great convenience and marvellous insurance in case one needs money while travelling 
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overseas, and he always pays the full amount when due, which he considers the right 
way to use credit cards.  In other words, one would describe his ethical view of credit 
cards as utilitarian in providing tangible utilities, though the major benefits accrue to 
cardholders like him who are not beguiled by the temptation to pay only a miniscule 
minimum monthly amount.  Otherwise he believes that cards are not a good means to 
borrow money.  In contrast to the current prevalence of features such as frequent flyer 
or loyalty points, he expects a simplified credit card structure will be offered in the 
future as a ‘plain vanilla’ option with competitive interest rates. 
The former Kangaroo chief executive remarked that banking has been 
transformed from being highly restricted and regulated in terms of who could gain 
access to financing where there was no marketing involved, interest rates were set by 
the Reserve Bank, and directional lending was norm, that is, banks were guided in 
how they should lend money.  According to this banker, social inequalities and 
problems abounded in the controlled regime, such as the limitation on loans to 
women, whereas today there is supposedly egalitarianism and equal opportunity with 
genuine freedom of access to money.  But concomitant with that, one can get into 
trouble.  As the former CEO said: “People might behave unwisely and get carried 
away when credit is readily available.”119  While such comments from this banker 
ostensibly supports individual freedom, it also bespeaks an attitude that people are 
accountable for the consequences of their own actions and banks cannot prevent 
individuals from entering into potentially difficult borrowing situations.  An objective 
commentator might depict this laissez-faire mindset as ethically deficient because 
there is scant regard for harsh consequences that befall hapless people. 
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Another bank has adopted the responsible practice of not extending credit to 
those with a poor credit history and likewise does not increase pre-Christmas credit 
limits for those with repayment deficiency.  In approving credit cards they look at 
factors such as education, financial literacy, in addition to income.  The bank tries to 
ensure that the credit cards are appropriately tailored to the customers and the risks 
are well disclosed so that those risks for cardholders are minimized.  One would view 
this as the correct approach for issuers of credit cards.  In response to a comment that 
good customers subsidize the delinquent ones because they have to pay the same high 
interest rates as less creditworthy cardholders when they rollover their outstanding 
credit, a banker said that they were looking at a pilot project wherein there would be 
differential rates and products for varied customers and pricing would depend on 
risk.120 
A compliance manager at Bilby, a very large non-bank lender, said that they 
have similar criteria as banks in approving credit card applications.121  They maintain 
that they stress responsible lending in their agenda, whereby they carefully assess risk 
and the capacity to repay.  Bilby believes that it is not in its interest to lend to people 
who cannot repay their debt, because the firm would lose money.  The company has 
products tailored to suit a broad range of customers whereas it views the banks as 
having products that are characterized as ‘one size fits all.’ 
The manager explained that Bilby offers risk-based products, which means 
that the more risk it assumes, the higher the rate.  Yet he claimed that its lowest rate 
for personal loans is the lowest among all sixteen major Australian lenders.  Its motor 
solutions activity is the second largest personal financing for cars, motorbikes, trucks, 
and jet skis.   
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Bilby’s retail finance activities include interest-free instalment purchases or 
buy now - pay later plans through retail merchants.  It also offers credit cards through 
department stores; depending on the type selected, these supposedly encompass the 
lowest rate in the country as well as some of the highest rates.  In distinguishing 
between revolvers (those who regularly roll over the outstanding amount) and 
transactors (those who pay the full amount outstanding every statement period), it 
finds that low rates are attractive to revolvers while interest rates are less important to 
transactors, who look for other features such as interest-free store finance on 
consumer durable goods. 
This executive said that consumers should be more concerned with the true 
cost of making a purchase in order to determine the true cost of finance.  Bilby claims 
to be proud of having driven competition in the market place so that big providers 
offer more choices and better prices.  This firm is actually unique in having 
commenced as a finance company supporting department store sales or as a factoring 
company, which later started offering credit cards in the name of the department store 
and would then acquire the receivables of the store.  This original role would seem to 
be an appropriate one for credit cards.  It provides convenience as well as related 
financing to shoppers, while the vendors are able to monitor customers’ preferences 
and adjust to them. 
According to the Bilby manager, many individuals do not meet the lending 
criteria of major banks due to a variety of reasons: no regular income, self-employed 
with no steady wages, black marks as a result of missed loan repayments, negative 
credit scores.  Examples might include recent widows who were dependent on 
spouses taking care of the bills, people who lost their jobs, individuals traumatized by 
severe illness or divorce.  Such a black mark remains on a person’s record for five 
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years.  This non-bank lender would accept these sub-prime clients and probably offer 
higher rates on credit cards because of the additional risk.  But the sub-prime 
customers enjoy the convenience of credit cards as well as a 55-day interest-free 
period.  After 5 years they can apply for a regular credit card with a lower interest 
rate. 
Although Bilby and its Australian subsidiary, Currawong, gained a reputation 
as providers of sub-prime loans, this non-bank institution asserted that more than 80% 
of its clients belonged to the prime category.  Loans written off in the prime class 
were alleged to be low and amounted to less than 1%, while it was a little more 
(undisclosed) in the sub-prime category.   
Quoll’s approach, which is predicated on defining its target audience as the 
members of its institutional shareholders, stipulates that its products must be simple, 
transparent, and equitable.122  Hence there is no complexity or contingency in the 
product offering.  There are no affinity programmes, no introductory offers, and no 
free balance transfer propositions. Instead what it offers are low interest rate cards 
oriented towards its constituency, who are primarily revolvers, that is, individual 
clients who do not repay the full amount of their monthly statements.  These are 
intended to be fair deals and good value for working-class Australians. 
Applications, which are available to everyone (whether or not members of the 
institutional shareholders), are processed through credit scoring of various factors 
such as disposable income, outstanding debt, overall risk of default, and credit 
references.  The applicant must be a permanent resident of Australia, at least 17 years 
of age, earn at least A$ 25,000 yearly, and be able to repay at least 3% of each 
statement amount.  Although Quoll admits to issuing credit cards to young 
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individuals, it does utilise a means test and the members of its institutional 
shareholders include young workers who have recently completed schooling.  The 
credit limits on the basic card range from A$ 1,000 to A$15,000; after nine months 
with a history of repayment the cardholder can apply for an increase of the credit 
limit.  The bank declares that it has a conservative credit process relative to the 
market.   
One institution, which values its role in its numerous communities as an 
important commitment, regards credit cards as a mode of convenience for individual 
clients.  Most of its cardholders repay the amounts outstanding in their accounts on 
time, and only 20% are revolvers, who repay a minimal sum and roll over the 
balance.  The bank proper as well as its community branches have a large personal 
instalment loan portfolio, and the proportions in arrears and in default are very low – 
less than the industry average.  In the opinion of the Chief Executive this is the 
outcome of their screening process, which tries to make sure that people can service 
their obligations without incurring hardship. 
Several attributes emerge in the review of the credit card business.  Firstly, 
there is intense and widespread competition for market share among all the financial 
institutions, so that they offer a broad range of products with varying features.  Some 
cards provide lower interest rates, which are targeted at revolvers; others have high 
rates but enable one to earn points with other partners such as airline frequent flyer 
groups; in Hong Kong they waive annual fees in order to attract users.  This wide 
variety could actually make it more difficult for many applicants to choose the right 
product for their needs.  Many institutions actively solicit credit card applications 
from young people who could still be students and may not yet be ready to manage 
their debt in a disciplined manner.  Secondly, the credit approval is essentially an 
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automated process that relies on a scoring system and cursory checking with a credit 
bureau, whose records only consist of negative reports; one should not infer that the 
credit is sound in the absence of negative comments.  Such a system could result in 
the approval of higher credit limits than warranted.  Thirdly, the proportion of 
cardholders who regularly rollover their credit each month pay an exorbitant interest 
rate on their loans outstanding because the interest rate pricing on credit card loans 
incorporates losses on defaults by non-creditworthy customers.  The financially 
reliable are therefore being penalized for the excesses and non-payment of others.  
The fundamental problem is that there is too much pressure on salespeople at 
financial institutions to sell these credit cards.   
 
C.  Housing Mortgage Loans 
This is a highly significant banking product, firstly, because all people require a 
shelter and most of them have conceived dreams of owning their own homes, so 
consequently a mortgage loan would be the largest component of household debt, 
and, secondly, because the aggregate mortgage loans would likewise constitute the 
biggest segment of the banking sector’s assets.  Individuals seeking to buy homes 
must go to a bank or other lender to secure financing, and the terms thereof impact on 
their savings capability and their quality of life.  Even those who choose to rent their 
abodes are also affected because the property owners would usually pass on their 
actual or imputed cost of borrowing to the residents or lessees.   
In Hong Kong mortgage loans constitute a large portion of the loan portfolio 
of the banking sector as a whole, so the banking supervisor has issued lending 
guidelines of a loan value ratio (LVR) of 70% and a debt service ratio of 50%, which 
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was the practice at the leading banks 20 years ago and was viewed by the regulator as 
prudent and therefore adopted as guidelines.123  Most of the banks observe these as 
standard procedures, thus contributing to sound mortgage assets. 
Hong Kong has a remarkable history of housing mortgage loans because of 
the extreme fluctuations the economy has suffered.   A property bubble preceded the 
period of deflation when property prices crumpled 70% from its pinnacle to its nadir, 
causing the negative equity of mortgage loans held by all the banks to exceed 30% 
and prompting concern from overseas banking regulators, who were monitoring the 
activities of Hong Kong subsidiaries under their jurisdiction.  However, the sentiment 
of local bankers was that, so long as repayment delinquencies and loan charge-offs by 
banks remained low, conditions would improve over time and there was no need to 
worry.124  Although there were purportedly slightly more delinquencies than normal, 
these remained low especially when compared to other countries such as the U.S. and 
the UK.  When interest rates rose to high levels and people had financial difficulties, 
defaults were higher than normal.  Nevertheless banks were convinced that the last 
thing that individuals would repudiate were their mortgage loans.  Rather than forcing 
borrowers to sell their properties into a falling market, banks took a pragmatic attitude 
and lengthened repayment periods and reduced the amounts payable.  Thus a 
potentially difficult situation was averted, and default rates these days are very low. 
Compared with the peak of 106,000 cases of residential mortgage loans in 
negative equity at the end of June 2003, the number had fallen by 92% to 8,800 cases 
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by the end of September 2006.125  The sector’s overall negative equity had 
significantly improved to a level of 2%. 
Property prices reached their height just prior to the Asian financial crisis of 
1997, which was caused by overblown current account deficits of most of the Asian 
countries, including the so-called tigers, a term referring then to the rapid-growth 
economies of Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, but affecting all the countries in the region 
and instigating drastic local currency devaluation vis-à-vis the US dollar and severe 
economic slowdown across the entire continent.  By that time the Hong Kong dollar 
was pegged to the US dollar, so there was no devaluation as such, but the crisis and 
the handover of the territory back to China that year precipitated a massive sale of 
residential properties. 
On the heels of the financial crisis, which lasted a few years, came the 
consumer credit bubble in 2000 – 2002, then the dreaded SARS epidemic in 2003.  
Property prices therefore did not begin their recovery till 2004, which continued in 
the succeeding years.  Residential unit prices in 2006 were almost at the same level 
they had reached at their peak in 1997. 
Housing prices are driven by the forces of supply and demand, which were 
greatly swayed by the above-cited calamities.  Some banks concentrated on financing 
upper-end or luxury housing, which was more sensitive to the fluctuations of demand 
and supply.  At this level many people bought properties not only for their own 
residence but also additional ones for investment and speculation.  And this was not 
confined to the local scene; the Chinese in Hong Kong and the mainland had a 
voracious appetite for properties in Hong Kong, London, New York, Sydney and 
Melbourne.   They have long considered real estate as a major hedge against inflation.   
                                                
125 HKMA, Press Release, 6 November 2006. 
83 
Due to the investment demand and its relatively limited supply, luxury 
housing was the first to recover.   The continuance of Hong Kong as a major global 
financial centre has also been accompanied by the steady influx of expatriate 
investment bankers, financial advisors, and specialists in allied professions. 
Comments made in the interviews indicate that banks in general treat housing 
loan applicants the same way whether they want to purchase a unit for their own 
dwelling or as an investment.  They are only interested in the borrower’s capacity to 
repay the loan.126  Bankers disagree with the suggestion that they have encouraged 
property speculation by providing easy credit because in their view the principal 
banks have always maintained strict credit policies and procedures.   Certain bankers  
argue that, even in the absence of Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) 
guidelines on housing loans, their banks would still call for a loan to value ratio of 
70% and debt service ratio of 50%, because this is deemed to be good banking.   
Instead of a loosening of credit standards, the interviewees claimed that 
intense competition for housing loans resulted in improved terms and conditions for 
borrowers.  As an example, the typical housing loan in 1973 carried an interest rate of 
BLR127+ 1.75% and a tenor of 7 years, while the average terms in 2006 were BLR - 
3% and a tenor of 20 years.128  The interest rate dropped by 475 basis points129 and the 
final maturity lengthened, thus benefiting the customers.  The total housing loan 
market has grown substantially but the banks earn less, though the assets continue to 
be of high quality.  At the end of 2006 the 3-month delinquency rate was 0.20% while 
this bank experienced 0.19% and a charge-off level of 0.03%, which were described 
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as very low by world standards.  This demonstrates that banks can maintain 
profitability and preserve the quality of its loan assets thus contributing to banking 
stability, while satisfying the needs of individual customers.  The approach of the 
banks in Hong Kong to improve rates for customers rather than sacrifice lending 
standards in the face of competition appears to be driven by motivation stemming 
from virtue ethics.  One should therefore contrast this attitude with that embraced by 
the American sub-prime lenders who chose to relax credit norms in order to generate 
more business. 
A leading bank asserted that it operates on the premise that human beings 
“always have a need to buy houses as they grow older, as they get married, or simply 
to improve the present living condition.”  Therefore the group offers “first class 
mortgage financing support to help people fulfil their dream of home-ownership.”130  
The bank adheres to prudent mortgage lending policies131 while remaining 
competitive with the best deals and product choices available to the customers, who 
are encouraged to spend time discussing their financial needs with the bank staff.  
When the clients encounter unforeseen difficulties in meeting their obligations, the 
bank advises them in finding appropriate solutions.  The debt workout unit provides 
assistance to defaulting customers that can include debt restructuring. 
One can draw a number of conclusions from this fascinating narrative on 
housing mortgage loans in Hong Kong.  The first is that catastrophes can occur in a 
terribly major way from wholly unexpected sources, and most of these are 
unavoidable despite what a few critics might claim in hindsight.  Secondly, banks that 
espouse ethical values observe prudential practices, which include sound risk 
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management.  Thirdly, the anecdotal evidence from numerous sources indicates a 
genuine concern and trust on the part of bankers towards their individual home loan 
customers.  This concern manifested itself in the manner banks attempted to assist 
borrowers in difficulties that in turn resulted in minimal defaults and negligible home 
foreclosures.    
A focus on the customer starts during the initial discussion when the bank 
representative must ascertain and understand the prospective borrower’s needs and 
financial condition, then plainly and comprehensively clarify the features and risks of 
the mortgage loan options.  Prudence would dictate recommending a loan that the 
borrower can comfortably service even in the event of unforeseen calamities, such as 
a financial crisis, higher interest rates, and loss of income. 
In Australia access to housing loans has become easier for most would-be 
borrowers.  A prospective homebuyer used to go to a bank, which would estimate the 
value of the property and assess the financial capability of the applicant in order to 
reach a decision on whether or not it would approve the loan request.  Nowadays 
potential borrowers go to loan brokers, who take care of finding a financial institution 
willing to grant a loan with the optimum terms and conditions to suit the respective 
borrowers.  These could be any combination of:  the highest LVR (loan to value ratio) 
or the amount of the loan in proportion to the assessed value of the mortgaged 
property, the interest rate (fixed or floating), the term or final maturity of the loan, 
and fees. 
A few institutions do not rely on brokers and evaluate each loan application on 
its merits and based on the creditworthiness of the borrower make decisions on the 
credit approval and the relevant terms and conditions.  It appears that credit unions 
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are more conservative lenders that are prepared to lose loan applicants who are 
dissatisfied with loan offers they receive. 
Traditionally the LVR at Australian banks has been 80% but due to 
competition from non-bank loan institutions some lenders have considered an LVR of 
95% with mortgage redemption insurance on the differential.  Conservative banks 
still calculate the value of the property based on current market prices not on future 
inflationary expectations. 
Lending practices changed in the decade until 2005 because asset prices had 
continuously risen.  The Perth housing market in 2006 was still strong, though the 
Sydney market, which had experienced a boom followed by a slump, was still 
generally in a satisfactory condition.132  But people’s incomes did not keep pace with 
asset price increases, which meant that banks had to change the way they lend.  
Financial institutions developed inventive techniques to help people own homes, 
mostly through low or no documentation loans.  These were provided by non-ADIs133, 
which did not take deposits from the public and were therefore not regulated by 
APRA134.  The typical borrower did not meet the credit standards of a bank and 
therefore would be described as a sub-prime customer.135  Generally there were fewer 
documents and less verification of employment and income than in the case with bank 
loans.   
Defaults were much higher among non-APRA-regulated lenders.  Loans 
provided by APRA lenders that were 90 days in arrears amounted to 0.3% of total 
loans outstanding, while the comparable level at non-conforming lenders was 4.1%.136  
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These sub-prime lenders securitised their loans and sold them to investors unlike 
banks and APRA-supervised ADIs which relied on deposits and carried the loans on 
their balance sheets.  Data for 2005 indicated that 3,800 individuals in New South 
Wales and the Australian Capital Territory lost their personal homes (excluding 
investment properties) due to foreclosures.  Of these affected homes, non-banks had 
financed 80%. 
Some interviewees observed that the mortgage loan market had changed over 
the past several years due to several factors:137 
1. The emergence of non-bank lenders active in the sub-prime market.  These 
lenders were aggressive because they were backed by securitised funding 
vehicles and did not raise funds through deposits from the public.138  These 
provided loans to individuals with impaired credit and usually at higher 
loan to value ratios. 
2. Some banks started lending at 100% or more of market values.  Their 
rationale was that the investment strategy of a client with sufficient equity 
available was usually predisposed not to deploy that equity into a property 
purchase.  Investment properties became the most favoured form of 
investment assets in Australia because of the significant tax advantages of 
negative gearing.  The accelerated depreciation of capital assets combined 
with interest deductions provided the investor borrower with negative tax 
positions while the value of the property was rising.  Most financial 
planners advised customers to include an investment property element in 
their portfolios. 
                                                
137 Transcripts AU 4, 6. 
138 As seen earlier, this keeps them off the radar screen of APRA. 
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Though high LVR loans might be defensible because of the tax effective 
nature of investment planning, there were worries that of some of these loans had 
been extended to individuals who were financially too stretched to be able to buy 
properties, and this was an inappropriate market segment to pursue.  The financial 
press in 2006 reported the rising level of personal debt in relation to income and the 
diagnosis of a property bubble, but some bankers in the research study subscribed to 
the view that analysts were looking at debt without examining the equity, namely that 
asset prices had escalated dramatically so that the borrowers’ equity position 
remained strong.139  These bankers were in denial of the dangers of ballooning 
personal indebtedness.   
The dynamic140 LVR across the mortgage loan portfolio of Kangaroo bank 
stood at an average of 68% implying an average equity ratio of 32%.141  This bank did 
not see any problems in its group because of its professed conservative lending 
practices though it recognized problems in the industry.  In this case the bank tried to 
make sure the monthly mortgage payment was no more than 10 – 12% of the 
borrower’s unencumbered monthly income.  Furthermore the borrower’s available 
income had to be able to absorb an increase of 1.5% (150 basis points) in interest 
rates.  Kangaroo thus did not want to lend 100% of property values and wanted the 
customers to be well protected. 
Reverse mortgage loans at some institutions were increasing.  These were 
loans granted on properties whose mortgages had been repaid.  They were generally 
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offered to older persons (approaching, or in, retirement), who then owned their homes 
and wished to liquefy the monetary value of their properties. 
The more conservative banks did not provide reverse mortgage financing 
because they were concerned about their reputation.  If someone had put his life 
savings into his home, which was his primary source of wealth (the typical situation 
for most Australians), how would it be ethical to force him to sell his home later in 
life to service a loan?142 
Some bankers recognize that there are legitimate customer needs for such a 
product but the problem arises when unscrupulous financial firms take advantage of 
innocent customers who are not financially sophisticated.  One bank was considering 
experimenting with a “good product that guarantees a reasonable proposition for the 
customer.”143 
Reports in Australia indicate that only a small number of people in actual fact 
have lost their homes.  In default situations the collection units at banks try to arrange 
refinancing.  Banks claim that they truly wish to avoid having to throw somebody out 
on the street.  The reputational damage for them is very high. 
When banks offer reverse mortgages, their rationale is the potential need for 
people to obtain cash from the equity in their homes.  This is the situation of so-called 
baby-boomers, who have worked all their lives and possess assets, yet are often cash 
poor because they might have retired, but have an increasing need for medicine and 
supervised care as they grow older.  They could either sell their homes and move to 
smaller flats or re-mortgage their property to achieve liquidity.   
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This is in contrast with the indebtedness of young professionals who are 
availing of current loans secured by their homes and splurging on luxury goods.  This 
is a well-established product that is popular with professionals but is dangerous and 
requires a clear appreciation of the potential risks.  It needs good personal 
understanding of the borrowers by the bankers, but face-to-face contact has been 
replaced by scorecard formulas.  In an effort to keep costs down, loan applicants are 
asked to fill in forms and are rated on score sheets.  If applicants fit the desired credit 
risk profile, their credit requests are granted.  There is no interpersonal contact and 
therefore no attempt to understand the individuals.   
There is a mindset among bankers that banks must satisfy clients and generate 
profits.  A bank would not be in business long if it did not satisfy its clients or make 
profits.144  But many admit that bank products are very complex.  The opinion in 
several banks is that the fee structure could be complex although actual interest rates 
might be quite competitive.  Some bankers feel that fees and interest rates are not too 
difficult for most people to comprehend.  The retired Kangaroo chief executive 
argued that if someone borrows money, he should be able to cope with the relevant 
concepts or otherwise he should not be borrowing.  The CEO did not accept that 
ethical issues are involved because he did not think any bank was trying to deceive 
anyone.145  From this banker’s perspective the policing of advertising conduct was 
pretty strict.146 
                                                
144 Transcript AU 5. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Transcript AU 6.  However a newspaper reported in mid-2006 that a major bank was forced to 
withdraw its advertisement for a deposit product because this was judged to be misleading.  The 
product entailed a savings account that paid higher interest but one could not make normal payments 
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This traditional banker bemoaned the change of culture that has meant the loss 
of fiduciary responsibility.  He explained his view: 
 It used to be that banks were obliged to make sure that it was prudent to lend and 
that the borrowers had the capacity to repay.  Now banks just want to lend the 
money out provided there is adequate collateral and get it repaid when due, so 
now there is mortgage insurance.  The focus is on repayment and recovery of the 
loan, not on the hardship or the practicality of the individual being able to service 
the debt.  Bankers have become straight commercial people; they do not have the 
obligation that went with fiduciary responsibility.147 
 
These are harsh words coming from a former chief executive of a large bank, whose 
current senior executives speak of a new culture of customer-focused service.  
Although he insisted that he was expressing his personal views rather than those of 
his former institution, one presumes that he maintains contact with bank officers and 
certainly keeps up with developments in the industry.  One might construe this as an 
elucidation of the actual prevailing frame of mind in contrast to the discourse used by 
the banks that profess to have values and the readiness to contribute to the 
community. 
This customary belief is that banks lend 80 to 85% of the value of properties 
and obtain mortgage insurance for the balance so the loan component does not 
actually assume the full risk of recovery.  They regard a mortgage as an amalgam of 
three elements:148  
1. availability of money 
2. administrative system keeping track of repayments and outstanding 
balances 
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3. sales: mortgage brokers who are not involved in the first two elements but 
function like commission salesmen trying to find the best deal for the 
clients; their role is similar to those salesmen of unit trusts. 
The sales-oriented structure briefly described above probably accounts for the 
majority of mortgage loans.  In the event of default one method of debt recovery is 
foreclosure of assets.  One reason banking works is that there are clear property rights 
that can be assigned as security and enforced.  When the property in question is 
somebody’s home, it would be prudent to limit the amount of the loan in order to 
minimize potential strain on the borrower’s capacity to repay and avoid foreclosure.   
When the former bank head was queried about the danger of a property 
bubble, he recounted the episode of the 1980s that witnessed a boom period with 
growth fuelled by banks.  According to him, the ultimate cause of the boom was the 
deregulation of the Australian dollar that triggered a flood of overseas funds coming 
into Australia.  He believes that the problem was that the Reserve Bank was not 
carefully monitoring the money supply growth that soared to an annual rate of 20%, 
which after five years could only be inflationary.  The banks were lending out money 
aggressively, purportedly in order to protect market share, and this drove up the stock 
markets, followed by property.149 This retired CEO explained that bankers were 
unfamiliar with a situation lacking foreign exchange controls, so this period was a 
disaster especially for the state-owned banks, many of which collapsed under the 
weight of bad loans and were taken over by other banks. 
Although the situation in the 21st century may have different underlying 
factors, there was no doubt that property prices had been escalating rapidly in the ten 
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years till 2006 and financial institutions were instrumental in providing housing 
mortgage loans, which fuelled the demand for property. 
 This research project showed that the mortgage loans of Bilby, the large non-
bank lender,150 were all originated through brokers, although Currawong, the 
subsidiary it acquired a few years ago, marketed its own home loans directly.  The 
principal firm targeted the so-called ‘non-conforming market’, typically, self-
employed individuals who are unable to provide much documentation to support their 
loan application; these are similar to the sub-prime market in America.  The 
Currawong subsidiary claimed to have the lowest mortgage rates in the country.  The 
entire group offered a wide variety of mortgage loans with diverse features and 
degrees of flexibility.   
The Bilby group did not grant reverse mortgages but was then considering 
doing so despite ethical concerns.  At the time of the research they were offering an 
unusual 40-year mortgage whereby individuals were able to buy properties that would 
otherwise be unaffordable for them.  The underlying assumption was that over 40 
years the value of properties would rise so that repayments would become easier.   
The Bilby executive claimed that media reports about foreclosure of homes 
were mainly incorrect.  He asserted that they and the banks bend over backwards to 
make sure that people are not evicted from their homes, which is the last thing they 
want to happen from both an ethical and financial point of view.  He maintained that 
financial institutions lose money when people are thrown out of their houses. 
The company contends that it assesses the individuals’ repayment capacity but 
circumstances change and, when difficulties arise, they still try to accommodate the 
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customer as well as they can.  Several cases were cited.  The executive stated that in 
genuine hardship situations they would write off debt.  Bilby and Currawong pursue 
the collection of their own debt for 100 days after which they sell the loans to 
collection agencies.  There are allegedly tight regulations covering collection agents.   
The medium-sized bank Quoll provides mortgage finance up to a maximum of 
90% of the property valuation and requires mortgage insurance, while many other 
institutions lend 95 – 100% and some up to 105% LVR.  For this bank responsible 
credit management is important and they do not want people overly geared.  As a 
consequence they have a default rate in housing loans of only 25% of the industry 
average.  This is a striking difference.151 
Anyone can establish an account relationship at this bank, but members of the 
stakeholders, which are employee unions and superannuation funds, receive a 
discount of 25 basis points from the standard rate on housing loans.  Otherwise the 
interest rates on all products apply equitably for everybody whether they have low 
incomes or high net worth, and there is no discrimination based on income or job 
position.  The bank does not seek to offset the risk of low-income borrowers or 
reward high-income earners. 
This institution, Quoll, which had been an originator of home loans since 
1994, received its banking license in 2001.  It continues to originate its own mortgage 
loans, though it has a separately branded product with a small share of the overall 
business that is distributed through mortgage brokers.  Late payments do occur, but 
there is a communications programme whereby Quoll contacts late payers to ascertain 
the reasons.  When debtors default, the collections department treats all customers in 
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the same manner, encourages communications, and assists them in repaying their 
debt. 
In an environment where interest rates have been historically low, home loan 
affordability has been very high.  The asset price increase has been significant, as 
people have borrowed much more.  This price rise has been due to an excess of 
demand over supply.  It is the view of many senior bankers that lenders are not at 
fault because this situation is supposedly due to state and local government planning 
of land release.  The opinion of bankers is that government entities have released 
inadequate housing stock to meet increased demand arising from population growth. 
The asset portfolio of the former building society that converted into a bank 
has a large segment of residential mortgage loans: 75% of the portfolio in terms of 
security valuation and 67% in terms of purpose.  The former includes loans secured 
by home mortgages but taken out for personal investments and for commercial 
purposes.  The average loan valuation ratio (LVR) of the entire portfolio is 50% 
because there have been repayments on the loans outstanding, while the LVR for new 
housing loans is generally below 70%.  Where mortgage insurance is provided, the 
bank may lend up to 80% LVR.  Because of this prudent approach there is a very low 
rate of repossession.152   
Quoll offers reverse mortgage credit as short and medium term financing up to 
5 years.  On the other hand, the community bank approaches reverse mortgage 
finance in the form of equity access finance whereby the bank becomes a part owner 
of the property.   
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To summarize this section, the expectation in all modern societies is for 
people to have dwellings in which to live and the common objective of many 
individuals is to own their own home.  Those who choose not to buy their abodes 
would nevertheless have to rent from other people who own these properties.  In 
every instance the residential accommodation would need to be financed by a bank or 
another form of lending institution.  Because housing mortgage loans are normally the 
largest debt obligations that individuals will ever undertake in their lifetime and they 
require exceptionally lengthy periods and substantial sums of money to repay, it is 
ethically incumbent on mortgage lenders to fully appreciate the personal 
circumstances of prospective borrowers and provide comprehensive advice on 
possible risks.  The research indicates that certain banks do this but many others are 
more interested in closing a sale and making a housing loan without much 
consideration for what happens to the customer after the loan has been released.  Dur 
to competitive pressure numerous lenders have quite often granted loans in amounts 
equal to, or in excess of, the purchase prices of the properties with inadequate 
examination of the impact of repayment on the borrowers. 
As Chapter 6 will illustrate about the sub-prime housing loan market, this 
behaviour on the part of some mortgage lenders, which has arisen from a lack of 
ethical values, would prove to be the catalyst for the implosion of the entire global 
financial system. 
 
D.  Corporate Finance 
On the one hand, banks attempt to look after the requirements of individuals through 
their retail or consumer finance departments and perhaps millions of physical 
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branches and automated teller machines as well as online services.  On the other 
hand, they provide specialised tailor-made corporate finance to the large and medium 
sized companies.  The ethical considerations here relate to how the banks strive to 
fully comprehend these commercial customers, the purposes of the loans, and the 
sources of repayment.  Because all corporations have financial officers specifically 
tasked with banking relations, this segment of the research does not focus on how 
banks relate to clients but rather how they reveal their values during the interactive 
process with corporations. 
Since nearly all corporations employ several layers of knowledgeable and 
highly-trained financial and legal specialists, the concern is not about corporate 
clients receiving unethical treatment at the hands of banks but rather the instances of 
conflicts of interest and corrupt practices on the part of banks and their employees 
while the deeper focus is on whether banks acquiesce in the perpetration of unethical 
practices by corporate clients. 
Several banks affirm that all their staff members are required to undergo 
sessions on the ethical values embodied in the respective Bank’s Code of Conduct; 
the stress seems to be the recognition and avoidance of conflicts of interest 
throughout the process of credit policy formulation, marketing, credit proposal, 
independent review and approval.  These banks state that they strike a balance 
between foreseeable social costs and anticipated business opportunities and that they 
are prepared to give up the latter if they come at the expense of their commitment to 
social responsibility. 
According to some bank managers in Hong Kong their credit policy follows 
the best practices on environmental risk management as released by the Hong Kong 
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Association of Banks.  They maintain a list of industries considered high risk for 
ethical reasons.  For instance, some banks do not finance gambling casinos.   
In addition to evaluating the credit risk of financing proposals, a few bankers 
stressed the importance of assessing reputation risk, meaning that they would not 
wish to be involved in any activities that would damage their reputation.  Since a 
handful of them have adopted the Equator Principles, these banks ensure that all 
projects that they support are environmentally sustainable.   They would turn down 
loan requests for projects that damage the environment.   
The chief executive of Lion Bank affirmed that his bank’s relationship 
managers153 are very well trained and among the best in the industry.  These managers 
are expected to regularly visit the customers’ premises, be thoroughly familiar with 
all operational facets, and fully understand the lending rationale in each situation.  
Through managing a good relationship process, the bank puts robust credit evaluation 
into practice and, as a result, has experienced a low level of loan losses. 
Lion Bank is selective with the industries to which it provides financing.  As a 
principle it will only finance those in which it has banking officers with specialized 
expertise.  For example, it previously shunned the electronics and airline industries 
but now lends to them because they have acquired the requisite industry know-how 
through recently hired banking professionals.  The bank finances projects in China 
both from Hong Kong and its affiliates on the mainland.  It does not support 
subterranean mining operations due to a lack of industry competence, though it grants 
banking facilities for extraction activities above ground.   
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Lion has undergone rapid growth in corporate finance over the last five years 
and is now a major player.  The CEO’s remarks depict an institution that has 
developed and implemented prudent credit policies and procedures, which are vital 
for a sound bank and a stable monetary system.  However, there is no explicit 
reference to ethical values relating to conservation of the environment or upholding of 
social values in the community.  Lion states that it refrains from financing gambling 
casinos but admits that the bank is a big lender to property developers and hotels, 
which might lease out a small portion of the premises to casinos.  In such cases the 
chief executive claims that the bank would carefully weigh up the overall merits of 
the project. 
Dragon, another large bank in Hong Kong, stated that it has long-standing 
guidelines about companies to whom it will lend and with whom it will invest.. The 
bank expects its customers to comply with the relevant legal and regulatory 
requirements wherever they are doing business.  Dragon also tends to take a 
decidedly public stance on such issues.  It was one of the original signatories of the 
UN Environment Programme Statement by Financial Institutions and a member of the 
UN’s Global Compact, which challenges companies to advance labour standards, 
human rights and environmental responsibilities.  Dragon has endorsed the Global 
Sullivan Principles that address economic, social and political justice issues.  It 
supports the OECD Guidelines, which promote sustainability, and has also adopted 
the Equator Principles, which requires assessing the social and environmental impact 
of long-term commercial lending.154 
As a consequence these Dragon bankers declare that they are even prepared to 
walk away from business with existing customers if these fail to demonstrate ethical 
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behaviour with respect to the environment and communities in which they operate.  
They cited as an example that they have traditionally been major bankers for the 
timber industry in Malaysia but now will only finance those companies that practise 
sustainability through replanting of trees.  A further comment was that Dragon had 
not provided banking services to entities engaged in the manufacturing of armaments 
and munitions for the last thirty years. 
In shifting the focus to Australia, one sees diverse types of corporate finance 
because of the extensive range of company sizes and varieties of financial institutions.  
The credit unions, building societies, and community banks normally have a very 
small percentage of loan exposure to commercial finance, which would typically be in 
local agriculture, such as faming or fishery, tourism in the form of restaurants or 
small hotels, or other small business enterprises such as sundry retailers, handicrafts 
and specialty food producers.  In these instances the banks should very likely be well 
informed about the plans, operations and progress of their various customers.  While 
there might be exceptions, one would expect that accountable bankers would quickly 
discover if their clients were causing some harm to the community, engaging in 
fraudulent practices, or were themselves experiencing difficulties. 
At the other extreme one finds major commercial (trading) and investment 
(merchant) banks155 whose clients are large Australian or multinational corporations 
operating throughout the country and the whole world.  As cited in the case of an 
international bank in Hong Kong, many large companies operate in industries that 
require specialized technical expertise on the part of the relationship banking 
managers.  The industry sectors of greatest concern to responsible banks are forestry 
and mining.  Banks that adhere to the Equator Principles extend only a modest 
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amount of financing to forestry projects and only consider old-growth forests while 
requiring the companies to adhere to strict Australian environmental regulations, 
which they deem more protective than in many Asian countries.   
Mining is a big segment for some banks and therefore more difficult to ensure 
that environmental safeguards are in place.  In evaluating loan requests they need to 
probe into the environmental policy of the corporations.156  Banks claim to be 
generally satisfied with Australian entities operating locally but have concerns with 
overseas joint ventures because an overseas partner might take short cuts that are 
permitted in their own country but are in violation of sound environmental principles.  
Truly responsible banks stress that they believe and enforce their environmental 
policies and encourage their existing and prospective corporate clients to alter their 
environmental behaviour even if they might lose customers. 
A handful of banks claim not to be active in financing leveraged buy-outs and 
compare this situation with the eighties when high-profile entrepreneurs borrowed 
large amounts of money in order to take over public companies.  In a leveraged buy-
out, the acquiring entity (A) assumes control of another company (B) by obtaining 
loans through a pledge of the assets of the acquired (B).  In many cases the loans are 
repaid through greater profits attained through sales of the pledged assets and cost 
cutting from the phase-out of some operating divisions and termination of workers. 
It is highly noteworthy that a former bank chief executive declared that 
corporate finance has changed.  In his day there were still genuine corporate 
relationships where a major corporation, such as BHP, would have a lead bank that 
could extend a significant loan facility to it and would understand its operations and 
requirements.  BHP would be able to rely on that bank and there would be mutual 
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assurance of trust and goodwill.  Nowadays banks tend to sell down any big exposure 
so they have less risk from any single borrower on their balance sheet.  They sell off 
the loans through asset securitisation, which is different from the process of loan 
syndication in which the lead bank maintained a relationship with the corporation.157  
In a syndicated transaction the lead bank would underwrite significant amounts of 
debt that it would subsequently parcel out to participating banks, but it would always 
retain a sizeable portion on its own books.  Nowadays banks prefer to completely 
unload the entire debt offering, so banks are uncertain which bank is maintaining a 
credit watch on the debtor, and the former bank head said this should be a concern to 
regulators.   
If this is indeed the case, then the banks might possibly be negligent in their 
continuing credit monitoring of the corporate borrowers and consequently ill-
informed about their activities and how these impact on the community and 
environmental sustainability.  However, when this retired banker was asked about his 
opinion on the Equator Principles, he expressed a firm conviction that banks should 
not impose their values on everybody else because their purpose is only to provide 
financial intermediation service. 
He feels that it is acceptable for a bank to provide financing for a project that 
is a legitimate part of the community, if the bank’s due diligence determines the 
ability of the borrower to repay the loan.  If a project (such as a power plant that is a 
potential pollutant) or an enterprise (such as a logging company) is legally 
permissible in a state and its operations do not run the risk of foreclosure, this former 
Kangaroo chief executive says it is not the bank’s job to say that its values cannot 
support that.  This attitude essentially affirms that a bank must not develop its own 
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set of independent ethical values.  This way of thinking is reiterated by another 
banker. 
An allied view in banking is that true corporate relationship lending has 
probably existed only in the middle market and has not been evident at the top end for 
some time.  The reason is that major corporate entities have direct access to a wide 
variety of market instruments through investment banks and do not want relationships 
with commercial or trading banks.  On the other hand, middle market companies have 
less choice in terms of capital market instruments so they require intermediaries and 
banks are still key providers of funds.158  Therefore relationship plays a role and is 
critical to success for both borrowers and banks.   
For small business enterprises it is not considered practical or affordable for 
banks to employ relationship managers for a company that has an A$ 50,000 loan, so 
no deep relationships are formed.  In the past small business firms did not receive 
unsecured loans from banks and used to pledge fixed assets (property or equipment) 
in order to obtain loans.  Small business has gained the most from deregulation, 
which has given such firms more access to intermediation.   
The demise of relationship banking suggests that the major banks are no 
longer completely knowledgeable about the activities and operations of their largest 
borrowers and customers.  The banks would necessarily be dependent on public 
disclosures of these corporations and supervision by government regulators.  
However, it indicates that banks are not fully aware of the ethical conduct of their 
customers. 
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Some senior bankers say that, while their banks cannot support a client in any 
illegal activity, they see a problem in traversing legal requirements to ethical criteria 
because they do not want to impose their own principles on other people or 
companies.  If a certain activity is legal and deemed acceptable by society, then they 
see no reason to deny banking services for that.159  An example of this line of thinking 
in some banks is a presupposition that society endorses the existence of gambling, so 
these institutions lend to every casino and gambling operator in Australia.  The 
argument is that an organisation should not interpose its values beyond those of a 
democratic society.  This is the outlook of some senior executives.  There is a similar 
approach to environmental sustainability.  While some banks do not support 
companies that damage the environment, they rely on governments to set the 
standards and enforce them.  They consider banks a reflection of society and therefore 
reason that one must start with society, not banks, to identify its values.  They 
contend that in a democratic system people elect a government to make decisions on 
their behalf, including passing legislation that reflects the mores and values of the 
society.   
However bankers are pragmatists.  Ultimately an institution will pursue its 
own interest.  A senior banker at Kangaroo said that if a sizeable proportion of their 
customers close their accounts to protest the bank’s loans to gambling operators, they 
would probably reconsider their position, because it might not be in the bank’s 
economic interest to support gambling in the face of widespread opposition.160 This is 
a statement of self-interest in the pursuit of profits. 
In exploring the topic of lending in China where certain domestic companies 
have been reported to be guilty of environmental destruction, unsafe working 
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conditions, and manufacturing of consumer items deemed dangerous to the health161, a 
top banker asserted that they conduct significant due diligence prior to undertaking 
any loans and investments.  However he cautioned that they must be careful not to 
introduce Australian or Western values and profess moral and economic superiority 
when judging the wisdom of the actions of Chinese enterprises.  This corporate 
banker believes that the Chinese do not consciously seek to pollute the environment 
but are still learning.  The consequences only emerge slowly over time, so perceptions 
thus change and banks adapt rules to those new realities.162 
The responsibility of banks operating globally is to convey the set of ethical 
values underpinning their policies to customers who operate in other geographical 
locations and at the same time to comprehend the differences in values of the other 
regions.  Where minor disparity exists, the banks should engage with their customers 
in dialogue in order to reach acceptable consensus.  If significant divergence presents 
itself, the banks should assert their values and insist on their acceptance as a pre-
condition of establishing a banking relationship. 
A senior banker at Bandicoot, a leading financial institution, explained that 
project financing in their group encompasses three sectors: energy and utilities, 
infrastructure, and resources (relatively small proportion compared to the rest).163  
Two senior engineers with significant experience at both practical and consulting 
levels review the environmental and engineering aspects of each project and report 
separately to the approval authorities on compliance with environmental regulations.  
The credit approval process goes beyond the economics of the transaction and 
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considers social issues and as well as the project’s environmental impact.  The bank’s 
position is less complicated than at other firms because until recently it has only 
financed projects in OECD countries, which have stringent environmental protection 
schemes.  These project lenders maintain that they try to form a view of the customer 
and not just a specific transaction; they normally receive the project deal flow from 
existing relationships within the bank.   
At the time of the interview, Bandicoot was not a signatory to the original 
Equator Principles because, after discussing the matter with the International Finance 
Corporation and other banks, the project financiers contended that their standards 
were more rigorous.  However, after looking at the new Equator Principles, the 
bank’s so-called carbon solutions group began reviewing the bank’s systems to 
determine if these were sufficient to be able to adhere to their avowed corporate 
principles.  Carbon trading in Australia was said to be limited because the country 
was not a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol on the environment. 
Bandicoot participates in private equity and leveraged buyout deals and 
disagrees with the contention that jobs are often eliminated in order to prop up 
earnings.  The counter-claim here is that the bank generally looks at private equity 
propositions in situations of underperforming companies wherein injection of capital 
expenditure leads to increased productivity.  One could accept that infusion of private 
equity to improve performance and management efficiency is a fine business model 
but most cases are accompanied by substantial leverage with the target company’s 
assets utilised as collateral for huge debt piled on the company.  In order to service 
the added debt the company needs to cut other costs, which usually include 
manpower. 
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There are several observations on how bankers see their activities in corporate 
finance.  Firstly, there seems to be the aspiration among some key banks to fully 
understand the operations of their customers through recruitment of industry 
specialists, who are able to analyse industry-specific project and credit risks.  The 
risks also include possible harm to communities and the environment.  These analysts 
assess the likelihood of project failure and corporate inability to achieve set targets, 
and they attempt to devise mechanisms to mitigate against such risks.  What is 
bothering is that some risks are not perceived in advance and, even if they are, the 
measures taken to prevent their occurrence could prove to be deficient. 
Secondly, it is worrying to hear some senior bankers lament that relationship 
banking has ceased to exist, because this implies that banks no longer maintain 
ongoing dialogue with their key corporate customers and are not as well-versed in the 
execution of strategy, operational issues, and needs of these companies as they used 
to be.  These circumstances have developed because of the dominance of investment 
banks which have promoted direct access to financial markets as global liquidity 
multiplied during the decade ending in 2007.  Due to falling interest rates and 
growing investor appetite these institutions were eagerly competing with each other to 
win mandates from corporations wishing to raise debt or equity in the capital markets.  
The investment banks have previously only worried about market risk, that is, 
whether they could sell off the full amount of their underwriting.  They have a short-
term focus on the highly lucrative immediate fees from each transaction and the 
trading profits on the securities they handle, so they have no motivation to sustain a 
continuing credit review or ethical audit of these corporate clients.  They are aware 
that, when these companies need to raise funds again in the future, the choice of lead 
investment bank will rest on the bank’s performance in the previous fund raising and 
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on the attractiveness of the future offer.  The inference is that banks have relinquished 
accountability for the actions of large corporations. 
Thirdly, it is astonishing to hear some senior bankers declare that, if certain 
prevailing practices are deemed acceptable by people in that society and are not 
judged illegal, they should not impose their values and refuse to serve as a banker.  
They argue that it is the role of government to legislate and they should comply with 
the laws but not have to go beyond that.  They are therefore apathetic about 
community values and environmental protection measures as contained in the Equator 
Principles.  While those few banks that opt to subscribe to broader ethical criteria are 
indeed commendable, it is important to note that there are many who disdain such 
action and would only go along with this in order to enhance their ‘reputation’ in the 
marketplace and push their marketing efforts. 
The problem stemming from the above observations is that investment banks 
have been able to invent a myriad of complex financial instruments which banks and 
other lenders have been so keen to promote and sell to all their customers over the 
past decade without either comprehending themselves or explaining to the ultimate 
buyers what the intricate and perilous risks could and would become.  This 
predicament foreshadows the failure of sub-prime lenders to assume responsibility for 
their actions and a breakdown in transparency.   
 
E.  Foreign Exchange and Securities Trading 
Trading room activities are unique because banks execute transactions for two very 
different purposes, namely the needs of their clientele and profit generation for 
themselves.  The foreign exchange needs of clients arise from exports and imports of 
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goods and services, cross-border investments, and travel expenses.  Foreign exchange 
trading underpins the international payments systems.  Banks acting as principals 
engage in so-called proprietary trading in many situations, for example, when they act 
as a ‘market maker’ in a certain currency or when they perceive an apparent disparity 
between current and forward rates and decide to take an arbitrage opportunity.  
Trading on behalf of clients entails significant conflicts of interest (because there is 
constant temptation for the bank or the individual trader for self-dealing), so well-
managed banks enforce client confidentiality, segregation of duties,164 restriction of 
personal dealing,165prohibition of dealing outside the bank’s premises and after-office-
hours trading, and systematic checks by internal and external auditors. Proprietary 
trading carries financial risk for the bank, which must determine that there are 
appropriate controls in place so that the risk capital is not unduly impaired.  The 
ethical problems arise when the individual traders seek their own personal financial 
gain ahead of the clients or the bank.   
Securities trading involves transactions on behalf of the clientele as well as for 
the bank’s own account.  The securities consist of both equity and debt instruments, 
including asset-backed securities.  This is the area in banks that is responsible for 
funding loans as well as selling off and dealing in loan assets.  Since conflicts of 
interest need to be avoided, segregation of duties and restriction on staff dealing are 
imposed.  Every bank has a Code of Conduct that provides guidelines for avoidance 
of conflicts and ethical problems.   
In many banks there is a positive correlation between the compensation of 
foreign exchange and securities dealers and their performance in terms of trading 
                                                
164 Between front or those liaising direct with the clients, middle or those who execute the trades, and 
back office or those who process the trading orders. 
165 Employees in the front-middle-back office of the foreign exchange department are forbidden to 
conduct foreign exchange trading for their own personal accounts. 
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profit.  The danger here lies in the enticement for dealers to assume an overly 
speculative foreign exchange or securities position.  The measures of control are 
embedded in the dealing limits and the other restrictions above.  The basic problem is 
that such dealers are motivated primarily by the financial gains they produce.  The 
recommendations for improvement include staff training on compliance and business 
ethics, but it is objectively difficult to judge whether such an approach is really 
effective.     
In the view of two senior bankers in Hong Kong that city has developed into 
the third largest financial market in the world and in order to attain this status it has 
needed to be well-disciplined and well-governed.  In speaking about their 
organisation they asserted that integrity begins with the people thy employ, because 
“their individual ethical standards of behaviour are the bedrock of the integrity of an 
organisation.” The recruitment process is therefore very important for this bank.  
Once the employees are admitted, the long-established core standards of the group 
provide the moral compass.166   
There is a general acceptance that any large financial services entity faces 
potential conflicts on a regular basis, so for bank managers the key to managing these 
successfully is to have a vigorous structure that sustains the separation of the private 
activities (banking / relationship / advisory) from the public activities (research / 
trading / sales).  Internal controls and audit functions are deemed essential in 
managing a prudent and secure system. 
Most banks employ control procedures in order to prevent conflicts of interest 
and fraud.  Although each financial institution might have a varied approach, the 
procedures usually include specific rules on trading limits, designated separation of 
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functions, and robust auditing.167  The emphasis is on prevention, which seeks to avert 
placing dealers and operations clerks in situations that might entice them to commit 
fraud or theft. 
The principal control mechanism used by banks in Hong Kong is a clear 
segregation of duty, which means that on a bank-wide level, they would have 
different departments looking after each risk category.  Dealers in the trading room 
strike deals within their defined trading authority limits.  Dealers acting for customers 
are strictly separated from those acting for the bank.  The settlement division is 
responsible for deal settlements to ensure that all orders have been executed and all 
parties to transactions have fulfilled their obligations.  A controller from the finance 
department independently verifies the trading positions, while the risk management 
department also monitors daily transactions.   
In addition to the separation of functions, the audit department carries out 
periodic audit checks to ensure compliance with related policies and procedures.  
Internal guidelines and codes of conduct are set up for all dealers to follow.  These 
guidelines include issues related to regulatory requirements and ethical values.  
External accounting firms also perform external audits over and beyond these internal 
controls.  
In certain institutions there is a belief that education is very important in 
uplifting the integrity of the staff.  Human resource departments set up various 
educational approaches to reinforce the importance of work ethics.  They hold regular 
talks and seminars on regulatory requirements and the bank’s internal requirements.  
Some banks in Hong Kong, such as Panda, periodically invite officers from the 
                                                
167 Written submission from Panda Bank on 28 October 2006. 
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Independent Commission against Corruption to come and talk about work ethics and 
regulation. 
This system of controls, segregation of duties, and internal audit is standard 
practice at banks that wish to avoid conflicts of interest and discourage fraudulent 
self-dealing in the frenetic environment of global currency and securities trading.  The 
overt reference to education is noteworthy because there is acknowledgment of the 
role of education in values formation. 
One striking observation is that a leading bank in Hong Kong does not have a 
dealer bonus compensation programme that rewards them for income or volume 
contribution, which is the norm at most banks.168  There was recognition that a bonus 
incentive scheme would motivate dealers but also worry that, if such a monetary 
inducement was too performance oriented, it could prompt dealers to assume 
excessive risk or engage in devious trading to enhance their results.  There was a 
conscious decision that trading performance as measured by an individual’s trading 
volume and income would not be the sole critical element for determining annual 
compensation for dealers. 
In the Australian scenario credit unions, community-based banks, and 
medium-sized banks that cater mainly to individuals typically do not carry out any 
foreign exchange or securities trading on their own and outsource their requirements 
in these specialties to their respective correspondent banks.  The demand for these 
trading products among smaller banks is generally low.  These institutions therefore 
have less complicated organizational structures and fewer market and operational 
risks. 
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The major local banks, which deal with large corporations, and the foreign 
banks have extensive activities in foreign exchange and securities dealing.  These 
institutions normally operate on a global scale to deal in currencies, trade in 
securities, and fund the requirements of the respective banks.  Active dealers trade on 
every major financial market in virtually all time zones.  Dangers are always present 
because of the customary trading frenzy, so banks have in place a system of controls 
similar to that in Hong Kong as described above.   
Trading in the Australian market has been depicted as generally free of fraud 
despite the isolated well-publicised case that occurred in January 2004 at a major 
bank.169 Dealer fraud is normally spotted in the back office or through alerts in the 
market that would trigger an internal investigation.  But the culture of that bank did 
not support the back office, which had protested that something was amiss, and 
therefore the errant traders in the front office prevailed.  In addition, the co-workers 
themselves ignored the warnings of market players in other banks who had spotted 
the anomalies. 
The classic trader mentality is portrayed as aggressive and motivated solely by 
profits and bonuses, hence there is a need for unambiguous separation between the 
front and back offices, and there must be good monitoring and strong compliance.  
But problems and deception do occur as well as occasional momentous crises. 
One large bank, Koala, revisits the issue of currency and securities trading 
every time a global crisis occurs.  It constantly tests for openness and transparency.  
Koala has in place processes and protocols to give a controlled environment, such as 
reporting requirements, separation of duties, and internal audits.  But ultimately there 
                                                
169 "Heads Roll at Nab over Foreign Exchange Scandal," Sydney Morning Herald, 12 March 2004. 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/03/12/1078594547046.html?from=storyrhs (accessed 3 June 
2010). 
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is the belief that the culture of an organisation and the degree of transparency are the 
determining factors whether people will seek to hide or manipulate their situation.  
Culture impels people to do the right thing.170 
There are three courses of action that Koala Bank advocates: 
1. The management has to understand what their varied businesses do and 
what all the employees are actually doing.  Hands-on management is vital. 
2. The management should encourage a culture of speaking up and ‘not shoot 
the messenger who delivers bad news’, so people are not uncomfortable in 
raising unwelcome topics.  This is the important notion of the whistle-
blower. 
3. Foster teamwork.  The bank must motivate bank staff to share what they 
are doing; it should discourage a lone wolf mentality.  A well-managed 
bank tries to create an environment that would not encourage an individual 
to manipulate his / her individual profitability for personal gain, so the 
bonus compensation formula would not drive an individual’s outcome.171 
Things can and do go wrong.  As mentioned above, a major Australian 
institution encountered a foreign exchange debacle in recent years when four FX 
options traders were discovered to be acting in a fraudulent manner and, though their 
immediate superiors might have been aware of the wrongdoing, they turned a blind 
eye because everyone’s bonuses were structured towards their doing well.   It seemed 
that the primary reason was the cultural environment, meaning that the management 
did not do enough to examine potential risks in the business.172 
                                                
170 Transcript AU 3. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Transcript AU 8. 
115 
In the opinion of bankers it is impossible to eliminate fraud or inappropriate 
activity in the dealing room or any other form of business but it is important to 
understand what the potential risks are, assess what level of risk is acceptable to the 
company, and then install a set of controls and mitigants to reduce risks to the level 
with which the institution is comfortable. 
The view seems to be that the way to prevent dealing room fraud and reduce 
the risks is through a control process at three levels of defence:173 
Firstly, at the business level the managers should ensure that employees have 
strong capability and this starts during the hiring stage when a separate group from 
the hiring entity carries out reference checks on the candidates’ probity and 
accomplishments.  Once people join the bank, they must undergo compulsory and on-
going training, some of which is product focused to make sure that the staff know the 
products well and can communicate these to clients.  In another training component 
the employees must understand the code of conduct and how the bank wants to treat 
clients.  Successful completion of the latter form of training is a pre-requisite to 
continuing employment at the bank.  Employees are also strongly encouraged to 
pursue continuing education outside of the business specialty. 
At a second level of control there are checks and balances through separate 
risk management and compliance.  Through this process employees can raise risk and 
compliance concerns either through managers in the line of business or escalate these 
directly to the independent compliance group.  This would come under the whistle 
blower programme. 
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116 
Thirdly, internal and external auditors regularly examine activities to ascertain 
the absence of fraud.  Audit functions have assumed more importance in 
reinvigorated corporate governance at all banks.  Yet cynics would say that outlawing 
dishonesty is very difficult and all problems in dealing rooms have always involved 
dishonesty.  Despite all the attempts to impose controls this might be the prevailing 
attitude among top bankers.  The following highlights a glaring example. 
During the week of 21 January 2008 when the share markets around the world 
began tumbling down in terror of the portents of American recession, another 
momentous scandal blew up in the dealing room of the respected French bank, 
Société Generale.174 The announcement stated that a single dealer, Jerome Kerviel, 
had substantially exceeded his dealing limits.175  The markets were shocked to 
discover that this solitary dealer had placed the bank’s capital at risk to the tune of 
EUR 50 billion, which was more than the capital of the bank at that time.  After 
learning of this fraud, Société Generale undertook to unwind the numerous put 
options on which Mr. Kerviel had gambled; he was betting that the German stock 
prices would collapse.  It was alleged that Mr. Kerviel came from a mundane 
background and did not stand out from his colleagues, but that he had earlier worked 
in the middle room operation of another bank, which provided him the technical 
expertise to enable him to circumvent controls on his personal trading. 
Although police and regulatory investigations were still underway, statements 
from Mr. Kerviel claimed that he was not seeking to make a fortune for himself but 
rather to achieve recognition for his brilliant efforts in earning profits for the bank.  
                                                
174 John Lichfield, "'Rogue Trader' Breaks His Silence and Insists His Bosses Knew What He Was 
Doing," The Independent, 30 January 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk (accessed 1 February 2008). 
175 Each dealer or trader in a dealing room (shares, bonds, foreign exchange, or derivatives) has a 
specific daily monetary limit to which he / she must strictly adhere, and this is closely monitored by the 
so-called middle and back room staff under computerised surveillance. 
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He said that his performance until the end of 2007 was excellent, even if he only 
received a slim bonus, so he insisted that his superiors must have been well aware of 
his strategy and tactics.176  According to reports, he took very little vacation (unusual 
especially for a Frenchman) and always worked at night, which should have triggered 
an investigation much earlier.  Indeed some exchanges, notably EUREX in Frankfurt, 
had complained to the bank about irregularities resulting from this dealer’s 
transactions, but the bank consistently rebutted the allegations.  The cost of the 
unwinding of the unauthorised transactions was expected to result in a loss to the 
bank of EUR 5 Billion, which was a hefty slice of the bank’s capital and would 
drastically impair all its stakeholders. 
While this is an amazing case of gross fraud perpetrated by one individual 
who was supposedly familiar with the computerized system used to monitor and audit 
each trading transaction, one would deem it a clear illustration that all the processes 
and controls of a bank can be sabotaged and overridden if people engaged in the 
activity do not have a culture of honesty and values and want to commit illegal acts.  
If Jerome Kerviel’s claim was honest, that he did not personally profit monetarily 
from his illicit trades, then his motivation of wanting to achieve fame was certainly 
based on false values and a lack of morals.  Moreover one would surmise that this 
trader’s immediate supervisor and senior managers must have been so pleased with 
the previous income and profits that he was earning for the bank that they did not 
bother to scrutinize his methods.  Truly competent managers should thoroughly know 
their products and understand the processes underpinning them.  Good honest 
management would have quickly realized that extraordinary profits under normal 
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conditions could only have arisen from taking excessive risks or engaging in 
fraudulent trading.  The ethos of integrity must commence at the top.   
 
F.  Code of Conduct 
Every bank has a Code of Conduct, which is an affirmation from its board of directors 
and senior management of the values of the bank and the desired behaviour of every 
employee.  Other names are used, such as Ethical Code of Conduct, Principles and 
Values, or Corporate Principles.  Many banks provide web links to their respective 
Codes on their corporate websites, so customers and the public at large can peruse 
these.  There are similarities in the stated principles and values, though some banks 
have a more extensive list, which could comprise several topics.  Business principles 
might include outstanding customer service, effective and efficient operations, strong 
capital and liquidity, prudent lending policy, strict expense discipline.  Some 
acknowledge the importance of employee loyalty and dedication in fostering lasting 
customer relationships and achieving teamwork. 
In addition, banks also declare key business values, which could consist of 
several benchmarks such as the highest personal standards of integrity at all 
levels, commitment to truth and fair dealing, hands-on management at all levels, 
commitment to quality and competence, a minimum of bureaucracy, fast decisions 
and implementation, putting the team’s interests ahead of the individual, the 
appropriate delegation of authority with accountability, fair and objective employer, a 
diverse team underpinned by a meritocratic approach to recruitment / selection / 
promotion, a commitment to complying with the spirit and letter of all laws and        
regulations wherever the bank conducts business, the exercise of sustainability 
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through detailed assessments of lending proposals and investments, the promotion of 
good environmental practice and sustainable development, and commitment to the 
welfare and development of each local community. 
A few banks state that their reputation is founded on adherence to these 
principles and values, and that all actions taken by officers and employees should 
conform to the publicly declared code.  A bank in Hong Kong defines its core values 
as Customer Focus, Focus on Quality, and Integrity / Honesty.  Integrity is defined in 
this bank as exhibiting and practising the highest ethical standards, recognition for the 
highest standards of corporate governance, and a relationship with customers 
characterised as honest, trustworthy, reliable and dependable.  The bank’s top 
management enunciated these values that were then developed into a mission 
statement by the strategic planning department and disseminated throughout the 
organisation. 
New bank recruits are required to attend an induction course that explains 
these core values.  During regular performance appraisals managers and supervisors 
are expected to take these values into account when determining the key performance 
indicators of bank staff.  Furthermore the mission statement is displayed as a screen 
saver on workstations to constantly remind employees of the core values. 
The bank acknowledges that its values have evolved as a result of growing 
awareness of consumer rights and the influence of guidelines issued by the Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority.  There was a candid admission that policies were 
previously one-sided, that is, designed to solely protect the interests of the bank.  
Since then, the bank has reviewed its contracts in order to assure fair treatment for 
customers.    
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There is a unique prototype in a bank that has preserved its local tradition of 
customer service and integrity over many decades while its affiliation with a global 
network has enhanced its values because the whole group subscribes to the highest 
international standards.  It has retained old clients while gaining new ones because of 
its perception as a traditional local bank.177  Its culture is perceived to be more 
conservative but service-oriented than its parent bank, which is viewed as very 
professional and efficient but cold. 
Yet, in spite of its warm and welcoming image, this major local bank (in 
common with many others) employs tiered pricing whereby customers with larger 
deposits, more accounts, or bigger loans – in other words, those who contribute more 
income to the bank – receive more benefits and favourable pricing.  The wealthier 
clients pay comparatively lower rates than those less well off.  This is one example of 
utilitarianism at work in banking; it would be deemed an ethical dilemma by 
contractualists. 
A former chief executive asserts that the culture of his previous bank, Dragon, 
is imbued with ethical practice, which is documented in a code of conduct distributed 
to all staff members, who must certify that they have read and understood it.  
Transgression of the rules and the code is subject to severe penalties.  There is a claim 
that the bank would rather forego a piece of business than lose its reputation.   Since 
the organisation is global in its operations, it is subject to countless regulatory 
authorities and it therefore allegedly takes the highest common denominator, 
oftentimes enacting internal regulations stricter than required under pertinent local 
laws.  Hence many of its practices have allegedly been adapted by both the HKAB 
and the HKMA. 
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The Dragon banker asserted that one cannot necessarily teach people to be 
honest and can only hope that background checks on new recruits can give an 
indication about their character.  He elaborated further. 
The only way you can really deal with it is to make sure that the most senior 
people have achieved their positions because they have demonstrated not only the 
ability to do the banking business but also that they follow the set of principles 
that you would wish anybody else to follow.  And if they follow those principles, 
the chances are they will make sure that other people who are working for them 
follow those principles, and so it goes on down through the organisation.178 
 
The Dragon executive added that once the leadership has set the right example 
that is emulated throughout the institution, then it becomes easier to spot someone 
who is prepared to cut corners or to take risks without asking questions.  Occasions 
arise when young, enthusiastic new hires want to do things faster and, in their 
opinion, better and ask if they can try a different procedure but are refused because 
they are told it has always been done the other way.  According to this senior banker:  
very often they are told that because doing it any other way has been tried and has 
not worked.  What happens then is that they go ahead and try to do it anyway.  
When something goes wrong, they then cover it up.179 
 
Within Asia and several other cultures there is in Dragon almost a zero tolerance for 
faults arising from infringement of rules.  Those involved in such breaches of ethical 
conduct are severely penalized, but, if they deny their transgression and conceal it, 
they compound the problem by not owning up to it and by continuing to do it in order 
to hide whatever the lapse of which they were guilty.  This chief executive subscribes 
to the principle that a well-managed bank does not want surprises.  If somebody 
commits a blunder, one should admit it straight away because there could still be 
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remedies but, if one just carries on, it could be too late.  He would prefer that 
individuals ask questions if they do not understand processes so they might be able to 
approach them correctly rather than make guesses and get them wrong.   
Despite this bank’s concern about ethical conduct and its reputation, it was 
one of the few foreign banks that acquired a major sub-prime lender in America but 
when it recognized the hazards in 2007 and its subsidiary was engulfed in a sinking 
housing market and mortgage loan defaults, it was quick to admit that it had made a 
mistake and was probably the first major bank to exit that business.  This will be 
revisited in Chapter 6 where the American sub-prime activity is dissected. 
Due to their diversity the Australian financial institutions in the research study 
have wide-ranging codes of conduct.  At one end of the spectrum there was a credit 
union that defined its values as respect, responsibility, and excellence.   It arrived at 
this affirmation after an internal process of dialogue among the managers.  
Presumably these values refer to respect in the organisation for one another and for its 
customers / members, responsibility for one’s actions, and excellence of service 
towards its members.  The institution strives to market these values to all its staff 
members.   
A typical large bank expresses its code of conduct as corporate principles, 
which are comprised of behavioural and compliance standards, the latter defining 
how employees need to act according to various statutory regulations under which the 
bank operates.  In a major bank the behavioural benchmarks resulted from a survey of 
5,000 staff members who were asked:  “What are the standards of corporate 
behaviour that you would expect in a company for which you would like to work?”  
123 
The responses have been distilled into a one-page statement of corporate principles 
that is provided to all bank employees.180 
The bank highlights five principles: 
1. Openness and honesty. 
2. Responsibility and accountability for one’s actions. 
3. Teamwork and collaboration. 
4. Respect for people. 
5. Speed, simplicity and execution of promises. 
Each employee must go through and successfully pass two gates during the 
mid-year and the yearly performance reviews.  These are the tests for behaviour and 
compliance.  There are three possible colour-coded outcomes:  green, signifying that 
the employee is acting according to desired expectations; amber, which indicates 
there are areas for improvement; red, meaning the person is significantly in breach of 
the standards. 
The statistical results, specifying the distribution of green, amber, and red 
scores, are reported to the board of directors and the regulators to show the extent of 
cultural change in the organisation.  The management is not uncomfortable with an 
increasing number of amber scores because these suggest that employees are prepared 
to identify compliance infringements, so compliance officers can take steps to 
mitigate these.  These are also viewed as signs of rising standards. 
Personnel compensation is comprised of a cash salary, a short-term incentive 
in the form of an annual bonus, and a long-term incentive.  With a red score an 
employee is not eligible for any bonus; one with an amber score is penalized with a 
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significant reduction of approximately 50% on any potential annual bonus.  This 
system therefore operates as a stick. 
This benchmarking system was developed as a result of the foreign exchange 
options fraud that was perpetrated at this bank as described in the earlier section.  
After the foreign exchange scandal, top managers realised that a significant 
contributor to poor ethical behaviour was that they only measured sales, so they 
introduced behavioural standards as well as compliance standards, which would form 
part of the gateway to performance evaluation.  But compliance standards were 
detached from behavioural standards with which a senior compliance officer 
disagreed because compliance should be deemed a combination of process and 
behaviour. 
Eight behavioural standards such as openness and honesty were identified that 
all organisations should have.  There was the belief that even with the best processes 
in the world compliance would not occur without proper behaviour because people 
could continually work around the process, which was what happened in the foreign 
exchange options case. 
The staff at Bandicoot must pass the behavioural standards and the 
compliance standards before they can even be considered for their sales targets.  The 
results in 2006 for the three compliance standards were: green – for 90% of all staff in 
Australia, meaning they could go straight to performance appraisal; amber – evidence 
of bullying or harassment or cutting corners – for which the maximum they could 
earn was capped at 50% of their entitlement; red – unacceptable behaviour such as 
accessing pornography on the internet at work – for which the gate was shut.   Ten 
per cent of employees were assessed amber and red.  Of 22,000 employees in 
Australia 70 people were caught red (someone was discovered spending 20 hours a 
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week watching pornography at work) although this did not necessarily result in 
dismissal.181  Pornography itself is fraught with moral problems while those depicting 
paedophilia are illicit; accessing it in the workplace indicates ethical deficiencies in 
an individual’s values and violates the employer’s stated code of conduct and 
diminishes an employee’s work contribution. 
The rating method instils fear in the staff in relation to the behaviour gates and 
the compliance gates.  The worrisome aspect is that the principal motivator in this 
organisation is a stick, that one must do certain things in order to avoid punishment.  
It encourages behaviour that has not been developed from within the individuals, so 
the use of a threat has limitations.182  
In a well-structured incentive system superior management recognizes good 
and bad achievement and does not merely grant a straight bonus reward.  But in 
striving for a balanced scorecard there seems to be difficulty with subjective measures 
of behaviour and not recognizing financial results.   
Nonetheless there is an allusion to a high correlation between good behaviour 
and economic success.  A top executive discovered that first-class corporate bankers 
are nice people because prickly people, who are tough to deal with, do not progress 
well.  In the business context society is attracted to people with positive 
characteristics.  If an individual does not share the values of the group to which she 
belongs, that group consciously or unconsciously isolates that person, who realizes 
she is in the wrong spot and moves on.183  The same holds true for customers who will 
avoid those with whom they do not share similar values and will either go to another 
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bank staff member or transfer to another bank.  In the end people with unattractive 
characteristics do not thrive. 
Due to expressed concern that banks have encouraged consumerism through 
the use of credit cards, some retail bankers admitted that there are people at the 
margin who have not managed their finances well and have taken on too much debt.  
But a major bank proclaimed that their institution was the only one that had 
introduced a ‘responsible lending policy.’  This ensures that borrowers are in a 
position to repay their debt.  In comparison with world patterns, including the US and 
UK, Australia has very low credit card usage.  This bank is not interested in 
promoting credit cards with marginal, sub-prime clients. 
This well-managed bank regards itself as a major blue chip Australian 
company serving millions of people and its reputation is built on trust.  The retail 
banking head at Kangaroo said: “There is plenty of money to be made playing the 
game straight with people who have jobs and own their homes.  We are not interested 
in bottom feeding.”184 
Values are very important for this bank and are part of its culture.  Kangaroo 
commenced a programme five years ago with the objective of re-energizing the 
culture at the institution.   
As a bank, you are not just a shoe store, not just another business earning income.  
The bank plays a really important role in the life of a community.  Having a 
banking license is a privilege, not a right.  With that comes responsibility – to 
contribute to the economic health and life of the community.  So the bank staff 
see they are not merely earning a salary, but they are making a contribution to the 
community.  So it is not congruent with that philosophy to cut corners or try to 
make a quick profit.185 
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The bankers at leading financial institutions agree that there is something 
intangible in the tone from the top, in the climate set by the board and the most senior 
executives in an organization.186  This is very important and is manifested in an aura 
of openness and the extent to which top managers declare their own preferences with 
respect to ethical behaviour.  If top executives are perceived to be self-seeking or 
interested only in short-term outcomes, that impression permeates the whole 
organisation.  On the other hand, if the directors and top executives are genuine in 
their desire for the long run health of the bank and not just their own interest and are 
involved in building an open and constructive culture, that likewise pervades the rest 
of the firm.  One cannot underestimate the power of corporate culture, of the power of 
the most senior leaders in the group in setting that climate.  Leaders create the 
climate.  If leaders do not set the climate, they should not expect the rest of the 
organisation to do so. 
There appear to be universal characteristics intrinsic to banking that are 
independent of where it is undertaken, which explains why international banks bring 
expatriate staff to their foreign locations as bearers of their unique banking culture.  
Many local people choose to join foreign banks because these have a style different 
from local banks.  This phenomenon seems to imply that respected international 
banks articulate a highly admired code of conduct throughout their global network. 
However, as seen earlier, there is also an opinion among some bankers that a 
bank’s values should conform to the values of the community in which they live and 
work and should not be self-imposed or different.  They contend that they should 
ignore public opinion polls and only pay attention to legal strictures.  These bankers 
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argue that it is the role of politicians to write the laws to reflect the values of the 
community.187 
According to this line of thinking there are sufficient laws to protect the 
environment and the community in accordance with the best interests of everyone so 
there is no need for bankers to have a higher set of standards than these.  Looking at 
this reasoning objectively, there is the assumption that all laws are sincerely enacted 
with ethical considerations, but it is common knowledge that political lobbyists earn 
their living by trying to influence lawmakers to write legislation favourable to their 
special interest groups.  Therefore certain laws could possibly be defective due to a 
lack of political will.  Even if some laws have desirable objectives, loopholes are 
sometimes integrated that preclude effective compliance. 
In resisting environmental protection measures, adherents of the compliant 
position referred to above argue that bringing to bear a set of considerations beyond 
what is required by the laws of the country is not the role of bankers.  They declare 
that banks have a responsibility to provide a service to the community, which is the 
basis of their business.  It is these bankers’ opinion that moral questions in a 
democratic system reflect community standards and are moveable issues:  
the values today may not be the same tomorrow, and these values are enforceable 
through the process of law.  Bankers have no right to change that by insisting on 
their own values and standards.188 
 
This argument looks at morality as purely subjective and diminishes the possibility of 
grounding these in objective and absolute values.  A reflective independent onlooker 
must disagree with this relativistic approach to morality, which is a major reason that 
banks have caused so much harm to individuals and communities.  This is the 
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philosophical rationale behind political attempts over the past decade to promote 
deregulation of the American financial markets. 
This predisposition has likewise carried over to the issue of the Equator 
Principles, which prompted some banks to declare that they were sceptical of 
manifestos on the environment prepared by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and have therefore developed their own codes of principles, which are supposedly 
90% congruent with the Equator Principles. 
While adopting a self-interested perspective, these banks attempt to rationalize 
their position, which appears to be utilitarian in tone.  As the senior corporate banker 
said: 
What is to be gained by associating oneself with a person or a company that is 
wilfully destructive?  The chances of that person having a bad debt are high; the 
chances of that person having the right standards are low.  Making a loan is easy 
but getting repaid is difficult.  A company with poor work practices and safety 
standards illustrates lack of control, so there is likewise a high probability that their 
finances are not under control.189  
 
 
G.  Bank Self-Assessment 
As necessary elements of their codes of conduct, banks measure themselves 
according to two important criteria: customer satisfaction and the employee opinion 
survey (EOS).  The EOS, which is conducted annually in all the Australian banks, 
attempts to gauge what the employee thinks of the organisation for which he or she 
works.  One of the big four banks rated highly at 60%, which meant that most 
employees were satisfied or very satisfied and liked working in that bank.  The others 
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rated poorly; one particular bank had a dreadful score of 32%.  The general manager 
for Australian compliance of that bank, Bandicoot, said: 
Therefore, if only 32% are satisfied employees, one could infer that half of the 
remaining 68% are indifferent, who are unhappy working there, and the other half 
are saboteurs, who not only do not like working there but also try to destruct the 
place where they work.  This is a reflection of how they deal with their customers 
because they are under constant pressure to sell.  The customers become a means 
to an end rather than an opportunity to do the job right.  This score tells us that 
68% of the people do not really care if they do the job right or not.190 
 
The corollary measure is customer satisfaction, what customers think of the 
banks.  Typically only 20% of customers said they were happy with the large four 
banks (though the one that rated highly in EOS also had a better ranking here), while 
40% of clients said they were pleased with the services of two smaller, well-known 
banks.  The reason people stay with their banks is convenience: it is so hard to move.  
The Bandicoot compliance head described this further:  
 The situation is one of unhappy customers whom the bank targets for a greater 
share of business, sold by people unhappy to work here.  The consumers think 
their needs are not genuinely understood because the banks only think of 
themselves.  The staff do not think their needs are genuinely understood because 
they are under so much pressure to do well for the bank and not necessarily meet 
the needs of customers.  So they are caught in a dilemma; this environment breeds 
conflicts and ethical problems.191 
 
The two smaller institutions that are well regarded by consumers have fewer products 
and listen to customers.  They have fewer conflicts and have a structure that enables 
them to reflect on why they are in business: to satisfy their customers. 
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Unfortunately in large organisations the desire is not to satisfy the customers 
but to satisfy the shareholders.192  This is an irony in that customers are also directly 
and indirectly shareholders in large institutions.  Australia has one of the highest 
shareholding in the world, because individuals either directly own shares in banks or 
through their superannuation funds.  The stress on shareholder value enhancement is 
intrinsic to theories of financial management and corporate governance, so this 
unleashes the potential for conflicts of interest.  
A major non-bank lender, Bilby, claims that it regularly upgrades employee 
benefits so that people are attracted to the company and want to work and stay there; 
this comes even though new government regulations are scaling down benefits.  The 
firm’s cash compensation rewards depend on the job classification. 
How does Bilby validate that employees are truly serving the customers?  
Every single phone call is recorded and audited.  Complaints against collectors are 
immediately investigated.  The review of recorded customer phone calls examines 
how the staff or collectors handle customer requests and complaints.193 
To test for customer satisfaction Bilby also regularly monitors the degree of 
closeness of the customer to the institution by asking them ‘How likely are you to 
recommend this product to a friend or a colleague?’194  This is a measure of customer 
loyalty and satisfaction.  A score of 9 – 10 designates an advocate or promoter; a 
score of 7 – 8 signifies those who are neither here nor there, who could jump ship; a 
score of 6 or below indicates deeply dissatisfied customers who will leave as soon as 
they can.   
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Bilby’s results in the employee opinion survey are described as good but it is 
constantly seeking to improve the correlation between satisfied employees and 
business success.  The EOS scores provide ideas on areas where improvement is 
possible. 
In addressing the dilemma where the richest customers pay the lowest rates 
and the poorest are charged the highest interest rates, the response by Bilby’s 
compliance manager pointed to the need for profits: 
If you charge a lower rate on a high-risk loan in a tight margin environment such 
as Australia, then you have no leeway built in if you start to have defaults and you 
are just in a loss-making business.  People are in business to make money.195 
 
This is the fundamental problem one sees in lending to the sub-prime sector.  The 
sub-prime individuals generally have higher credit risk, but they are also entitled to 
certain necessary basic items, such as a home.  But extending credit at high rates 
could border on being usurious. 
However the staunch belief of this firm is that responsible lending is a key 
principle for them.  The compliance manager said: “We not only want to be a great 
company, but we also want to be a good company.”196  They have a major volunteer 
programme in community involvement whereby every employee is allowed and 
expected to spend a day a year performing volunteer work in communities.  This 
manager disclosed that he himself dedicates much more time than this. 
The company also has guiding principles on ethical conduct set out in a 
booklet and on the company web page.  To implement these, Bilby requires all 
employees to complete and pass monthly training on compliance (most banks insist 
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only on annual or quarterly guidance).  The policies cover a wide range of ethical 
standards relating to employees, customers, suppliers, governments, environment, 
money laundering, privacy, international trade, and competition.  The company wants 
to do the right thing and be seen doing the right thing.  Bilby’s ethical principles 
claim to focus on the right thing to do for customers, the community, and the 
employees rather than what are legally permitted.197 This assertion diverges from the 
opinion of some executives who said that legal compliance should be the sole concern 
of banks.  
Reputation is very important for Bilby especially because its parent group has 
frequently been chosen as the most respected company in the world.  The group has 
many diverse businesses whose products are vastly different from each other, but they 
are connected through shared values and behaviour, through a common culture of 
how they live and work.  Indeed several banks stressed reputation as a key element in 
their code of conduct. 
It was therefore very distressing for a large well-regarded bank to discover in 
2008 that it had engaged in activities damaging to its reputation.198  Due to the 
financial liquidity squeeze stemming from the sub-prime crisis in America, credit had 
become nearly impossible to obtain in Australia as well as other countries.  This 
situation inflicted severe difficulties on non-bank financial institutions that had no 
customer deposits and had to rely on loans from traditional banks.  This was certainly 
the state of affairs for stockbrokers.  In a well-publicized case two brokers had been 
providing margin facilities to their customers to enable them to buy shares of stock 
through the brokers, which loaned them money and retained the securities as 
collateral, which they in turn pledged to their bank in order to fund themselves.  Due 
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to the turbulent financial climate these two stockbrokers failed and declared 
bankruptcy.  Although the clients of the brokers had signed agreements allowing 
transfer of ownership of securities, they might have expected the lending bank, which 
was holding the securities, to return these to the clients in the event of insolvency of 
the brokers.  However, in order to protect itself and recover a portion of the loans it 
had extended, the bank foreclosed on the collateral and sold the shares in the market.  
The bank was therefore regarded as acting in its own interests at the expense of the 
clients of the brokers. 
This was a considerable blow to the reputation of the bank, so its chief 
executive immediately formed a task force to investigate the circumstances.  After an 
extensive enquiry the committee released its lengthy report, which the bank disclosed 
to the public and posted on its website.  This would be regarded a very good example 
of transparency.  Among the negative findings was that the responsible officers did 
not really understand the product or the distinction between security loans (where the 
bank lends the physical securities to brokers) and equity loans (where the bank lends 
money to brokers which pledge securities as collateral).  Without a clear awareness of 
the full ramifications of the product the bank did not have appropriate policies and 
procedures with regard to credit limits and risk management.  There was also poor 
accountability and a failure to identify and act on warning signs.  On the positive side 
the report indicated that the individuals concerned had not committed any deliberate 
wrongdoing, although two persons were found in violation of potential conflicts of 
interest in not having disclosed to their supervisors that they conducted personal 
trading through the affected brokers; they have since been dismissed.  The enquiry 
concluded that the bank had acted in accordance with legal provisions but had not 
instituted a system to protect its reputation and minimize harm caused to innocent 
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third parties.  The bank has subsequently decided to eliminate the equity finance 
product.  It has also announced an upgrade of its code of conduct and relevant 
policies.   
This episode demonstrates how lack of complete familiarity with a product 
that a bank offers can pose enormous risks for both the bank and other parties and 
result in unethical conduct.  Once the predicament was spotted, the bank’s chief 
executive took decisive action and displayed transparency. 
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CHAPTER 4.  SELF-GOVERNANCE AND STATE 
REGULATION 
A.  Code of Banking Practice 
In addition to a Code of Conduct proclaimed by individual banks, Hong Kong and 
Australia each have a Code of Banking Practice issued by the respective banking 
associations.  In order to appreciate the banking situation in Hong Kong it is 
worthwhile to look at the Hong Kong Association of Banks (HKAB) and to examine 
its role and its relationship with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), which 
has the exclusive power to approve the establishment of licensed banks, restricted 
banks, and deposit taking companies, but the focus in this dissertation is only on 
licensed banks.  Once a bank receives a license to operate, it has a statutory obligation 
to become a member of the HKAB, which has traditionally had a pivotal role in the 
establishment of banking practices and guidelines.  The locally established banks are 
entitled to select their own representatives, whereas the foreign banks have to choose 
representatives according to their geographical grouping.  The HKAB has three 
permanent members, namely the Hong Kong Bank (HSBC), the Standard Chartered 
Bank, and the Bank of China, each of which rotates annually as Chair of the HKAB.  
These three are not only the largest banks in Hong Kong but also have a notable 
statutory function, namely as officially designated note issuers of the Hong Kong 
currency, which is a unique privilege held only by central banks in other countries. 
Until the relatively recent establishment of the HKMA, which subsumed the 
previous Commissioner of Banking, the HKAB had a much broader unofficial role.  
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Not only did the three permanent members issue the currency, but also effectively 
established the interest rates, and thus the HKAB was referred to as a banking cartel.  
The HKMA has endeavoured to break up the interest-setting cartel by stipulating that 
market forces must determine interest rates.  Despite this measure, the three 
permanent members remain the largest banks, continue to be the official note issuers, 
and dominate the monetary trading, so they exert considerable influence on interest 
rate movements and are effectively the market makers.   
These permanent members perform another key role, which is normally 
carried out by the central bank of the country, namely as the official clearing banks:  
HSBC and HKMA for US Dollars, HSBC for HK Dollars, and Bank of China for 
PRC RMB (Chinese Renminbi).  In its role of US Dollar clearing HSBC cooperates 
closely with the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States. 
Together with the Deposit Taking Companies Association, the HKAB has 
also issued the Code of Banking Practice (COBP), which is intended: 
(a) to promote good banking practices by setting out the minimum standards 
which institutions should follow in their dealings with personal customers; 
(b) to increase transparency in the provision of banking services so as to   
enhance the understanding of customers of what they can reasonably 
expect of the services provided by the institutions; 
(c) to promote a fair and cordial relationship between institutions and their 
customers;  
(d) through the above, to foster customer confidence in the banking system.1 
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The HKMA fully endorses the COBP recommended practices and standards, 
and expects all banks to take active steps to ensure full compliance with the COBP, 
which some senior bankers believe actually emanates from the Authority.  It believes 
that the COBP will help to further enhance the transparency and quality of banking 
services in Hong Kong as well as Hong Kong's status as an international financial 
centre.  As part of its regular supervision and to set up the monitoring of banks' 
compliance with the COBP, the HKMA has required all banks to commission their 
internal audit departments or other equivalent units to conduct an annual self-
assessment of their compliance with the COBP.  The self-assessment results are 
required to be submitted in the standard template to the HKMA by the timeline as 
imposed by the HKMA.  The self-assessment aims to encourage banks to rectify any 
weaknesses identified at an early stage.  Where non-compliance areas are identified 
during the self-assessment process, banks should specifically provide the details, 
remedial plan and the target completion date.  The HKMA closely monitors banks' 
progress in implementing the rectification plans.  The self-assessment results also 
enable the HKMA to analyse the compliance position of individual banks, with a 
view to identifying common issues within the banking industry and developing 
supervisory guidance over the longer term.  Although no penalties are specified for 
failure to submit reports, a non-cooperative manner would adversely affect the 
HKMA's outlook on the bank's practices in providing services to its personal 
customers.  From one perspective, even if the COBP is voluntary for banks, the 
mandatory self-assessment of compliance for all banks is a clear signal that it is an 
instrument of banking supervision.  The HKMA may undertake more frequent and 
stringent on-site examination to supplement its supervisory function. 
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During the course of the Hong Kong research, interviews were granted by the 
current and the previous Chairmen of the HKAB, who were chief executives of their 
own major global banks but were able to speak about the entire industry because of 
their position as industry spokesmen and also to comment on the occasional tension 
between the banks and the regulators. 
Looking at Australia, the Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA) works with 
its members to provide analysis, advice, and advocacy and contributes to the 
development of public policy on banking and other financial services.  The ABA 
claims that it tries to ensure the banking system can continue to deliver the benefits of 
competition to Australian banking customers.   
In practice the ABA works to ensure that the banking industry views are put 
forward when governments determine policy or legislation.  Many areas of 
Commonwealth and State law and in some cases international law, impact upon the 
commercial interests of Australian banks.  The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC), the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC), the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and the Reserve 
Bank of Australia (RBA) regulate banks. 
With the active participation of the member banks, the ABA works to foster 
an environment in which financial services are properly appreciated and allowed to 
prosper.  In conveying the industry’s views, the ABA works with the Commonwealth, 
State and Territory Governments, the regulators, other industry associations, the 
community, community groups and the media.   
The ABA has issued the Code of Banking Practice, which is a voluntary code 
of conduct that sets standards of good banking practice for banks to follow when 
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dealing with persons who are, or who may become, individual and small business 
customers and their guarantors.   This COBP is reviewed periodically and updated by 
a professional external consultant.  The Code establishes the banking industry’s key 
commitments and obligations to customers on standards of practice, disclosure and 
principles of conduct for banking services.  When a bank adopts the Code, it becomes 
a binding agreement between the individual customer and the bank.   
Although the Australian Bankers’ Association instituted the Code, an 
independent body administers compliance.  The Code Compliance Monitoring 
Committee (CCMC) was established to ensure that banks that have adopted the 
COBP meet the standards of good practice set out in the Code.  The Committee 
investigates complaints that the Code has been breached.   CCMC also monitors bank 
compliance with the Code through compliance activities such as mystery shopping, 
surveys and compliance visits. 
However CCMC does not get involved in financial loss.  If a complaint 
against a bank includes a claim for financial loss, the Banking and Financial Services 
Division of the Financial Services Ombudsman (FOS) would consider the complaint.  
The FOS may also be able to consider other complaints that the CCMC cannot look 
at, for example, where the bank being complained about has not adopted the Code.  
The Financial Services Ombudsman endeavours to independently and impartially 
resolve disputes between consumers, including some small businesses, and 
participating financial services providers.  The FOS independent dispute resolution 
processes cover complaints about financial services including banking, credit, loans, 
general insurance, life insurance, financial planning, investments, stock broking, 
managed funds and pooled superannuation trusts. 
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The CCMC can look at serious and systemic breaches of the Code.  Such 
complaints can also be reported to the Australian Securities & Investments 
Commission (ASIC), whose role will be discussed in the section on regulators. 
Though both the HKAB and the ABA are industry associations representing 
their member banks, the ABA is portrayed as very different from the HKAB, which 
takes active business decisions.  In the past, the HKAB fixed interest rates and, 
though market forces now set the rates, it continues to carry significant influence.  
Moreover, the three permanent members of the HKAB are the official issuers of the 
currency and the official note clearing banks.  The ABA confines itself to formulating 
bank industry policy particularly in relation to regulations and compliance thereof.   It 
avoids matters involving competition among the banks because it acts as an advocate 
for the entire industry.2  In certain ways there is a commonality because Australia is 
characterized by four major trading banks that are clearly larger than any other bank 
in the country, whereas Hong Kong is dominated by three leading banks, but the key 
difference is that the latter banks conduct specific monetary roles on behalf of the 
government treasury in addition to their commercial functions and they maintain 
positions as rotating permanent chairmen of the HKAB.   One would therefore 
consider that the HKAB and the HKMA have a symbiotic relationship, whereas the 
ABA functions more as an industry advocate vis-à-vis the RBA. 
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B.  Regulation in Hong Kong 
 
B. 1.  Financial Crises in Retrospect 
In order to understand the attitudes and practices of banks and regulators it is 
especially useful to comprehend the environment in which they have operated and 
to recall the highly significant events that have made their imprint on Hong Kong.  
Without delving into the original history of the establishment of the colony by 
entrepreneurial traders from the British Empire, one only needs to recall historical 
episodes such as the Chinese Civil War ending in the establishment of the 
Communist Peoples Republic of China in 1949, and the Mao-inspired Cultural 
Revolution of the 1960s characterised by upheaval and persecution, which resulted 
in large-scale migration to Hong Kong and Taiwan.  But for the banks and the 
people living in the territories the initial modern premonition of the turbulence that 
would soon test the resilience of Hong Kong was the Thatcher declaration of 19 
December 1984 when the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announced 
that Great Britain would be handing over Hong Kong back to China in 1997 as part 
of its mutual agreement.3  This was the impetus behind the frenetic panic-driven 
foreign exchange trading immediately after that announcement that saw the HK$ 
falling to its historical low and resulting in the establishment of a linked exchange 
system with the US dollar. 
Why was there such a panic?  Many residents had fled the centrally planned 
communist regime in China for the laissez-faire milieu of Hong Kong, some of them 
becoming very prosperous, many attaining respectable, comfortable professional 
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status, with the average folk relishing the newly gained freedom, and they then feared 
all their affluence and independence would be lost once Hong Kong was returned to 
China, from which they and their parents had struggled to flee. 
Therefore the initial reaction was to sell the local currency in order to buy 
foreign currency.  The second and more long-lasting one was that the residents 
applied for, and received in many cases, permission to migrate to foreign countries 
such as Canada, Australia, and Britain.   
When the handover eventually came in 1997, there was also a mad rush to sell 
property because these migrants wished to dispose of their assets so they could buy 
new homes in their new countries.  A city that had experienced spectacular growth in 
property prices saw the real estate sector collapse by 70% over the next several years.  
Such a dramatic downturn was due to a loss of trust by the people of Hong Kong in 
the sustainability of the institutions and the rule of law that had safeguarded the 
freedom to which they had grown accustomed.  China had given assurance of having 
one country but maintaining two systems, that is, allowing the capitalistic money-
oriented economy to continue unfettered within the communist state, but the Hong 
Kong residents had misgivings about this promise.   The succeeding years would 
prove to be the true test. 
The freefall in property prices and the loss of trust by the residents wrought 
severe repercussions on the banks and the financial stability of the former colony, 
thus necessitating institutional restructuring and upgrading of the regulatory 
framework in order to cope with the unprecedented systemic stresses.   
Just as the former colony struggled to recover from this crisis of confidence, 
Hong Kong was afflicted in early 2003 by an unexpected SARS (Severe Acute 
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Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic, which was transported from mainland China 
because of the extensive trade and commerce.  SARS was a rare form of pneumonia 
caused by a coronavirus resembling that responsible for the common cold but was 
different because it was deadly, originated from contact with contaminated animals, 
and was not spread in the air but through contact with infected persons.  This was a 
blow to all segments of the economy as factories and commercial offices sent workers 
home whenever employees were diagnosed with the disease.  The impact was 
ferocious on tourism as all travel dried up overnight, and unemployment in the 
tourism, air transport, hospitality, restaurant, and retail sectors soared to an all-time 
high of 7.8% in the period of February – April 2003.  All business enterprises 
suffered because production, sales, and profitability plummeted as the disease spread 
like bush fires. 
The banking system had to struggle anew with this menacing onslaught, 
which struck at the whole corporate establishment as well as the working classes, the 
professionals, and the business elite.  An entire branch of one bank had to close down 
when it was discovered that one employee was infected with the deadly virus.   The 
story of the past decade reveals the amazing crucible that has shaped the ethos of the 
present-day banks of that city.  The banking edifice of any other country might easily 
have collapsed under these circumstances. 
 
B. 2.  The Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
In response to the numerous financial crises and in preparation for the hand-over, the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) was established on 1 April 1993 as Hong 
Kong’s central banking institution by merging the Office of the Exchange Fund with 
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the Office of the Commissioner of Banking.  This was made possible by legislative 
amendments to the Exchange Fund Ordinance in 1992 empowering the Financial 
Secretary to appoint a Monetary Authority.  What makes this institution unique is that 
the Exchange Fund Ordinance – Section 5A specifically states that “The Financial 
Secretary shall appoint a person4 to be the Monetary Authority on such terms and 
conditions as he thinks fit.”5  Thus the Office of the Monetary Authority is known as 
the HKMA, and the Monetary Authority as the Chief Executive of the HKMA. 
The HKMA has four main functions: maintaining the stability of the Hong 
Kong dollar; promoting the safety of Hong Kong’s banking system; managing Hong 
Kong’s official reserves; and maintaining and developing Hong Kong’s financial 
infrastructure.6 The Banking Ordinance provides the Monetary Authority with the 
responsibility and powers for regulating and supervising banking business and the 
business of taking deposits.  The HKMA’s Supervisory Policy Manual states that: 
The HKMA’s primary function under the Banking Ordinance is to promote 
stability within the Hong Kong banking system.  Good and ethical banking 
practices are essential for safeguarding depositors’ interests, maintaining the 
stability of the banking system and preserving Hong Kong’s reputation as an 
international financial centre. 
The HKMA believes that it is consistent with these functions to require AIs 
(approved institutions) to promote a sound moral culture within their 
organisations and to develop a set of ethical standards and values to which their 
staff are expected to adhere.  This can be done by means of establishing a Code of 
Conduct and having a system in place to enforce it.7 
 
It is significant that the Monetary Authority explicitly declares the need for morality 
to be practised by individuals and ethical conduct to be institutionally established in 
                                                
4 Italics added. 
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http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/en/ord/66/ (accessed 15 November 2006). 
6 HKMA, "An Introduction to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority," ed. Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (Hong Kong: 2006), http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/index.htm (accessed 15 November 2006). 
7 ———, "Supervisor Policy Manual," ed. Hong Kong Monetary Authority (Hong Kong: 2006), 
http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/bank/spma/index.htm (accessed 9 March 2007). 
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the banking system because this has elicited a positive response from the banks.  
Considering that countless individuals maintain deposits with banks, the protection of 
those depositors can only be ensured through principled and fair treatment by the 
banks.  One could infer that the previous crises that afflicted Hong Kong provided the 
incentive for this affirmation of morality. 
The Chief Executive appears particularly concerned about integrity as he 
wrote: “The integrity of the financial system is too important for us to allow it to be 
undermined: effective regulation and robust systems are essential.”8  One interprets 
this to unequivocally mean that the Chief Executive considers regulation as necessary 
for maintaining integrity, which is indispensable for financial intermediation to 
effectively support economic growth especially in an international financial centre 
like Hong Kong with its global ramifications on investors and fund-raising issuers 
worldwide.   
The Authority rightly expressed apprehension about the “deep-rooted 
dilemma between the public interest in ensuring effective financial intermediation 
that promotes the general well-being of the community and the private interest of 
financial intermediaries in maximising profits.”9  He sees the key role of a financial 
system as that of a conduit between sources and users of funds, with providers or 
depositors accepting the credit risk of the banks and the latter exposed to the credit 
risk of the borrowers.  As remuneration for their services and the risks of 
intermediation the banks earn a net interest margin, or the difference between what 
they pay depositors and what they charge borrowers. 
                                                
8 Joseph Yam, "The Integrity of the Financial System," ed. Hong Kong Monetary Authority (Hong 
Kong: 2006), http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/index.htm (accessed 5 April 2007). 
9 ———, "A Deep-Rooted Dilemma," ed. Hong Kong Monetary Authority (Hong Kong: 2006), 
http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/index.htm (accessed 10 April 2007). 
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An effective financial system is one that gives a high rate of return to those 
saving or investing money, and a low cost of funds for those raising money.  But 
clearly for the intermediaries to play their specialised role effectively, they need to 
have the correct incentive to do so, and this means a reasonable level of remuneration 
for them, in terms of profits for the financial institutions and pay for those working in 
them.  The HKMA said: “To ensure reasonableness, policymakers often, and rightly, 
rely on the competitive forces of the market.”10 (Italics added) 
The HKMA realizes that a totally free market is not always feasible because 
the role of intermediation can only be entrusted to institutions with high integrity, 
thus necessitating banking supervision and regulations.  At this point in time there 
was already ethical concern with selfish interests in compensation that needed to be 
curbed. 
A free market also implies a somewhat protected mandate for the 
intermediaries that may be further strengthened through the advocacy of industry 
associations.  Banks vigorously pursue self-interested, profit-maximising objectives.  
Therefore the more successful the banks are in their corporate role, which is measured 
by the profits they make, one can argue, the less effective is the financial system in 
financial intermediation.  According to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, this is 
the deep-rooted dilemma often faced by policy-makers.11    
While the HKMA leaves the relationships between banks and customers in the 
hands of the banks as befits a free market, it upholds the ethical value of transparency 
and disclosure in order to grant an adequate degree of protection for individual clients 
and lessen the need for supervisors and regulators to get involved.  The HKMA sets 
                                                
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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the standards and occasionally promulgates statutory guidelines.  It expects its 
constituent banks to comport themselves according to ‘best practice’ norms.   
Although not a consumer rights advocate per se, the Authority in actively 
promoting greater competition within the banking system, had started to curb the 
powers of the HKAB cartel in the 1990s and after seven years successfully eliminated 
interest rate fixing, which brought positive benefits to both depositors and borrowers 
alike.  During the cartel regime the net interest margin had ranged from 2 to 3%, 
which in 2006 fell to 1.4 to 1.5%, which was evidence of the high efficiency of the 
banking system.   
While subscribing to the conviction that competition stimulates efficiency, the 
Authority says that regulators must ensure that competition does not reach the point 
of eroding profitability to such an extent that it pushes financial intermediaries into 
irresponsible behaviour that eventually undermines the stability and integrity of the 
financial system.  The Chief Executive of the HKMA stated: “improper behaviour 
…is categorically unacceptable.”12 
The Authority is of the opinion that regulators cannot prevent all crime or 
unethical behaviour; it promulgates guidelines and rules, statutory or otherwise, but 
expects the private sector to act without the supervisors reviewing every transaction.  
The Authority thus encourages transparency and investor education.  Where 
necessary, it promotes investor protection measures, such as the requirement for 
deposit insurance introduced in 2006.  The motive behind deposit insurance could be 
interpreted as a Kantian categorical imperative of treating all bank depositors as 
persons but it could also be perceived as utilitarian in the sense that it sought to 
                                                
12 Ibid. 
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protect as many small depositors as possible and implant confidence among them in 
the banking system. 
 
B. 2.1 Credit Cards 
The proliferation of credit cards was due to competition and in the HKMA’s view 
possibly good for cardholders who obtain rebates and are able to earn awards with 
their usage, but the worry is about the potentially reckless issuance of cards to 
individuals who are not in a position to borrow or service their liabilities, for instance 
students.  The Authority’s concern is that all banks conduct business prudently or 
otherwise it could intervene.  But non-bank institutions, which are beyond the scope 
of banking regulation, also issue credit cards so the HKMA normally prefers to allow 
the market to instil discipline.  Its main anxiety is over risk management, that banks 
are issuing credit cards to the right people.13 
The Monetary Authority has witnessed scores of problems that surfaced 
during the period of economic crises and the devastating SARS epidemic.  In the 
worst case scenarios credit card borrowers amassed debt exceeding 40 times their net 
income, leading to an extraordinary bankruptcy rate.  The HKMA identified the need 
for sharing credit information so that every lender could be aware of the overall level 
of indebtedness of each potential borrower or credit card applicant.  In its role as 
supervisor the HKMA wished to ensure that banks take prudent risk and therefore 
encouraged the establishment of a credit bureau, which is owned by the private 
sector.14  Since then, loan losses have dropped to comfortable levels.  Credit cards are 
a profitable source of income but not a big part of overall earnings. 
                                                
13 Transcript HK 5. 
14 Ibid. 
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B. 2.2 Housing Loans 
The mortgage loan segment has been a major concern for the HKMA because it is the 
largest component of banking assets.  The Authority is therefore particularly keen to 
make certain that banks proceed cautiously with granting mortgage loans – for both 
commercial and residential purposes.  It has therefore deemed it necessary to promote 
prudent practices, such as setting a loan value ratio of 70%, a debt service ratio of 
50%, and the enactment of non-performing loan classification.  These guidelines are 
far more stringent than those observed in America over at least the last ten years. 
The Authority does not feel that banks were responsible for driving up 
housing prices because banks are in the business of taking risk and providing 
financing to whoever is creditworthy.  In arriving at decisions banks have to evaluate 
the creditworthiness of prospective borrowers and the quality of underlying assets.  
Banks can choose to act counter-cyclically and help to dampen speculation.  As 
displayed at the height of the property boom banks voluntarily reduced their loan 
valuations ratios to 60%, even 50% in some instances, especially for luxury housing 
that tended to be more volatile.   
 
B. 2.3 Negative Equity Problem 
There are two sides to this problem, the first one relating to the anguish of individuals 
who suddenly become aware of their negative equity position, that the current value 
of their property has plunged vis-à-vis the amount of the loan they still have to repay.  
This situation, which is upsetting by itself, could be aggravated if the interest rates 
soar or the borrowers lose their jobs, which could impair their capacity to repay their 
obligations.  The other side corresponds to the position of the lenders who discover 
that the collateral assigned to them has deteriorated.  As Chapter 6 will point out, this 
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is precisely what occurred in the sub-prime crisis that erupted in America in 2007.   
“As banking supervisor, the HKMA’s concern has to be the likely significance of 
negative-equity mortgages for the quality of the loan book of the banks.”15 
It is due to this apprehension that the Authority prescribed a loan valuation 
ratio of 70% for residential mortgage financing.  Adherence to this guideline made it 
possible for banks to weather the storm.  It was also not a common practice for banks 
to demand additional collateral on performing mortgage loans of owner-occupiers, 
who were making regular timely repayments.16 
A look at the actual levels of valuation of residential mortgage loans (RML) 
reveals a peak of 105,697 cases in negative equity amounting to HK$ 165 billion 
representing 22% of all RMLs but 31% of total value, yet resulting in a delinquency 
ration of only 2.28%.  By December 2006 the circumstances were substantially 
improved with 8,444 cases with HK$ 14 billion outstanding or 3% of all RMLs.  The 
delinquency ratio was down to a low level of 1.26%.  What is extraordinary is that 
even at the height of the negative equity problem the delinquency ratio always 
remained at a respectable level.  These levels of negative equity and delinquencies are 
depicted in the table below. 
HONG KONG NEGATIVE EQUITY & DELINQUENCY IN RESIDENTIAL 
MORTGAGE LOANS 2001 - 2006 
Negative equity RMLs (end of period 
figures) 
Cases (% of total 
RMLs) 
Value (% of total 
RMLs) 
Delinquency 
ratio 
Sept. 2001 (1st available position) 65,000  (14%) $127 billion  (23%) Not available 
Jun 2002 (peak of delinquency ratio) 68,252  (14%)   
Jun 2003 (peak cases & value) 105,697  (22%) $165 billion  (31%) 2.28% 
Dec 2006 (latest available position) 8,444  (2%) $14 billion  (3%) 1.26% 
                                                
15 Joseph Yam, "Mortgage Loans in Negative Equity," ed. Hong Kong Monetary Authority (Hong 
Kong: 2006), http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/index.htm (accessed 12 April 2007). 
16 Email to JS Villa, HKMA, 13 April 2007. 
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B. 2.4 Supervisory Stance 
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority prefers the term supervision to regulation in 
describing its role.  The HKMA has progressed from a posture of prudential 
supervision to one where it defines a policy framework within which financial 
intermediaries operate and are encouraged to adopt sensible risk management tools.  
In carrying out corporate finance, foreign exchange trading and securities dealing, the 
banks are expected to utilise appropriate risk management tools to guard against 
credit risk, operational risk, market risk, interest rate risk, exchange risk, legal risk, 
and reputational risk.  In the view of the HKMA the reputation of an institution would 
be damaged if it provided financing to a project or a borrower that destroyed the 
environment or harmed the community, so it would be unwise to back such a scheme.  
Likewise the HKMA expects banks to adopt best market practices and institute codes 
of conduct and procedures that discourage fraudulent trading among dealers.  The 
Authority does not discourage banks from taking risks, but they must have effective 
mechanisms in place to manage these risks.   
Rather than acting as a consumer advocate, the HKMA adopts the stance that 
fees and charges are commercial decisions of banks.  It defines its role as one of 
“ensuring transparency and sufficient competition in the market so that consumers 
can make their own decisions.”17  This comment encapsulates the laissez-faire 
character of the Hong Kong banking environment 
B. 3.  Attitude of Banks towards HKMA 
The bankers expressed the sentiment that the banking industry in Hong Kong is over-
regulated with the HKMA imposing too many detailed guidelines that require banks 
to submit excessive quantities of returns, which are a cost burden.  The banks would 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
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prefer a risk-based18 approach that attempts to avert or mitigate risks and ensures a 
level playing field for all market players, rather than the current system in which the 
HKMA is perceived as regulating all activities.  Moreover, since many banks in Hong 
Kong are engaged in securities activities, they are also subject to the supervision of 
the Securities and Futures Commission, which is allegedly very tough on banks.   
There is a feeling among financial institutions that industry self-regulation 
through the Hong Kong Association of Banks is quite effective and that good banking 
practices are in place, but there is also an impression that the regulators do not have a 
sufficiently comfortable level of trust in the banks.  While comments from bankers 
abound that much pressure is imposed by the HKMA in the form of costly 
compliance and additional reporting, bankers nevertheless acknowledge that the 
HKMA has performed well, engaged in dialogue with the banks, and through the 
HKAB encouraged self-regulation with the espousal of the Code of Banking Practice. 
There is the observation that unlike former days the HKMA has become much 
more pro-active as a result of several major directives emanating from international 
regulators such as Basel II relating to bank risk, Sarbanes-Oxley on corrupt practices, 
and anti-money-laundering decrees.  The latter, for instance, necessitated the 
acquisition by banks of expensive software, which was not previously utilised. 
It has been remarked that the Hong Kong Monetary Authority is one of the 
most enlightened regulators in the world, with strong leadership at the top.  There has 
been reference to the HKMA as more similar to the UK and European models than 
the American one, the latter having an approach of ‘comply or perish’, and the 
HKMA a technique of ‘comply or explain.’  In other words, the HKMA is prepared to 
                                                
18 Oddly enough this is what the HKMA asserts it likewise wants, but the difference is that banks seem 
to be more interested in a ‘level playing field’ than protecting themselves against various risks. 
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listen to a bank’s explanation for non-compliance and will not automatically impose 
penalties; it might well accept the clarification.  There is therefore a view that the 
HKMA is a ‘world class’ regulator.19 
There is general agreement that the regulatory, compliance, and legal 
environment of the banking system has become much more rigorous than five years 
ago.  Banks have to ensure that they operate soundly, are well capitalized, take the 
right risks and manage them well in order to protect the customers and depositors.  
The costs have been enormous for banks, but the institutions are more robust and 
risk-free than five to ten years ago. 
Nevertheless, professionals in the field maintain that even in the absence of 
regulations the banking history of Hong Kong has demonstrated that banks have 
typically acted in a very responsible manner and have displayed a high level of 
natural integrity.  There is a belief that the business environment here is good where 
people operate on the basis of trust.  There is a claim for a high level of ethics among 
banks in Hong Kong.  Reference was made to only one instance of serious 
misconduct that occurred in a major foreign-owned bank in the past decade.20 
There is the view that the cooperation between the HKMA and the banks is 
one of the main factors that explain why Hong Kong did not collapse despite all the 
catastrophes that battered it.  Communication between the HKMA and the banks is 
deemed very good and has engendered a sound banking system.  Similarly the HKAB 
is regarded as performing an important role in coordinating with the HKMA on 
behalf of all the banks.  An example cited is the synchronization of deposit insurance 
fees for the different levels of banks. 
                                                
19 Transcript HK 3. 
20 Transcript HK 5. 
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Top bankers accept that regulations are enacted in order to foster discipline 
but believe more self-regulation should be encouraged with reliance on guidelines in 
lieu of austere regulations.  The Dragon CEO argues that the better-managed banks 
should be granted more flexibility based on their own self-assessment.21  The leading 
banks believe they would behave the same way even in the absence of regulations 
because their internal standards exceed those required in regulations. 
They contrast the situation in China, where corruption is rife, with that in 
Hong Kong, where it is avoided.  The Hong Kong bankers attribute this to several 
factors that are positive in Hong Kong, namely: a high level of education, a well-
defined legal system to which people adhere, a high standard of living, a well-paid 
and disciplined police force.  They allude to a lack of checks and balance in China 
unlike Hong Kong, where the establishment of the Independent Commission against 
Corruption more than thirty years ago is regarded a highly effective measure that 
provides equal recourse to the law for everyone.  The free press is another essential 
ingredient. 
Some top bankers remark that regulations are probably necessary in 
developing areas such as Latin America in order to instil discipline but their own 
global institutions have performed very well in emerging markets.  Because of their 
experience in such markets one leading bank avers it has taken the initiative towards 
more self-regulation, that is, of setting standards according to its moral values. 
 
                                                
21 Transcript HK 8. 
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C.  Regulation in Australia 
C. 1.  Deregulation, Banking Crisis, and Recession 
The Australian financial system has undergone several major adjustments over the 
past sixty years, with the period from the Second World War until the late 1970s 
characterized by stringent regulations on trading and savings banks such as interest 
rate ceilings and asset ratio requirements.  As Fitzgibbons wrote, a new breed of 
financial institutions developed during this period: 
However, during the 1950s and 1960s, a number of NBFIs (non-bank financial 
institutions) emerged outside the regulated banking sector, including finance 
companies, merchant banks, building societies and credit unions, and began to 
challenge the dominance of the banks.22 
 
These NBFIs were not subject to the same degree of controls affecting the banks and 
hence offered new competition.  These new institutions arose in response to increased 
demand for financial services driven by economic growth. 
Although the two-tier financial structure meant that banks had to operate 
under strict rules, they enjoyed numerous benefits.  As Amanda Fitzgibbons explains: 
Many financial regulations conferred significant advantages upon the banks.  
Exclusive access to LLR (lender of last resort) facilities and an implied guarantee 
in case of failure gave the banks an unsurpassed reputation for safety and stability 
that attracted many customers.  Regulations gave the banks a collective monopoly 
over cheque payments services and foreign exchange transactions: the latter was 
particularly valuable, as it was highly profitable and the Reserve Bank bore all the 
risks.  Entry regulations prevented competition from foreign banks and ensured 
the domestic banks’ semi-monopolistic positions.  The burden of controlled 
interest rates on loans was offset by controls on deposit interest rates and the 
prohibition of interest payments on current accounts, which provided the banks 
with a large source of low-cost funds.23 
                                                
22 Amanda Fitzgibbons, "The Financial Sector and Deregulation in Australia: Drivers of Reform or 
Reluctant Followers?," Accounting, Business & Financial History 16, no. 3 (2006): p. 372. 
23 Ibid.: p. 374. 
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The banking sector therefore preferred to live under a regulatory regime rather than 
admit entry of new and stronger bank competitors.  Yet the forces of economic 
progress and international markets started to clamour for change and deregulation, 
and in January 1979 the Campbell Committee was established to conduct an inquiry 
into the conditions of the Australian financial system.  Submissions were requested 
from the Australian Bankers’ Association, which acted as the banking industry’s 
advocate and, at that time, was staffed by economists who backed ideas of economic 
liberalism and free markets and who therefore argued in favour of deregulation; bank 
economists who came from a similar academic training were likewise highly 
supportive.24 
However, the bankers themselves did not share this view and were resistant to 
change.  They were especially fearful of the entry of foreign banks that might come to 
Australia once deregulation was enacted.  In countering such sentiments the bank 
economists argued that, if the banks wanted to expand overseas, they had to accept 
the principle of reciprocity and allow foreign banks to operate in Australia.  Even 
while desiring international expansion, the bankers wanted foreign bank entry to be 
delayed in order to be better prepared. 
The NBFIs were lukewarm towards deregulation because the current 
restrictive regime created a niche for them.  As pragmatists, they acknowledged that 
deregulation was unavoidable and so they sought equality with the banks, which in 
turn attempted to exclude foreign institutions and retain their oligopolistic powers 
over the payments system and foreign exchange.25 
                                                
24 This analysis of the rationale behind deregulation was developed by Fitzgibbons. 
25 Fitzgibbons, "The Financial Sector and Deregulation in Australia: Drivers of Reform or Reluctant 
Followers?," p. 385. 
158 
The banking sector and the NBFIs submitted their respective 
recommendations to the Campbell Committee with each group seeking partial and 
selective deregulation to suit its own respective vested interests.  For instance, credit 
unions and building societies resisted foreign bank entry but insurance companies 
were favourably disposed. 
While the Inquiry was underway, the financial institutions embarked on 
stratagems to prepare for the inevitable onset of deregulation, which they viewed with 
trepidation.  The banks believed that they needed to grow bigger in order to meet 
foreign competition, so a spate of mergers ensued.  In June 1981 the Bank of New 
South Wales, the oldest bank in the country, merged with the Victoria-based 
Commercial Bank of Australia to form Westpac.  During the same timeframe the 
National Bank of Australasia merged with the Commercial Banking Company of 
Sydney with the resulting entity named National Bank of Australia.  In addition to 
mergers these enlarged banks went on an expansion programme to acquire other 
financial subsidiaries such as merchant banks and finance companies. 
In November 1981 the Campbell Committee submitted its final 
recommendations to the parliament that included abolishment of interest rate 
restraints, floating of the Australian dollar, and allowing entry of new foreign and 
domestic institutions into the Australian banking system.  Westpac faced these new 
challenges with heightened vigour.26 
In her book on Westpac, Carew narrates how Australia’s oldest bank 
endeavoured to pursue growth through aggressive lending, acquisition of new 
businesses, and establishment of a global network.27  During a period of less than six 
                                                
26 Edna Carew, Westpac: The Bank That Broke the Bank (Sydney: Doubleday, 1997), p. 19. 
27 Ibid. 
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years Westpac transformed itself from the leading Australian bank to the epitome of 
financial disaster.  It launched finance companies and merchant banks, which had 
scant central control and sometimes competed with each other and provided loans to 
the same corporate customers; it embarked heavily in property financing and 
development and its various subsidiaries wound up becoming substantial property 
owners.  For the first time in its long history the bank hired outsiders in senior 
management positions to propel the growth in global markets and in new financial 
product areas such as foreign exchange trading and treasury products.  The incumbent 
bankers who had spent their entire careers in Westpac unsurprisingly resented these 
newcomers, and this cultural clash prevented integration that could have fostered 
genuine dialogue. 
In January 1983 the Australian Treasurer declared that the government would 
allow the establishment of ten new banks, including foreign-owned ones.  The newly 
elected Labor government in March of that year formed the Martin Group to review 
the Campbell recommendations; in February 1984 the Martin Review Group gave its 
support to maintaining deregulation as well as entry of new, including foreign, 
banks.28  The government followed the recommendations and in 1985 approved the 
licensing of sixteen new foreign banks, far more than initially proposed by the 
Campbell Committee. 
The over-reaction to deregulation by the existing banks as well as the 
onslaught of the new entrants in the 1980s created the circumstances that would lead 
to the worst losses in the Australian banking industry in nearly a century. 
Deregulation in the mid 1980s intensified competition and the desire by 
institutions to grow their balance sheets rapidly.  This took place in an 
environment in which asset prices, particularly commercial property prices, were 
                                                
28 ———, Fast Money 4 (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1998). 
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increasing quickly, and credit assessment procedures in many financial institutions 
had not adjusted to the new liberalised environment.  The result was extremely 
strong credit growth secured against increasingly overvalued commercial 
property.  In 1989, the combination of high interest rates and a softening of the 
commercial property market exposed the poor credit quality of some of the most 
risky loans.  Then, as the economy went into recession and the decline in property 
prices accelerated, more broadly based credit quality problems became evident…29 
 
Westpac suffered heavy losses but as a group the banks owned by state governments 
and foreign banks lost the most because they were the most relentless in the pursuit of 
market share.  Supervision of the state banks was made difficult by the technicality 
that the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) did not have formal legal powers over 
licensing, “even though the state institutions had given formal voluntary undertakings 
to meet the Reserve Bank’s prudential standards.”30 
While public trust in financial institutions was shaken by the huge losses and 
runs on smaller entities, overall confidence was not eroded because of public sector 
intervention.  The state governments ensured that no depositors lost their deposits 
while the foreign banks replenished the capital of their Australian subsidiaries.  The 
depositors of the Big Four were never in danger of losing their deposits in the 1990s. 
While the 1980s could be described as the era of corporate financing 
extravagance, the 1990s ushered in a significant financial development, the escalation 
of Australian household indebtedness.  As RBA economists noted in a conference 
paper, the proportion of household debt to household disposable income nearly 
doubled over the decade, “rising from 54 per cent in 1990 to almost 100 per cent at 
the end of 1999…Most of the additional debt was used to purchase residential 
                                                
29 Marianne Gizycki and Philip Lowe, "The Australian Financial System in the 1990s," in The 
Australian Economy in the 1990s (Reserve Bank of Australia Conference: Reserve Bank of Australia, 
2000), http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/Conferences/2000/GizyckiLowe.pdf, p. 183 
(accessed  15 February 09). 
30 Ibid., p. 186. 
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estate.”31  A key reason for the emergence of households as a major market segment 
was the breathing space needed by corporations to wind down their excessive loans 
and acquisitions.  The loan losses of banks from corporate finance propelled them 
into retail banking. 
Accompanying the increase in household debt was the shift of household 
savings away from traditional bank deposits to market-oriented investments.  This 
had a profound effect in the restructuring of the balance sheets of banks. 
The combination of strong credit growth and subdued growth in domestic 
deposits has led financial institutions to rely increasingly on wholesale markets for 
funding, largely through debt securities.  Given the relative lack of domestic 
savings, many of these securities have been issued to non-residents.32  
 
This dependence on international funding would subsequently impact Australian 
banks adversely as liquidity tightened during the global financial crisis.   
Deregulation brought competition to the market for residential mortgages, 
where the RBA reported “the margin between the standard mortgage rate and the cash 
rate fell from a historically high 4-1/4 percentage points in 1992/93 to around 1-3/4 
percentage points in 1999.”33 Although the mortgage brokers relied on banks for 
initial funding, they later turned to securitsation of mortgage assets and were able to 
lower margins on their loans without worrying about the profitability of existing 
loans. 
In the financial product of credit cards, competition was also fierce, but the 
strategy was a robust attempt on the part of credit card issuers to stimulate card usage 
through various loyalty reward programmes rather than a cut in lending margins, 
                                                
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., p. 189. 
33 Ibid., p. 194. 
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which succeeded in driving a “five-fold increase in the number of credit card 
transactions over the decade, and a trebling since 1995.”34  Competition in this case 
did not offer card customers financial benefits but creative inducement schemes to 
earn frequent flyer mileage or loyalty points with other service providers. 
Despite competition banking business became more concentrated among the 
top five banks and their average return on equity remained unchanged.  A noteworthy 
contributor to profitability was the growth of non-interest income, which was 
primarily fee income on services provided to households.  According to RBA 
economist Gizycki, “the most notable examples are the introduction of mortgage fees 
and account-servicing fees…whereas in 1990 such fees rarely existed.”35 
There are several observations one can make about financial liberalization in 
Australia during the 1980s.  Firstly, many new financial institutions were established, 
with some of the largest international groups setting up branches or subsidiaries.  
Secondly, the push to lower interest rate margins came from newcomers rather than 
from the major local banks that had the biggest market shares.  Thirdly, zealous 
speculation created a property bubble that caused financial losses at numerous banks, 
thus resulting in the failure of several institutions and concentration of assets among 
the leading five banks.  Fourthly, household debt emerged as a significant growth 
factor.  Fifthly, banks became progressively more reliant on funding through asset-
backed securities and the use of derivatives in international financial markets.  
Finally, the structure of prudential supervision and regulation required adjustment and 
strengthening to cope with the sea change brought about by deregulation. 
 
                                                
34 Ibid., p. 196. 
35 Ibid., p. 197. 
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C. 2.  New Regulatory Model 
 
The crisis suffered by the financial sector in the late 1980s to the early 1990s resulted 
from deficiencies in the risk management systems of the financial players and the 
prevailing regulatory structure.  The immediate response in the initial half of the 
1990s was the compulsion on financial institutions to upgrade their risk-management 
techniques, while in the latter half of the decade there was an emphasis on regulations 
that encouraged competition, protection of individual customers, responsiveness to 
financial innovation, and firmness to ensure a stable financial system. 
The new measures included regular on-site bank inspections by the Reserve 
Bank, the enactment of guidelines on the determination of non-performing loans, 
assumption of responsibility by the RBA of regulation of state-owned banks, and the 
creation in 1992 of the Australian Financial Institutions Commission (AFIC) to 
supervise building societies and credit unions.36  AFIC brought disjointed State 
systems under unified national regulation. 
After instigating much of the necessary enhancement to address the earlier 
problems, the Commonwealth Government created the Wallis Inquiry in 1996 to 
undertake the first comprehensive assessment of the Australian financial system since 
the Campbell Inquiry in the late 1970s.  The Wallis Committee was tasked with 
evaluating the results of deregulation since the 1980s, examining the elements of 
transformation in the industry, and proposing a regulatory structure ideally suited for 
efficiency, flexibility, and competition in the financial system.37  In its final report of 
                                                
36 Jeffrey Carmichael, "Apra: Some Reflections on Where We Have Been and Where We Are 
Heading," in Australian Institute of Credit Union Management Conference (1998), 
http://www.apra.gov.au/speeches/98_05.cfm (accessed 20 February 2009). 
37 Ibid. 
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March 1997 the Wallis Inquiry recommended a significant reorganization of financial 
regulation. 
Responsibility for the prudential supervision of banks, building societies, credit 
unions, insurance and superannuation funds was assigned to the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), which commenced operations in July 
1998.  This brought to an end the Reserve Bank’s role in bank supervision.  
Responsibility for market conduct and disclosure in the financial sector was 
assigned to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), which 
was also given responsibility for the enforcement and administration of the 
Corporations Law and consumer protection across the financial system.  The 
Reserve Bank retained responsibility for monetary policy and the maintenance of 
financial system stability.  In addition, a Payments System Board was established 
within the Reserve Bank with responsibility to promote safety, competition and 
efficiency within the payments system.38 
 
The remarks in a speech of the inaugural Chairman of APRA, Jeffrey 
Carmichael, are worth noting: 
 It is universally agreed that the primary rationale for regulation is market failure. 
There is a widely held myth that Western economies are built on unfettered free 
markets – on laissez faire.  The reality is that all markets fail, and they fail for a 
variety of reasons:  Private enterprise only works where regulation corrects market 
failure.39 
 
Regulations, of course, are simply rules of behaviour.  As a totality, regulation 
attempts to establish a legal and ethical framework within which commerce can 
flourish to the mutual benefit of all involved.  The ideal regulatory system encourages 
competition, but does so in a way that encourages honesty and fairness.40  According 
to this view, market failures can result from a number of factors, which include 
monopolistic or anti-competitive behaviour, consumer exploitation and market 
manipulation, the lack of prudence in the structure of financial products, and the 
                                                
38 Gizycki and Lowe, "The Australian Financial System in the 1990s," p. 203. 
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breakdown of trust in and among financial institutions.  As pointed out earlier, the 
advent of deregulation motivated the existing banks to attempt to strengthen their 
bastions through pre-emptive acquisitions and unbridled expansion.  They also sought 
to manipulate markets without concern for individual customers.  In the process they 
extended huge loans funding a property bubble that eventually burst and inflicted 
sizeable losses on several institutions.  Bank runs were a natural consequence.  Such 
were the conclusions reached by the Wallis Inquiry that effected the rearrangement of 
financial regulations in Australia.  One would agree this coordinated approach was 
the appropriate step in addressing the multi-fold risks that could cause market 
failures. 
 
 
C. 3.  Attitude of Australian Banks Towards Regulators 
 
The attitude among banks appears to be one of resignation and forbearance.  Though 
they claim to have good relations with regulators, credit unions contend that 
regulations are burdensome because they are much smaller than banks and do not 
have as many support staff to maintain compliance.  Among banks there is a 
sentiment that regulations stifle innovation. 
Bankers feel that there is a need for a balance between protection of the 
community and efficient functioning of business enterprises.  They decry the 
unintended consequences of regulations created by the Financial Services Reform 
(FSR), such as a directive enacted in reaction to the fraud and eventual collapse of a 
well-known insurance company.  There were good intentions behind the desire to 
establish common licensing procedures for banks and insurance companies, but the 
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implementation has proven to be a bureaucratic nightmare because banking and 
insurance are extremely dissimilar businesses.  Banks complain that (a) clients are 
now inundated with 50-60 page documents for each product because of the huge 
disclosure requirements, (b) banking efficiency is impaired, and (c) overzealous 
regulators make compliance more costly.41 
The underlying principle is to provide disclosure and transparency so that 
when a customer walks into a bank he or she is expected to understand everything 
about a product and that it should be appropriate for what he needs.  But the way this 
been given form under the FSR is that the bank employee hands the customer an 
advisory service guide, then a products disclosure statement.  Those steps discharge 
the bank from its legal obligation, so from a compliance viewpoint it has done what it 
has to do.  But it is questionable if the client is any wiser about what he applied for.  
The substance of the law is that the customer should be aware of what he is being 
offered.  But because regulation is by nature bureaucratic and procedural, bankers 
argue that they end up going through the motions sometimes at the expense of the 
essence of the intent. 
One of the difficulties under the law is that banks must have numerous 
disclaimers, so when a client rings a call centre (and most people usually only have 
simple queries), by the time all the disclaimers are announced the client wants to hang 
up.  Many individuals claim to have this experience and find it annoying and a waste 
of their time.  The good intent is harmed by the manner of delivery. 
A number of senior executives have opined that some regulations are good, 
such as the Basle II Rules on capital adequacy and the anti-money-laundering 
directives, which have instilled a measure of discipline in banks so they now ensure 
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they know their customers well and their intended use for the products.  However, as 
Chapter 7 will show, the capital position of the world’s largest banks would prove to 
be inadequate in the wake of the global financial crisis because innovative funding 
techniques allowed them to circumvent strict capital provisions in the situation of 
mortgage-backed securities.  
There is a well-founded belief that regulators have an important role to play 
because trust is important.  It is accepted that members of the community generally 
trust banks to protect their money and not embark on risky loans that jeopardize their 
deposits, so it is deemed appropriate to have regulations in place to make sure that the 
financial system is sound and serves the community.  But some bankers worry that, 
after the Enron scandal, the manner pursued by regulators appears to be more about 
covering one’s rear, not so much about genuinely identifying risks and dealing with 
them.  From the perspective of banks the requisite paperwork is burdensome and 
distracting.  The banking attitude is that well-run institutions should not have to be 
subjected to all these rules. 
A few accept that not all banks have the proper values and contend that 
regulations should be directed at the firms operating at the edge of permissible 
conduct.  They grumble that regulators spend an inordinate amount of time with the 
big banks and not enough time with the sub-prime lenders.  They maintain that the 
financial operators catering to clients at the margin are committing most of the 
egregious violations against individuals.  They admit that the large banks might 
occasionally get things wrong but do not mind being reprimanded, and they spend 
tens of millions of dollars a year in compliance.  But they protest that mortgage 
brokers, financial planners, sub-prime lenders, and investment advisors are not 
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regulated.42  When the thesis subsequently turns to the story of the American sub-
prime crisis, it will become evident how the situation there is especially exacerbated. 
From the perspective of compliance officers it almost seems “redundant that 
the government has to constantly legislate matters that are absolutely common 
sense.”43  Yet two major regulations from ASIC caused great uproar among financial 
institutions during the twelve months prior to the interview: conflict of interest 
legislation and dollar disclosure. 
Dollar disclosure means that if a bank teller is recommending, for example, a 
term deposit product for which she may receive a financial reward, she should inform 
the customer that she would be entitled to extra pay as a result of closing the sale.  
Some banks did not want customers to know that individual sales personnel were 
being remunerated on a volume basis.  They should have been disclosing this anyway 
but did not, so the legislation had to be passed, and this has caused much concern.44 
More troubling to banks is the conflict of interest legislation that requires 
financial institutions to maintain a register of conflicts of interest, which is not really 
a harsh demand, and to strengthen their functional segregation through more robust 
Chinese walls.  The Bandicoot senior compliance officer said that a large bank 
typically owns half a dozen financial planning firms not carrying the bank’s name.  
The bank instructs the financial planners to sell the products that it creates and also 
competes with them in the open market to sell the same products.  When the same 
entity is involved in the development, distribution, and sales of the products, there is a 
genuine conflict.  It is ethically wrong to recommend something in which one has a 
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pecuniary interest, unless one discloses this up-front.  But in Australia there has been 
considerable resistance. 
It was alleged that in the years prior to 2003 the mores were especially bad.  
Managers supposedly looked at compliance from a selfish standpoint; they would ask 
how much the penalty would be for non-compliance and, if told that it might cost, say 
A$ 500,000 and the cost of implementation was A$ 1 million, they would inquire 
how many firms had been caught.  The managers then chose to defer 
implementation.45  
Some chief executives stated that their banks do not willingly break the rules 
and no longer operate according to a risk and reward equation because that is 
unethical.  Yet there remain many people in some banks who continue to think in 
terms of balancing that equation.  The ethical strife thrives because the banker is not 
really considering the customers; he is only thinking about himself.  Bank managers 
are only thinking about how products translate into profitable returns for shareholders 
because their career orientation is towards this goal. 
Every large bank says it puts the customer first, but there are those who 
disagree and argue that each institution is shareholder-focused.  According to a 
compliance officer, it is absolutely paramount in large organisations to win the 
confidence of investment analysts and commentators.46  After announcing their 
annual results, the banks undertake a two-week road show speaking to analysts at 
major investment houses.  Superannuation funds amounted to a total of A$ 1 trillion 
in 2006, and investors desirous of good returns look for shares that show promise.  
Therefore the investors’ questions relate to profitability and not whether the banks are 
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dealing with customers in a fair and honest way.  Nonetheless in 2005 one investment 
report commented on the poor EOS score of one large bank and questioned the long-
term sustainability of the bank if employees did not like working there.  It would 
seem this bank had to make genuine strides to listen to stakeholders other than 
shareholders and the investment houses. 
However, one bank, which regards compliance seriously, maintains that the 
focus of compliance has to be on the customers for two reasons: regulations and the 
reputation of the bank.47  The staff members have to establish the needs of customers 
and offer them products that best meet those needs.  The bank employees should 
provide either general advice in terms of the range of products and their features or 
personal advice based on a detailed analysis of the needs. 
The policies set at the top fall into two principal categories: know your 
customer as an overall corporate thrust and manage conflicts of interest so that 
employees do not put remuneration objectives ahead of customer needs.  Every 
branch is subjected to testing for quality assurance and compliance risk.  The 
frequency of testing depends on the risk score of the particular branch.   One that had 
previous compliance deficiency would be visited more frequently than one that 
performed well.  They also employ shadow shoppers pretending to be customers to 
check if the advice given to customers is appropriate.48   
Two regulatory areas that banks consider highly challenging, because they are 
extremely difficult to detect wrongdoing, are money laundering and bribery 
payments.  They conduct training for all employees that are tailored for those with 
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customer contact and those in operational roles.  Many locations have an anti-money 
laundering reporting officer. 
The anti-bribery policy for well-managed banks prohibits acceptance of 
bribes and facilitation payments (even if permitted by law) for reputational reasons.49  
This is naturally difficult to enforce in countries that have acknowledged rampant 
corruption where Australian banks might have joint venture investments or 
partnerships.  Australian corporate bankers state that the anti-bribery and anti-
corruption policies apply in all segments of business and partnerships over which they 
have control.  If one were to assume that corruption is part of a specific local culture, 
the challenge is to influence the behaviour of decision-makers in the other culture in 
situations where a bank is a minority shareholder.  Since a bank might typically be a 
minority partner in overseas ventures one would strongly suggest that extra due 
diligence be conducted to guarantee effective ethical conduct.   
In summary, after reviewing the circumstances that led to deregulation and the 
consequent reaction and behaviour of banks, followed by the Wallis Inquiry, one has 
to conclude that the revamping of financial regulation was necessary in order to 
preserve the integrity of financial markets, protect consumers, and ensure the stability 
of the financial system.  With the introduction of new regulations one finds that there 
is general compliance even if some bankers express frustration.  Compliance in itself 
does not necessarily denote ethical values in the financial institutions but rather action 
taken to avoid punishment and maintain reputation or public trust.  One could 
describe compliance by banks as utilitarian. 
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CHAPTER 5.  PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
The previous chapters have presented and analysed the empirical research on banking 
conduct and attitudes in Hong Kong and Australia.  There was also a review of the 
history behind the economic crises in those countries as well as the resultant efforts to 
upgrade banking regulation and the reaction of bankers to these new measures.  Some 
preliminary conclusions would now be appropriate. 
A.  Diminution of Responsibility 
The first preliminary conclusion is that the sense of responsibility in banks has 
declined to levels that have given rise to patterns of wrongful conduct.  One condition 
that has promoted irresponsibility is the loss of focus on customers.  Several bankers 
who were interviewed stated that it is highly important to get to know the customers 
and understand their needs, and one would fully agree that this is the basis of banking 
because the customers go to the banks with trust so the bankers should respond with 
considerate and reciprocal behaviour.  The closest approximation to the ideal 
approach to customers occurs in the opening of new retail deposits when the banks’ 
sales personnel explain the various types of products available, but even here one 
suspects that most institutions are more interested in legal compliance so they plaster 
new clients with thick brochures describing all the product features even if the latter 
might not truly comprehend or ever read these on their own.  Handing out these 
booklets exonerates the bank representatives from any legal liability that could arise 
in the future.  However, after the accounts are opened, there could be subsequent 
service charges of which the client might not have been aware and attempting to 
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obtain satisfactory explanation could necessitate wasted time dealing with call 
centres, which now routinely handle all customer inquiries. 
This loss of customer focus has led to the depersonalisation of customer 
relationships, whereby banking transactions are mainly handled through automated 
teller machines or over the internet and credit card and loan applications are 
processed through computerized scoring systems.  One could take the view that this 
growing trend towards impersonal banking is a contributor to a gradual alienation of 
banks from the communities they are supposed to serve.  Referring to the Kantian 
Categorical Imperative that was mentioned in Chapter 2, this denotes that banks do 
not treat persons as ends in themselves but rather as means of generating profits.  
There has been reduced accountability to customers and other stakeholders. 
An example of this occurred in Australia on 8 April 2009 when the Reserve 
Bank of Australia reduced interest rates a further 0.25% with the expectation that 
banks would pass on the full amount of the reduction to their customers, but none of 
them did so, and one, National Australia Bank (NAB), kept the full amount to itself.   
The chief executives of Westpac and NAB explained that their cost of wholesale 
funding had risen significantly in the wake of the global financial crisis, implying that 
they would utilise the rate reduction to improve their profitability. 
Banks proclaim their corporate social responsibility in their annual reports and 
special corporate responsibility reviews, which are often prominently displayed on 
their respective web sites, but different institutions have varying approaches.  As 
indicated earlier, some of these appear to be good public relations exercises, though 
many pronouncements declare sound principles, which are laudatory if all or most of 
the management and employees fully accept and live according to those.   
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B.  Departure from Fairness 
The second preliminary conclusion is that the value of fairness has been eroded 
among bankers.  In the Australian Interviews 6, 7, and 9 the top-level bankers state 
that they would continue to lend and offer banking facilities to legitimate businesses 
so long as regulations do not prohibit doing so.  In other words there is a reluctance to 
avow any values and therefore a passive surrender of this responsibility to the state.  
A good example of this mode of thinking was the top banker who said: 
Here you’ve got a let’s say the Lonely Planet Brothel down the road and they 
want credit card facilities.  Are you going to give them credit card facilities or not? 
The process you’d go through is: is this legit…is this legally permissible in 
Victoria and if it is, is it a legitimate business?  Is it conducting itself in a way that 
doesn’t impose risks of being foreclosed…?  If it is a legitimate business you have 
to explain to me why it was our job to say our values say we can’t support that.1 
 
This unwillingness to reflect upon whether certain activities are right or wrong and 
assert one’s values is a dangerous impediment to ethical conduct and reveals a refusal 
to assume moral leadership.  In response to a question about whether banks should 
install ATM cash withdrawal machines at casinos and racetrack facilities, the same 
senior banker said: 
…that is quite a vexed problem because some people would say you should help 
to control problem gambling.  Others would say that it’s the individuals’ right to 
access their money if they want it.  And there’s a real difficulty I think with 
bankers taking upon themselves to protect people from themselves and I’d have to 
admit to being a little on that side when it comes to capacity to repay.  I do think 
that banks are being irresponsible…if they lend money into a situation which is 
going to cause or has the potential or probability of causing future difficulties 
because these things are never straightforward in their resolution.  But once you 
get into the moral questions I reckon these are, first of all they’re moveable issues 
in that today’s values may not be tomorrow’s.  The whole point of our democratic 
system of government and decision-making and law formation is that you have 
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community standards from time to time which are enforceable through a process 
of law…that’s how our system works and I can’t see bankers as having any rights 
to change that by insisting on their own standards and values.2 
 
This mindset certainly influenced this executive’s perspective on all banking products 
and services from deposits to credit cards to mortgage loans.  In other words, what 
was legally allowed was perfectly acceptable.  Conversely what was not definitively 
classified as illegal was considered permissible.  The banker acknowledged that it 
would be irresponsible to lend to someone who might have difficulties with 
repayment.  However he also claimed that moral values are relative and bankers are 
not supposed to affirm their values.  An ethical observer would consider this a faulty 
attitude because bankers are part of the community and should therefore participate in 
shaping the morals of society. 
A major contributing factor is the cultural evolution in financial institutions 
where monetary rewards take precedence over principles of community service or 
customer satisfaction.  Excessive performance-based compensation at banks has been 
harmful because it is a powerful stimulus behind the continuous pressure on managers 
and employees to aggressively push sales to clients, as clearly evidenced in the multi-
million dollar bonuses paid to executives, originators, and dealers, those who either 
originate new debt or equity fund raising for corporate issuers or execute transactions 
in foreign exchange, options, or derivatives.  The sales orientation is manifest even at 
the personal banking representative level, which is the contact point for most retail 
customers, who open and operate retail deposits, apply for credit cards, obtain 
personal and real estate mortgage loans.  The majority of these bank representatives 
receive compensation that is commonly linked to the amount of sales and income 
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they bring to the bank.  While a number of banks may have instituted employee 
performance measures that track behavioural aspects in addition to numerical 
contribution, because some prominent institutional names have been afflicted with 
employee scams in the dealing room (where blatant fraudulent self-dealing occurred) 
or abuse of vulnerable customers as reported by the media, the reality is that earnings 
and profits are objectively quantifiable whereas behavioural assessment is adjudged 
as only subjectively measurable.  One would therefore argue that the compensation 
system at most banks favour the individuals who are most aggressive and successful 
in delivering bottom line results.  The most obvious proof of this is the massive sum 
of salaries and bonuses paid out to CEOs and other top executives of banks.  Since 
nearly all the bankers speak of the significance of good examples set by senior 
management, the role model of personal income maximization undoubtedly 
permeates the entire organization.   
A focus on sales growth rather than customer needs is certainly a significant 
reason behind the spiralling issuance of credit cards and the concomitant defaults and 
financial hardship of credit cardholders.  Although there have been efforts by bank 
supervisors and consumer protection agencies (and subsequently joined by bank 
industry associations) to promote responsible lending, the evidence shows a steady 
rise in credit card issuance over many years. 
A prominent area where the extreme emphasis on sales and earnings is a 
constant factor is the dealing room of banks where they execute trades in foreign 
currencies, securities, options and credit derivatives.  Fraud is an enormous 
temptation in the dealing room.  The primary means of control over dealing activities 
and fraud prevention is through segregation of functions and internal as well as 
external audit.  While the desire for instant riches is usually the driving force, 
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sometimes the motivation of the erring dealer is not personal monetary gain but 
egotistic glory.3 
In both above-mentioned situations, credit cards and dealing rooms, the 
problems can be traced to a shift away from the customers and to a flawed 
compensation system.  But the principal reason behind the lack of fairness and the 
prevalence of self-dealing is the absence of ethical leadership in these situations 
because senior management has relinquished primary responsibility to regulators. 
A key impetus behind the growth of unfair practices in banks is the stance 
banks assume with regard to risk management, a critical function embedded in all 
banks and companies, which principally serves to protect the interests of the bank not 
those of its customers.  It has been a widely accepted economic principle that 
financial returns grow with increased risk.  Therefore the objective is to weigh the 
risks so the bank can properly mitigate against them and earn an attractive profit.  For 
example, when banks assess credit risk factors, they are seeking to determine the 
probability of default of the clients, so one would argue that the emphasis is not to 
determine what the clients really need or what is best for the clients.  Banks measure 
a myriad of risks, including market risk (that interest rates might move against the 
bank or the prices of certain assets might decline), liquidity risk (that the cost of 
funding for the bank might rise to such an extent that it becomes too expensive or 
unavailable), or sovereignty risk (that the banks might not be able to enforce its claim 
in a certain sovereign jurisdiction).  Over several years risk management 
methodology has evolved into a quantitative discipline reliant on stochastic models.  
These mathematical models assume that all risks can be consistently predicted and 
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mapped out in the same way that scientists forecast the activities of natural 
phenomena adhering to the laws of physics.   
 Such risk management tools enable banks to determine their pricing models.  
For instance, in calculating the probability and incidence of default among credit card 
users, banks establish interest rates for revolvers4 as well as delinquency or penalty 
rates for those who miss their payments.  Although there are now several financial 
institutions that offer varying credit cards to suit different personal needs, one 
observation is that interest rates on credit cards continue to be very high, thereby 
producing attractive profitability in this line of business.  Historical experience and 
statistical probability of default have been factored into these rates to assure banks of 
profits.  The individuals who are revolvers are the ones sought after by credit card 
issuers and yet they generally have to pay what could be considered onerous rates, 
even though they might not have defaulted on their obligations and continue to make 
regular monthly payments; in most cases, it seems their problem is simply that they 
have insufficient regular income to pay for recurring expenses.  A few institutions 
claim to have started offering more reasonable terms to such individuals.   
There is another set of credit cardholders who have succumbed to the sales 
pitch of credit card issuers, namely those who are avid buyers of consumer durables 
and luxury items whether or not they can afford them; they might buy on impulse or 
simply have extravagant taste.  One view in these cases is that they should not have 
been offered such generous credit limits, but the risk models and the sales orientation 
of banks collaborated in producing the opposite results. 
                                                
4 Those who do not or cannot pay the full outstanding balance in their account on due date and 
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There is an ineffaceable notion that banks and their senior managers 
persistently champion their own self-interests ahead of other considerations.  This 
was unmistakably the situation at the time the Australian government liberalized the 
financial markets in the 1980s; prior to the lifting of regulations the Australian major 
banks scrambled to bulk up in size and gain additional market share in order to 
forestall competition from prospective new international and local entrants.  Several 
mergers and consolidations ensued among established financial institutions, and 
underwriting standards were reduced to accommodate more aggressive lending.  The 
end result of their anti-competitive behaviour was disastrous because many of them 
embarked on a lending spree to unsound property development projects and highly 
leveraged entrepreneurs.  Many banks suffered financial losses, and none of the 
previously state-owned banks continued to exist in their original form.  Due to the 
problems that arose in this period the Federal government commissioned a new 
inquiry that eventually recommended the enactment of new regulations to safeguard 
the stability of the financial system and provide consumer protection. 
The ratification of comprehensive regulations in Australia preceded other 
seemingly more stringent global regulations stemming from America as a 
consequence of corporate fraud perpetrated at Enron and other companies.  All 
companies and banks with operations in America have since been required to comply 
with these regulations.   The upshot is that most banks grumble about the need to 
conform to so many regulations in all the jurisdictions where they operate.  They 
complain about the cost of manpower and time in ensuring legal compliance.  A few 
institutions assert that their own standards, which arise out of institutionally ingrained 
ethical values, are higher than those legally stipulated.  In such cases one would say 
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that the righteous institutions should actually be pleased that others are required to 
observe similarly high standards and are not attempting to compete on a lower plane. 
Here is where one finds merit in well-conceived regulations.  Institutions must 
on their own initiative still develop and espouse ethical values but regulations bring 
recalcitrant entities into line and serve to look after the interests of consumers and 
others who are powerless vis-à-vis banks.  As profit-oriented entities banks should 
seek their self-interest and defend themselves against competitors but they should 
possess moral values so that they do not injure customers and innocent bystanders in 
the process or engage in corrupt practices in order to attain their declared objectives.  
The chapter on the sub-prime crisis shall demonstrate how unbridled self-interest has 
harmed virtually everybody. 
Some bankers will make a case that they fully comply with all the stringent 
regulations; others will contend that they go further and subscribe to corporate social 
responsibility practices; others will maintain that they esteem their reputation so 
much that they would not do anything to besmirch it.  However, unless there are 
moral values that have taken root in the bank, one would deny that these other 
measures diminish the force of selfishness in the organization.  To take specific 
examples, legal compliance does not inhibit bonus-hungry business strategists from 
trying to circumvent the laws in order to achieve their objectives; a bank might 
publicise its deeds of good corporate social responsibility, but, if some of its 
employees are dissatisfied with their jobs, they might not genuinely care about their 
customers and could even act in a detrimental way.  In the case described earlier 
about a bank’s handling of a stockbroker client that had gone bankrupt, the bank 
acted legally in disposing of the securities collateral in its possession without regard 
to the actual shareholders of those securities, but it subsequently realised that it had 
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lost its reputation in the process by not considering the interests of the other affected 
parties.  And this is a bank that sets great store by its reputation.  In all these cases the 
banks were motivated by their self-interest.  Ultimately what should matter is that 
banks have sound ethical values.    
All banks these days proclaim in their annual reports that they practise good 
corporate governance and have established board committees to provide oversight in 
this matter.  This may be beneficial for the corporation because it ensures that the 
interests of management are aligned with those of shareholders.  However, this alone 
does not assure protection to bank customers, because the priority is still the bank’s 
own interest.  As pointed out above, during the financial crisis gripping the world in 
2009 several banks still refuse to pass on interest rate reductions to customers because 
of their worries about their own profitability.  Such behaviour can only be described 
as selfish and unfair. 
 
C.  Opacity or Transparency? 
When one looks at how banks in Australia and Hong Kong behave towards their 
customers and stakeholders, one notes their declarations of service and adherence to 
good governance.  At the same time one has seen how aggressive credit card 
promotion among some issuers has resulted in unjustifiable hardship among 
cardholders who should never have been granted credit cards.  In reviewing the 
financial disclosure booklets that banks hand out to new customers, one might 
consider them opaque for most average personal clients.5 Therefore the legal 
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disclosure by banks may satisfy legal requirements but they would lack transparency 
for most individuals. 
Banks might argue that they have developed authentic corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and operate according to the right principles yet these may not 
be enough.  The corporate responsibility goals enunciated by various banks include 
engagement with all stakeholders, concern for the environment, and responsible 
products, services and decisions.  The steps taken include upgrading of skills and 
capabilities of employees, supporting the communities where they operate, enhancing 
financial literacy of customers, and offering micro finance to the disadvantaged.  
Nonetheless adopting a CSR programme or a code of ethics does not necessarily 
mean that a bank is behaving appropriately; as indicated in the earlier chapter on the 
Australian empirical research, a senior compliance officer at a major bank lamented 
that CSR at her bank was evidenced by spending large sums of money in sponsoring 
sports events followed by sponsorship of concerts.  Both certainly served as good 
publicity, so they were intended to promote the bank’s products and services. 
Good corporate social responsibility should incorporate an effective code of 
ethics that is grounded on moral standards.  Unfortunately many large institutions that 
proudly speak about their code of ethics are guilty of ethical violations.  Several 
ethicists have analysed this situation and arrived at some explanations on the 
discrepancy between stated ethics policy and business practice.  One paper cites two 
factors: ineffectual ethics programmes and defective corporate culture.6 
To understand the apparent gap, one has to probe into the rationale within the 
specific institution behind the enactment of the code, the method of creation, the 
                                                
6 Simon Webley and Andrea Werner, "Corporate Codes of Ethics: Necessary but Not Sufficient," 
Business Ethics: A European Review 17, no. 4 (2008): pp. 405-15. 
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content, and the implementation and administration thereof.  The reasons might 
include a genuine desire to establish guidelines for the staff, or to safeguard against 
legal penalties, or to generate public awareness about its community deeds as well as 
its products and services.  The principal motivation would shape the process of 
creating the code, which should include employees across a broad cross-section of the 
organization so there is participation and ownership throughout the firm.  In his paper 
Schwartz lists six universal moral standards that should be included in the content of 
a code of ethics, namely trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, fairness, caring, and 
citizenship.7  As one of the minimum moral requirements for a code of ethics he states 
that there should be prioritisation such that “specific provision must be included in 
the code to the effect that profits or self-interest must not receive greater priority than 
the fulfilment of the six moral standards.”8   
The background, process, and content shape the embedding and enforcement 
of the code of ethics in the institution.  Deficiencies in the creation of the code 
frequently result in the difficulties of its application and administration, thus 
explaining the gap between policy and practice. 
Therefore one must conclude that, while banks expend visible time and energy 
to publicise their community activities, they have not truly disclosed their full 
intentions.  As a principal example, the senior banker in AU Interview 4 affirmed:  
We made a public commitment over a year ago that we would keep our call 
centres in Australia because that was a bit of an emotional issue.  And in fact we 
just won an award for having the best call centre in Australia of any company let 
alone banks and that’s for the third year in a row we’ve won that award.  We made 
a commitment. 
 
                                                
7 Mark S. Schwartz, "A Code of Ethics for Corporate Code of Ethics," Journal of Business Ethics, no. 
41 (2002): pp. 27-43. 
8 Ibid. 
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Two years after that senior executive made this pronouncement his bank announced 
the closure of their Australian call centres and their relocation to India.  This is a bank 
that claims to pay special attention to the needs of their customers, which included a 
desire to speak with local bank representatives who could understand their situation, 
and this was the reason for the boast about their Australian-based call centres.  
Ultimately the bank must have accepted that its profitability could improve if these 
jobs were to be sent offshore.   
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Part C.  Harsh Realities and Critique of Banking Ethics 
CHAPTER 6.  THE SUB-PRIME CRISIS: AN ETHICAL 
FAILURE? 
A.  Eviction from Homes 
Although the empirical research was confined to banking practices and ethical 
conduct in Australia and Hong Kong, there were distress signals emanating from the 
United States as early as the end of 2006 and mounting in intensity and frequency as 
2007 unfolded, and these would have unforeseen ripple effects on the entire global 
banking system.  The financial events that emanated from America offer a profound 
and disturbing insight into the conflicts of interest afflicting banks and other lenders.  
The troubles arose when numerous American homeowners were unable to repay their 
mortgage loans as interest rates escalated, thus prompting lenders to foreclose on 
their properties.  These loans generally had attractive low rates at the outset but 
would adjust after a grace period to reflect market rates and the higher risk category 
of the borrowers, who unfortunately lacked the financial capability to repay larger 
amounts of debt. 
These were the so-called sub-prime loans for the purpose of acquiring homes 
that were granted to individuals who did not meet the normal credit standards of 
commercial banks.  As the senior officer of a large American subsidiary of a major 
global financial institution explained in a letter addressed to this researcher: 
It is important to understand that the sub-prime market is comprised of ordinary 
citizens who, due to a troubled or non-existent credit history, find it difficult to 
obtain credit.  These men and women and their families have pressing financial 
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needs and require responsible financial services.  We believe that the bank has a 
responsibility to provide them with fair lending and responsible credit.1  
 
This clarification signified that the bank was guided by utilitarian thinking, which in 
this instance equated the optimisation of utility with greater home ownership among a 
broad spectrum of the population.  The intended consequence of making homes 
affordable was viewed as a worthy objective.   
The ostensible rationale for this financial product was to provide greater 
financial opportunity and flexibility to non-creditworthy individuals.  Typically the 
borrower was not required to contribute any equity or down payment on the property 
and the lender provided 100% financing.  There was little or no attempt to verify the 
income sources of the borrower and therefore no sensitivity analysis to ascertain the 
individuals’ capacity to cope with interest rate acceleration.  This omission concealed 
the precarious financial state of many borrowers.  Though the problem had 
principally arisen in America, there were some lenders in Australia and Hong Kong 
that provided home mortgage financing to customers who would not normally qualify 
for bank loans.  One financial institution that consented to an interview had attained a 
sizeable market share of Australian mortgage financing by offering such credit 
facilities.  However, the senior officer of the American bank subsidiary quoted above 
stated that, despite a significant bank operation in Hong Kong and a large presence in 
Australia, they conducted sub-prime lending only in the United States.  In fact, the 
evidence in both Australia and Hong Kong indicated a rigorous stance on the part of 
regulators against sub-prime lending.  As disclosed by the CEO of the parent bank,2 
he objected strongly to his institution’s purchase of the American sub-prime financial 
institution.  He explained that the parent bank had excess liquidity that it could not 
                                                
1 Excerpt from respondent’s comment to sub-prime queries in April 2007. 
2 Transcripts HK 8, AU 19. 
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adequately deploy, so the acquisition of the American institution represented an 
opportunity to substitute its liquidity for the latter’s wholesale funding.  As it turned 
out, the strict banking regulations in Hong Kong restricted this approach.  Moreover, 
this CEO was concerned about potential damage to his bank’s reputation, so how 
does one evaluate this ethical position?  On one hand, it could reflect a serious worry 
about the business model of the acquired institution being uneconomically viable, that 
potential loan losses outweighed the increase of more clientele in the U.S.  On the 
other hand, it might have been a genuine ethical anxiety that the bank might be 
extending housing loans to borrowers at risk, who could end up suffering as a result.  
The essential point to note is that here was a very senior executive of the acquiring 
bank who objected to the purchase of the sub-prime lender and later served on its 
board.  Several months after the CEO’s interview for this research and when the sub-
prime problems first surfaced, this was the first bank to set aside a substantial loan 
loss provision and it terminated sub-prime lending by the American subsidiary.  An 
objective observer would view this individual’s conduct according to several ethical 
standards: firstly, there was a sense of duty towards customers in the sense of 
preserving the reputation of being a responsible, fair and honest banker; secondly, 
there might have been a purely rational concern that the risks of loss to the bank 
outweighed the benefits to be gained; thirdly, there might have been a utilitarian 
perspective that the scheme would do more harm than good to borrowers, contrary to 
the view expressed by the officer in the sub-prime lender.  In the existential condition 
of this banker all three, or possibly more, ethical axioms might have been operative. 
From the standpoint of justice the basic concept of sub-prime loans is 
problematic, whether the end-use is for home acquisition or credit card purchases, 
because it preys on the most vulnerable members of society, those who have impaired 
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credit due to lack or loss of a job, marital or family problems, illness, or financial 
difficulty.  These individuals, if they were financially illiterate, would very likely 
struggle with comprehending the complexity of a mortgage loan and the linked 
interest rate adjustments as well as their consequential impact on whatever disposable 
personal income they might have.  To push such loans to susceptible individuals 
could probably mislead them to accept an unaffordable proposition.  Such action 
would be morally reprehensible. 
If one were to analyse this from the perspective of a Kantian categorical 
imperative one would definitely not apply this course of action to all persons in such 
circumstances because it would be impossible to argue that this is a universally moral 
act.  Likewise it would be difficult for a consequentialist to argue in its favour 
because of the numerous homeowners whose properties have been foreclosed.  On 
the other hand, most implicated financiers and mortgage lenders would possibly have 
viewed the situation in terms of subjective consequentialism3 because they looked at 
intended and expected consequences of fairness and equality; they might declare that 
they were enabling individuals to acquire homes and consumer goods that they could 
not otherwise afford.   
Yet there is another view that prudential credit standards developed by 
traditional banks have a sound underlying rationale borne out of lending experience, 
namely that borrowers require a determinate level of unencumbered income in order 
to repay loans and they must have the financial resilience to be able to surmount 
unforeseen problems and cope with increased repayments due to higher interest rates.  
The fact that countless foreclosures had already occurred (estimated at more than 2 
                                                
3 The term here refers to allegations of good intentions expecting positive consequences. 
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million in the U.S.A. as of November 2007)4 is stark evidence that lending money to 
those who could not afford the repayments caused more hardship than benefits, and 
that such type of loans had no lasting, net utilitarian value. 
Sub-prime loans were not only inherently unscrupulous because of the 
vulnerability of the prospective borrowers but also because this segment could easily 
give rise to grossly immoral practices on the part of lending institutions that resort to 
fraudulent means.5 Since the borrowers were not required to provide proof of income, 
the lenders could easily manipulate the documents. 
While there has been censure of the conduct of sub-prime lenders and 
approval of the sound credit standards observed by banks, the latter are not entirely 
blameless.  Firstly, some of the large sub-prime lenders were directly owned by 
banking groups, which presumably were familiar with, and supportive, of the loan 
policies and operations of their subsidiaries.  Secondly, though most banks laid great 
stress on reputation (as described in the interviews with bankers) and decried the 
behaviour of the non-banks, the latter would not have thrived without backing from 
the banks, which provided substantial lines of credit and were significant investors in 
mortgage paper. 
 
                                                
4 Editor, "Keeping Americans in Their Homes," The New York Times, 19 November 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com (accessed 21 November 2007). 
5 Bob Herbert, "A Swarm of Swindlers," The New York Times, 20 November 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/ (accessed 21 November 2007). The opinion article describes a family that 
was hounded by mortgage lenders to sign up to repeated refinancing of a mortgage on the mother’s 
home despite lacking financial capacity.  The lender falsely inflated the borrower’s income despite the 
fact that the only source of income was social security payments.   
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B.  Sub-Prime Mortgages Analysed 
To comprehend the economic catastrophe that commenced in 2007 one should 
examine the nature and impact of sub-prime mortgages.  In order to understand the 
problems affecting individuals it is helpful to take a look at the different types of 
mortgages that were available to individuals in America: 
• Sub-prime: at a higher rate of interest for borrowers with poor credit history and 
low income 
• Alt-A: at a higher rate of interest for people with poor credit history but better 
jobs 
• Jumbo: mortgages over US$ 417,000 and not backed by government guarantee 
• Prime: mortgages under US$ 417,000 and backed by government guarantee with 
stricter loan conditions (also called ‘conforming’)6 
 
Sub-prime lending had spread rapidly in the United States, particularly in the 
frenetic housing markets of Florida, Southern California, Washington, DC, and New 
York City.  One in five American mortgages came under this class.  These had 
become widely accepted in a country that espoused home-ownership as the 
‘American dream.’  They were very popular among individuals who did not qualify 
for housing loans at banks due to any of a variety of reasons: brief or no employment 
record, undocumented or inadequate earnings, lack of assets.  Sub-prime mortgages 
involved a much higher risk of default by the borrower than other types of mortgage 
finance, because most of them were ‘balloon’ mortgages (technically known as 
hybrid-adjustable rate mortgages, or ARMs), which offered a low fixed-rate loan (as 
an introductory inducement) for two or three years, and then switched to a much 
higher adjustable rate afterwards.  Moreover most of them did not require any down 
payment, so the loan to value ratio was at least 100% of the acquisition cost. 
                                                
6 Steve Schifferes, "Housing Meltdown Hits Us Economy," in BBC News (BBC, 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go//pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/7078492.stm (accessed 12 November 2007). 
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Although such mortgage loans provided opportunities for home ownership to 
economically less fortunate individuals, they also gave rise to predatory lending 
practices.  There were the so-called ‘Ninja’ loans for people with no income, no job, 
no assets.  There were the ubiquitous ‘2/28’, mortgages that change from a fixed to a 
significantly higher adjustable rate after the first two years.  Exorbitant prepayment 
penalties were standard, so the borrowers were precluded from trying to refinance at 
lower rates.7 
In numerous instances the ill-fated mortgagors claim they were not aware 
interest rates would be reset or would rise to such an extent.  They assert that most 
fees were not disclosed and separately itemized.  Among them there is a prevailing 
sentiment of having been deceived.  At the very least, there was lack of effort on the 
part of the lenders to inculcate financial literacy among the vulnerable, poorer 
members of society. 
Christopher Dodd, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, stated in his opening speech at a hearing on the mortgage 
market turmoil: 
These adjustments are so steep that many borrowers cannot afford to make the 
payments and are forced to refinance, at great cost, sell the house, or default on 
the loan.  No loan should force a borrower into this kind of devil’s dilemma.  
These loans are made on the basis of the value of the property, not the ability of 
the borrower to repay.  This is the fundamental definition of predatory lending.  
(Italics added) 
 
Frankly, the fact that any reputable lender could make these kinds of loans so 
widely available to wage earners, to elderly families on fixed incomes, and to 
lower-income and unsophisticated borrowers strikes me as unconscionable and 
deceptive.8 (Italics added) 
                                                
7 ———, "Foreclosure Wave Sweeps America,"  (BBC News, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/business/7070935.stm (accessed 12 November 2007). 
8  Michael Lewis, Panic: The Story of Modern Financial Insanity (W.W. Norton, 2009), p. 310. 
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The proximate cause of the sub-prime mortgage crisis was the upward 
tweaking of interest rates following the initial period that began in 2006 and gathered 
pace the following year.  The soaring rates pushed monthly loan repayments beyond 
most borrowers’ disposable personal incomes, causing them to miss instalments.  As 
the problems escalated, the amounts of the loans quickly exceeded the value of the 
properties, so people stopped payments altogether or the lenders pre-empted them by 
foreclosing the homes pledged as collateral. 
The accelerating repossession of properties brought an avalanche of forced 
sales of homes resulting in the first absolute decline of housing prices in the U.S. 
since the Great Depression in the 1930s.  It was estimated that some cities saw 
property prices fall by as much as 30% towards the end of 2007. 
 
C.  Housing Meltdown 
Borrowers, whose loans were at readjustment phases, found that interest rates had 
soared and new loans were unavailable, so defaults climbed even higher, and 
financial institutions, which had provided more than US$ 1 trillion of sub-prime debt, 
were sitting on these vacant properties, attempting to unload them in the market.  
These lenders also refused to extend any new financing, thereby compounding the 
credit crunch.  The American National Association of Home Builders predicted in 
2007 that the house building industry would contract by 50% in the next two years, 
eliminating 1 - 2 million jobs, and decimating many businesses.9 In November 2007 
The Economist reported that “The housing downturn has entered a second, more 
                                                
9  Schifferes, "Housing Meltdown Hits Us Economy."  
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dangerous phase: one in which the construction rout deepens, price declines 
accelerate and the wealth effect of falling prices begins to change consumers’ 
behaviour.”10   
The source of the current turmoil lies with the bursting of the housing bubble, 
which had manifested itself in the doubling of house prices from 1997 till 2007.  That 
price increase shaped America’s economy in a manner that surpassed the construction 
boom.  The Economist reported: “In particular, rising house prices provide consumers 
with the collateral they need for a huge increase in borrowing.”11  As with all bubbles, 
this asset bubble eventually had to burst.  During the period between the middle of 
2006 and early 2009, according to the Economist, “single-family home prices had 
fallen by nearly 27%.  Existing home sales tumbled by nearly 40% from their peak in 
early 2005.”12  But the economic statistics of collapsing price levels did not begin to 
uncover the underlying human anguish.   
In the questionnaires and interviews with bankers there was an explicit 
reference to a housing bubble in certain countries, particularly the United States, and 
the question was raised as to whether they thought that banks had contributed to this.  
The bankers denied that their respective institutions were responsible for this or 
encouraged excessive borrowing, but nonetheless they all agreed in 2006 that the 
American situation appeared worrisome. 
 
                                                
10 "Getting Worried Downtown," The Economist, 17 November 2007, http://www.economist.com 
(accessed 19 November 2007). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
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D.  Origins of Chaos 
The roots of the turbulence in 2007 can be traced back to the Asian financial crisis of 
1997 when several nations in the Far East, which had unwisely incurred sizeable 
current account deficits (encouraged with liberal loans from Wall Street banks), 
suddenly found themselves besieged by global currency speculators and hedge funds 
that were gambling that they could force these countries to devalue their currencies 
and thus reap substantial profits as a result.  This wager paid off for many bettors, and 
wrought havoc on all the Asian economies, including some well-managed ones such 
as Hong Kong and Singapore.  It thus became necessary for the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to intervene vigorously in order to forestall a global contagion.   
Much of the money lent by the IMF to bail out distressed economies had the 
effect of bailing out the Wall Street bankers who had lent to them with abandon.  
At the same time, extreme conditions were imposed on the IMF loans which in the 
short term enhanced the social and economic pain.  It made many of these 
economies determined never again to let their destiny lie in the hands of others.13 
 
These nations chose to tidy up their respective economies, reduce current account 
deficits, build up surpluses, and trim down inflation.  They started to save frenziedly 
and invest domestically and internationally.  The rapidly growing countries, China 
and Singapore, amassed huge liquidity in search of attractive investment 
opportunities.   
Meanwhile the new American regime in 2000 suffered through the 
effervescence and subsequent puncture of the dot.com bubble that entailed start-up 
companies being founded in Silicon Valley by twenty-something entrepreneurs with 
innovative internet-based products and services, then being floated on stock 
                                                
13 Sean Farrell, "Anatomy of a Credit Crisis," The Independent, 6 November 2007, 
http://www.independent.co.uk (accessed 7 November 2007). 
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exchanges with neither track record nor profits, thereby creating instant young paper 
multimillionaires who would subsequently witness all their ‘wealth’ evaporate.  This 
Internet bubble inevitably had to burst and lead to a stock market collapse.  After this 
exuberant fiasco, the government endorsed a housing boom as the catalyst in 
rebuilding the economy.   
The new American government policy initiatives advocated low interest rates 
in stimulating demand for credit and housing.  The policies also leaned heavily in 
favour of free market forces in lieu of regulations in promoting innovation and 
prosperity; the prevailing attitude was that the marketplace would curb any 
competitive excesses. 
The decade from 1997 was also characterised by low inflation on a global 
scale, which indicated that central banks in the major economies could sustain low 
interest rates.  Although borrowers welcomed this situation, it frustrated the sizeable 
Asian investors whose ranks were soon joined by the oil producing countries, which 
were flush with cash from rising oil prices.  This gigantic weight of money created an 
insatiable appetite for liquid investments that carried more attractive rates of interest 
than offered by U.S. government securities. 
The investment bankers were more than happy to meet this enormous demand 
from investors with innovative financial instruments.  Many types of high-yielding 
investment products were invented, and some of the most actively traded were 
secured by American sub-prime mortgage loans.  The financial engineering 
transformed risky assets into high-yield investment grade instruments. 
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D. 1.  Financial Wizardry 
Sub-prime mortgage loans were extended to homebuyers with a deficient payment 
history, but the mortgages were cunningly repackaged into residential mortgage-
backed securities or RMBSs.  As of July 2007 more than 399 of these bonds had been 
downgraded by a rating agency with another 612 bonds about to be downgraded, 
worth US$ 12 billion.  These were only a minor fraction of the mortgage market. 
The RMBSs are in turn divided up and placed in instruments called collateralised 
debt obligations or CDOs.  These were sold to a wide range of investors, 
depending on their tolerance for risk.  One set of securities, known as an equity 
tranche, pays the highest returns but is the first to suffer if the underlying bonds 
default; other securities offer a much lower yield but a triple-A credit rating, 
because a lot of defaults would be needed to trigger losses.14 
 
While the initial impetus came from Asian investors and oil producing 
countries, numerous financial institutions soon flocked into the market.  They were 
attracted by the investment ratings of these credit derivatives because of the scarcity 
of such high-grade debt.  Although sub-prime mortgages were certainly not triple-A 
quality, they could be reengineered into securities via collateralised debt obligations 
through formulas that made default an extremely low mathematical probability.  The 
rating agencies that provided the ratings also helped design these structured products.  
For example, a newspaper reported that Moody’s earned more than 40% of its 
revenues from rating such products as CDOs in 2006.15  Despite a voluntary code of 
conduct, agencies engaged in potential conflicts of interest because the firms they 
rated paid them.  Passing judgment on CDOs was lucrative business for the rating 
                                                
14 "Another Pounding," The Economist, 14 July 2007, http://www.economist.com (accessed 16 July 
2007).  
15 "Asking for Trouble," The Economist, 14 July 2007, http://www.economist.com (accessed 16 July 
2007).  
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agencies, which were the midwives that helped give birth to these investment 
instruments.  
In the mid-1990s individual loans looked appealing to investors, but their ratings 
(often below investment grade) made them too risky for conservative types.  So 
whole forests of asset-backed securities were put together into a single CDO.  
These were structured so that the first losses would be taken by whoever had 
bought the riskiest, highest-yielding piece of the package.  That piece had a low 
rating.  But the piece at the top, which would take the last losses, was rated AAA – 
a reflection of how unlikely it was that all the loans in the CDO would default at 
once. 
Rather than standing back and observing this from the sidelines, the rating 
agencies got involved in structuring these products.  The agencies would suggest 
improvements based on their models.16        
 
In his book, The Two Trillion Dollar Meltdown, Morris wrote that in five years from 
2002 to 2006 the rating agency Moody’s saw its income double and its share price 
triple.  The firm’s principal clients were the major banks and investment houses, 
which had always fought fiercely over the CDO bond ratings, so the agencies were 
frequently willing to compromise on these issues in order to continue receiving new 
business.  The connivance of the agencies helped create highly attractive securities.17 
 
D. 2.  Upsurge in Securitisation 
These new instruments proved to be very appealing to financial institutions not only 
in the U.S. but also in Europe due to further innovation by the investment banks in 
the form of new investment vehicles known as conduits, which were mostly not 
reflected in the banks’ balance sheets and were funded in the asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) market.   
                                                
16  "The Game Is Up," The Economist, 18 August 2007, http://www.economist.com (accessed 21 
August 2007). 
17  Charles R. Morris, The Two Trillion Dollar Meltdown: Easy Money, High Rollers and the Great 
Credit Crash 2009 ed. (Melbourne: Black, 2009), p. 77. 
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The loans were typically cheap, usually roll over every few months, and are used 
to buy highly rated, but high-yielding assets, such as collateralised-debt 
obligations.  The risk of short-term funding was always one of liquidity – and it 
dried up quickly once lenders became spooked.  With triple-A assets, that had not 
been expected to become a problem.18 
 
Conduits were very well accepted in North America and Europe because the top 
ratings of the underlying assets could permit the banks to minimize prescribed capital 
under the forthcoming Basle II Agreement and because these offered better returns 
than similarly rated U.S. government bonds.  Thus by August 2007 the global ABCP 
market totalled approximately US$ 1.2 trillion, nearly doubling in three years. 
Yet the structured-finance geniuses did not stop at conduits.  They ventured into 
structured investment vehicles (SIVs), which are similar, but more highly 
leveraged.  SIVs have been one of the fastest-growing areas of structured finance, 
and they have been investing in riskier assets…23% of SIVs assets are in 
residential mortgage securities, half of which are American…some banks even 
manage SIV-lites (echoing the covenant-lite trend of the leveraged-loan market.  
These have fewer diversification restrictions and involve borrowings of up to 40 to 
70 times equity collateral.  Most SIV-lites made big, focused investments in 
American mortgage securities, including subprime and Alt-As, which are also 
troubled in spite of their better credit quality.19 
 
However, if an unbiased critic or a prudent regulator had carefully scrutinized 
the fundamental structure of this securitisation and maintained that a triple-A rating 
was unwarranted, then the banks would have been obliged to set aside a larger 
portion of their capital to protect themselves against potential losses and, by doing so, 
they would have assumed more responsibility for their actions.  Bank that commit a 
larger proportion of their own capital to transactions are more inclined to be 
responsible about the process and the consequences.  One would hypothesize that 
                                                
18 "A Conduit to Nowhere," The Economist, 18 August 2007, http://www.economist.com (accessed 22 
August 2007). 
19 Ibid. 
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they would probably have looked more carefully at the actual conditions of the 
borrowers and adopted more sensible lending standards. 
Hedge funds, which employ a variety of techniques to enhance their returns, 
were also substantial investors in CDOs and SIVs.  The heaviest losses were suffered 
by quantitative funds reliant on sophisticated mathematical tools for investment 
strategies, which had smugly calculated that the dramatic failures in the debt and 
equity markets in 2006– 2007 were statistically impossible.  
Conduits and SIVs were extremely popular with hedge funds that borrowed 
enormous sums from banks such as Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, and other large banks 
in order to invest in sub-prime loans that were being packaged by the investment 
banks.  The demand from investors grew so immensely that mortgage lenders were 
pressured to boost their production of sub-prime loans.  The lenders, brokers, and 
their salesmen were only too happy to comply because these brought in substantial 
corporate profits and personal commissions.  The bonuses paid to these bankers and 
other lenders were enormous.  In their thrust to push sales further, these lenders 
dropped their credit standards and allegedly duped potential and existing homeowners 
into signing up for sub-prime mortgage loans.  As investment banks gratified the 
hedge funds and other institutions, their earnings swelled. 
 
D. 3.  Unexpected Occurrences 
Policymakers said they never saw it coming.  Yet, when interest rates on sub-prime 
loans underwent readjustment, borrowers found themselves unable to meet 
repayments and started defaulting on their loans, which triggered a wave of 
foreclosures.  But these occurred in multiple states across America creating a national 
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housing disaster.  The statistically impossible transpired, and mortgage bonds started 
to collapse in value sparking off dramatic falls in credit derivatives. 
The additional risk in conduits and SIVs arose from their leveraged position in 
terms of loans or lines of credit provided by banks.  As the valuation of RMBSs and 
CDOs plummeted, the banks demanded more collateral and, if none were delivered, 
they disposed of these assets, thus adding fuel to the frenzied sell-off of mortgage 
securities.  Many banks were also caught holding mortgage loans in their portfolios 
that they had bought from other institutions and were planning to repackage and sell 
but could no longer do, so they had to write these off.   
Investors were belatedly stunned by the gravity of the crisis when the rating 
agencies finally admitted the problem on 10 July 2007 and started downgrading the 
mortgage-backed securities and their derivatives.  They were slow because they were 
under the impression the sub-prime troubles were limited to a few lenders, but the 
website www.ml-implode.com noted that 97 of them had imploded by July 2007 and 
216 by January 2008.20 A second reason was the complex structure of these securities 
that rendered them illiquid and difficult to value especially if they were kept off the 
balance sheets.  As The Economist commented: 
Many of these securities are illiquid, so regular prices are not available…They 
may not recognise the problem until they are forced to by auditors or by rating 
agencies. 
Those required to ascribe a market value to these securities are faced with…a 
version of the prisoner’s dilemma.  Everybody would be better off if nobody 
traded, so that there would be no need to recognise lower prices.  But if everybody 
is planning to sell, those who trade first will have an advantage.21 
                                               
                                                
20 "Another Pounding." 
21  Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 7.  IMPACT OF SECURITISATION 
A.  Metamorphosis of Banking 
Because a sub-prime loan was extended to someone with a poor credit record it was 
highly profitable to the lender, who demanded and received higher interest rates for 
the additional risk.  Although a traditional bank had to carefully assess the 
creditworthiness of its borrowers in order to maintain sound asset quality because it 
provided loans from its deposit base, a sub-prime lender did not take customer 
deposits but funded itself from the money market.  These lenders did not hold on to 
their loans but sold them off to investors. 
Clever investment banks packaged these mortgage loans into bundles that 
were marketed to other financial institutions such as investment vehicles, hedge 
funds, banks, and insurance firms. 
This was meant to make the financial system more stable by dispersing risk and  
reducing the chance of a single bank being sunk by bad debts.  But being able to 
offload debt encouraged some lenders to loosen their lending standards and make 
loans to riskier borrowers.1 
 
The concept of securitisation, whereby loans arising from assets such as mortgages, 
credit cards, leases, and corporate loans were put together into parcels and sold as 
bonds into the market, transformed the nature of banking.  This financial technique 
engendered three far-reaching consequences, namely disintermediation, diminution of 
accountability, and globalisation of risk. 
                                                
1 Farrell, "Anatomy of a Credit Crisis." 
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Disintermediation, which a senior Australian banker2 cited as a feature of 
modern-day corporate finance, has been characterised by depersonalisation and the 
demise of traditional relationship banking.  In situations where banks no longer lend 
to major customers out of their own balance sheets but rather sell off the loans as 
securities, they have less inducement to maintain regular contact with the customers, 
especially large corporate firms.  Furthermore there is no motivation at all to 
personally communicate with retail banking clients, because mortgage loans and 
credit cards are processed, approved and serviced electronically; human interface is 
considered an additional cost.  The present-day thrust of both banks and non-bank 
lenders is to generate more volume and fees without necessarily addressing customer 
needs.  In such a situation there is a breakdown of community values and a slow 
disintegration of the social contract.  This means heightened tension in trying to 
resolve the conflicts of interest between the institutions and their customers. 
The second related consequence is a diminution of accountability, which has 
been generally considered as the obligation to provide an account of, or justification, 
for one’s actions to one’s stakeholders.3  On the one hand, the financial institution 
providing the loans does not have to inform the borrowers how the funding is 
arranged and what transpires after the credit is released.  On the other hand, the same 
institution might supply only scant data to the investors if a credit rating agency 
decides to stamp the securities investment-grade, which institutional investors look 
for.  Until just recently these investors have not bothered to scrutinise the underlying 
loans that have been bundled into these securities.  Given such ease of funding, credit 
                                                
2 Transcript AU 9. 
3 Tracey Swift, "Trust, Reputation and Corporate Accountability to Stakeholders," Business Ethics: A 
European Review 10, no. 1 (2001): pp. 16-26. 
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standards were relaxed and reports emerged about instances of badgering and 
falsification of loan applications by loan mortgage salesmen. 
The third consequence relates to the global nature of financial markets.  
Securitisation was very appealing to lenders because it facilitated funding and the 
transfer of credit risk.  The attraction of securitisation for investors was the higher 
rates of return comparable to those for risk-free investments such as bond obligations 
of the U.S. Treasury, the Commonwealth of Australia, the industrialized countries, 
and triple-A corporations.  In hindsight the elevation of RMBSs and CDOs to such a 
low risk category seems ludicrous and incomprehensible.  But this greedy quest for 
higher returns during the build-up to the crisis meant that institutional investors from 
around the world acquired significant amounts of these sub-prime bonds.  Global 
investors purchased these bonds without fully comprehending the underlying risks or 
their ethical ramifications.  The global markets ensured the free transfer of these 
bonds, now known as toxic assets4, to unwitting investors. 
 
B.  Implosion of the Sub-Prime Market 
As home loan defaults escalated in the U.S., fears arose among financial institutions 
about the reliability of the mortgage bonds they were holding.   The ensuing crisis of 
confidence wreaked havoc on the debt market because banks became reluctant to lend 
to each other due to apprehension about the counter-party’s possible failure to repay.  
The extent of the calamity first evidenced itself in early August 2007 when a little-
known German bank, IKB, announced it could lose billions of euros from its 
                                                
4 So called because they financially hazardous to the financial institutions that held them due to the 
probability of default of the underlying sub-prime loans.   
204 
investments in sub-prime American assets and required emergency funding so the 
German central bank and leading private banks stepped in to provide lines of credit.  
In November 2007 its shareholders decided to inject additional equity of EUR 2.3 
billion.  As a consequence, this bank had less funds to support its constituency, 
middle-size German companies, and its main shareholder, KfW, which is a 
development finance institution, certainly had fewer resources to finance projects in 
the developing world. 
Even some small towns in Norway felt the ripple effects of the U.S. housing 
crisis.5  These towns had invested its funds in complex securities sold by 
unscrupulous Norwegian brokers who placed the money in U.S. sub-prime mortgage 
instruments.  There were fears that due to the losses the municipalities might not be 
able to pay for essential social services such as kindergartens, nursing homes and 
cultural establishments. 
Foreclosures of American homes increased 30% from the previous quarter in 
2007 and nearly doubled from a year ago; these were estimated to be one for every 
196 households.6  Repossessed properties eroded the value of the neighbourhood and 
the tax income of municipalities, thus impacting on their budget.  By 2008 more than 
2 million homeowners with sub-prime loans were affected.  In January 2009 some 
economists were estimating that “8 to 10 million borrowers may lose their homes 
because they cannot afford to repay or refinance their loans.”7  Though this problem 
started with lower-income individuals being evicted from their homes, it spread to 
numerous communities in the United States, and even borrowers who paid on time 
                                                
5 Mark Landler, "U. S. Credit Crisis Adds to Gloom in Norway," The New York Times, 2 December 
2007, www.nytimes.com (accessed 3 December 2007). 
6 Editor, "Spreading the Misery," The New York Times, 29 November 2007, www.nytimes.com 
(accessed 1 December 2007). 
7 Vikas Bajaj, "Mortgages and the Markets," The New York Times, 14 January 2009, www.nytimes.com 
(accessed 15 February 2009). 
205 
were suffering from higher interest rates.  The human toll had become starkly evident.  
Access to commercial and industrial bank loans and the commercial paper market 
also became much tighter for corporations, thus posing a threat to job creation and 
business expansion.    
 
C.  Loss of Trust 
The entire global financial market in late 2007 was filled with trepidation about the 
prospect of an American recession that could drag down most of the world’s 
economies.  Financial institutions, which had seen the value of their security holdings 
drastically diminished, started to hoard cash and stay out of the money markets.  As 
liquidity evaporated, the New York Federal Reserve Bank announced that it would 
increase its funding for the markets and the European Central Bank committed to 
inject EUR 30 billion.8  By the end of that first year 2007 the ECB had increased its 
allocation to EUR 348.7 billion.9  As the next two years unfolded, the immensity of 
government intervention throughout the world would dramatically escalate.   
The credit catastrophe was instigated by a breakdown of trust among financial 
institutions, which had ceased lending to each other for fear that they would not be 
paid back.  One economist commented that “the collapse of trust has been caused by 
the bursting of the housing bubble.10  From another point of view this may be the 
immediate cause but the root of the problems was the inability of various players to 
manage conflicting objectives without sacrificing the other parties’ interests.  But 
                                                
8 Sean O'Grady, "Ecb to Pump Eur 30 Billion into Money Markets," The Independent, 28 November 
2007, www.independent.co.uk (accessed 30 November 2007). 
9 BBC News, "Ecb Lends $500 Bn to Lower Rates,"  (2007), 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7149329.stm (accessed 18 December 2007). 
10Paul Krugman, "Innovating Our Way to Financial Crisis," The New York Times, 3 December 2007, 
www.nytimes.com (accessed 4 December 2007).  
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where does one lay the blame?  Some disingenuous people lamely argued that 
“America’s subprime borrowers themselves deserve a good part of the blame for the 
current mortgage mess.  They were either greedy…or irresponsible.”11  On the 
contrary, the evidence indicates that many of the lenders and other key players have 
shown themselves to be untrustworthy. 
The sub-prime lenders have typically demonstrated self-interest and greed in 
their pursuit of profit maximization.  Sub-prime loans were initially priced at low 
interest rates in order to attract borrowers but would automatically readjust to higher 
interest rates after the introductory period.  When the repayments became too 
demanding for borrowers, refinancing options were offered with new front-end fees 
and continuing high interest rates.  Many of these loans seemed calculated to fail. 
There is some credibility to the point of view that the counterpart of the sub-
prime equation was ‘consumer myopia’ or the overconfidence of borrowers who 
previously could not receive any financing but were then enticed by the “lax lending 
standards to make calculated, if ill-advised, gambles.”12  If individuals unexpectedly 
received offers from banks willing to finance the entire cost of a house as well as the 
documentary and legal fees, they might have very readily accepted the financing. 
Most of these people did not suddenly run into financial trouble; they were 
betting that they would be able to buy the house and quickly sell it.  Similarly, last 
year almost forty per cent of subprime borrowers were able to get “liar loans ” – 
mortgages that borrowers can get by simply stating their income, which the lender 
does not verify.  These loans were ideal for speculative gambles: you could buy 
far more house than your income justified, and if you could flip it quickly, you 
could reap outsized profits.13 
 
                                                
11 Gretchen Morgenson, "Blame the Borrowers?  Not So Fast," The New York Times, 25 November 
2007, www.nytimes.com (accessed 27 November 2007). 
12 Lewis, Panic: The Story of Modern Financial Insanity, p. 314. 
13 Ibid. 
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It is useful to draw attention to a distinguishing aspect of American mortgage 
laws, namely that a residential housing loan, secured by a mortgage on the property, 
is typically non-recourse financing.  This means that, if the borrower is unable (or 
unwilling) to pay the loan, the lender can seize the property but the borrower is not 
personally liable.  If the outstanding amount of the loan exceeds the value of the 
property, the lender is in an unfortunate position but may not pursue the borrower’s 
other assets.  The only exceptions would be in cases where the lender required 
another person as a guarantor or a co-signatory or insisted on additional security in 
the form of other assets.  The commentaries infer that the sub-prime loans were all 
granted on a non-recourse basis. 
Even accepting that some borrowers of sub-prime loans were speculating that 
house prices would rise quickly to enable them to sell and take profits or trade up to 
another property or refinance, responsible lenders should have cautioned them about 
prospective dangers if their financial condition did not warrant the magnitude of the 
loans they sought.  Furthermore it must be stressed that the so-called ‘liar loans’ were 
not initiated by the borrowers but by the lenders, who had ample opportunity and 
legal right to verify the financial declaration of the borrowers yet chose not to do so. 
These sub-prime mortgage loans were critical components of the 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), which were in great demand from investors 
seeking higher returns, so the investment banks innovated these new financial 
instruments.  As described earlier, the credit agencies issued their investment-grade 
ratings and thus earned their fees.  The securities were very popular with bond dealers 
in financial institutions, so investment banks collected good fees and earned more 
income as they engaged in trading these instruments. 
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However, even after a few investment banks discerned unacceptably high risk 
in sub-prime mortgages, they continued to sell the securities to investors and other 
institutions because they assumed that others ought to be able to do their own risk 
calculation.  These institutions included those major banks that subsequently 
announced spectacular multi-billion dollar write-offs on their securities portfolios.14 
Several high-profile bank chief executives were later dismissed but with extravagant 
severance packages. 
 
D.  Mutual Mistrust and Credit Squeeze 
When banks belatedly woke up to the reality of the greatly diminished value of their 
mortgage loans and conduits, they were forced to make provisions for potential losses 
and in most cases actually ‘write down’ these assets.  Many financial institutions 
charged these against earnings, resulting in significant losses at several of the biggest 
ones: Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Union Bank of Switzerland, and Bear Stearns.  As the 
short-term advances of banks came due on maturity dates, they were compelled to 
borrow in the inter-bank market, which functions as a global clearinghouse funnelling 
liquidity from banks that have funds to those who need them.  However, after 
mortgage loans started defaulting, banks were no longer willing to accept mortgage-
backed securities or their derivatives as collateral and they stopped lending.  Since 
these banks had their own conduits that invested in CDOs, they became risk-averse 
and no longer trusted the credit judgment of other banks.  Thus banks began hoarding 
cash and, when they did lend in the inter-bank market, they did so only against 
verifiably high grade collateral and at higher interest rates. 
                                                
14 Jenny Anderson and Vikas Bajaj, "Wary of Risk, Bankers Sold Shaky Mortgage Debt," The New 
York Times, 6 December 2007, www.nytimes.com (accessed 8 December 2007). 
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The financial institutions naturally passed on the higher costs of funding to 
their borrowers, who were forced to accept prohibitive interest charges upon rate 
adjustment.  This was particularly severe on sub-prime borrowers, who faced 
additional pre-termination fees if they wanted to refinance, so there was an escalation 
in mortgage loan defaults and housing foreclosures. 
Companies were also confronted with serious financing problems.  Those in 
the real estate industry discovered that they could no longer obtain or refinance their 
loans and were forced to cancel their development plans with some closing down 
their business entirely.  Those in other industries suffered as well and found their 
expansion plans constricted.  Employment was therefore curtailed in numerous areas. 
The irony was that sufficient funds remained in the hands of individual banks 
but these had shut the spigot and blocked the flow of liquidity into the system.  And 
this occurred on a global scale. 
Normally interest rates on inter-bank lending closely track the rates set by the 
central bank, but these deviated radically in the early weeks of August 2007.  The 
rates that banks charge each other for overnight borrowing soared to nearly 6%, 
considerably more than the Federal Reserve’s intended rate of 5.25%.  In the euro 
zone interest rates climbed to 4.7%, compared with the European Central Bank’s 
target rate of 4%.15 
People were startled by the sudden turn of events, but the world of banking 
can only thrive in an environment of trust; once that was lost, the streams ran dry.   
Lenders unsure of their ability to tell good borrowers from bad become less 
willing to lend to anyone at all.  As markets become more suspicious, banks send a 
bad signal about their creditworthiness merely by seeking to borrow funds.  Cash-
                                                
15 "A Spike through the Heart," The Economist, 12 August 2007, www.economist.com (accessed 20 
August 2007). 
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rich banks will hoard their money if they fear that the inter-bank market will cease 
to function, cutting them off from future supply.16 
 
The response of the central banks in injecting huge funds into the money 
markets to provide additional liquidity succeeded in driving down money-market 
rates but did not solve the fundamental problem of mistrust, which continued to 
impede the smooth progress of the world’s markets.   
 
E.  Panic in the Markets 
While liquidity improved due to the infusion of cash from central banks, interest rates 
stayed high as banks tightened their credit standards.  Realising that they had not 
properly priced risk in the past, they readjusted rates for individuals and companies 
after the event.  When banks themselves had to pay more for funding, they passed on 
the cost to the borrowers.  Even Australia and Hong Kong, which had little incidence 
of sub-prime lending, saw interest rates climb above what would be demanded in 
normal circumstances. 
Fear gripped the global stock markets in 2007 because of apprehension about 
the probable recession in America contaminating the world’s other economies.  
Investors were concerned that the travails in the housing sector would set off a 
collapse of the building industry, a rise in unemployment, and a likely drop in 
consumer spending as the realisation of diminished wealth sinks in.  The Economist 
analysis reported that the drop in confidence due to the sinking markets and losses in 
the banks could exacerbate economic conditions and possibly lead to panic.17 The 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
17 "Mortgage Flu," The Economist, 18 August 2007, www.economist.com (accessed 21 August 2007). 
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anxiety of investors was due to the key role of consumer spending, which constituted 
nearly 70% of American GDP and was therefore the principal determinant of the 
economy’s outcome.18 
Though seemingly distant, the major stock markets in Asia and Europe were 
plunging for most of 2007 while struggling to recoup some losses on occasional 
positive news, such as announcements from the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of base 
rate reductions.  The previous sanguinity of international investors emanated from 
confidence in three optimistic scenarios.  The first was that the Federal Reserve 
would be able to save the markets and the economy, as its past track record had 
demonstrated.  The second was that, even if the American economy stalled, Asia and 
other regions could pick up the slack in driving global growth.  The third hope was 
that corporate profits would be resilient despite a global economic malaise.19 
This optimism faded in January 2008 due to realisation that interest rate cuts 
take a long time to work their way through the economy and that production and 
exports from Asia are intimately linked to the U.S. economy.  Share prices therefore 
went into freefall in all major markets during the third week of January, prompting 
the Federal Reserve to slash interest rates twice in the space of 8 days for an 
aggregate 1.25% reduction, the most aggressive effort it had undertaken in years to 
avert a recession.20 The markets made a slight recovery but then shrugged off the first 
interest rate cut, because there was a sense of eager expectation for further lowering 
of the Fed funds rate.   
 
                                                
18 "Getting Worried Downtown." 
19 "Why Markets in Asia and Europe Are Tumbling," The Economist, 21 January 2008, 
www.economist.com (accessed 25 January 2008). 
20 Edmund L. Andrews, "Fed Reduces Rate by Half-Point; 2nd Cut in 8 Days " The New York Times, 
30 January 2008, www.nytimes.com (accessed 2 February 2008). 
212 
F.  Initial American Policy Remedies 
The American government response to the sub-prime crisis was characterised from 
the outset by adherence to ideological beliefs in free market capitalism and minimalist 
government interference.  Despite warnings from a highly placed official within the 
Federal Reserve, there seemed to be little concern for the plight of individuals who 
would likely be adversely affected by the devious practices of sub-prime lenders.  As 
early as 2000, Edward M. Gramlich, a Federal Reserve Governor, had warned: 
“Increased subprime lending has been associated with higher levels of delinquency, 
foreclosure and, in some cases, abusive lending practices”.21 Unfortunately Alan 
Grenspan, the Fed Chairman, refused to conduct investigations into such mortgage 
loan modus operandi.  There was a distinct lack of ethical fervour on the part of 
regulators despite a law enacted by Congress in 1994 to regulate all mortgage 
lending: 
The language is crystal clear: the Fed “by regulation or order, shall prohibit acts 
or practices in connection with A) mortgage loans that the board finds to be 
unfair, deceptive, or designed to evade the provisions of this section; and B) 
refinancing of mortgage loans that the board finds to be associated with abusive 
lending practices, or that are otherwise not in the interest of the borrower.22 
 
When the initial cases of sub-prime loan foreclosures occurred in late 2006, the 
Federal Reserve nonchalantly chose to take no action till a tidal wave of foreclosures 
broke through in the first half of 2007 and rating agencies started downgrading 
mortgage-backed securities, obligating auditors and banks to write down mortgage 
loans and all their derivatives.  As described earlier, banks proceeded to write off 
                                                
21 Paul Krugman, "A Catastrophe Foretold," The New York Times, 26 October 2007, www.nytimes.com 
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significant amounts of assets and refrained from lending to other banks as well as 
customers. 
The subsequent measures undertaken by the Federal Reserve and the other 
major central banks, notably the European Central Bank, sought to alleviate the 
liquidity blockage by infusing cash into the monetary system.  These were intended to 
assist the banks and other lenders, which were actually the original perpetrators of the 
sub-prime crisis, but did not mitigate against the problems of sub-prime borrowers, 
namely excessive interest charges and fees and foreclosure of their homes.  The 
injection of additional liquidity simply allowed banks to continue funding themselves 
at central bank subsidised rates, but these did not reduce interest rates for besieged 
borrowers. 
The second attempt by the American government under George W. Bush to 
address the problems came by way of asking the industry, that is, the investment and 
commercial bankers, to agree to a temporary freezing of interest rates.  Despite 
several press releases, nothing significant was achieved, which one could ascribe to 
the expectation of voluntary restraint while the industry’s constituents were only 
concerned with their corporate profits and personal bonuses. 
The third attempt by the Americans came in the form of a fiscal stimulus, 
which at the start consisted mainly of tax cuts that would favour companies and all 
individuals, including rich ones, which was indicative of the policy preferences of the 
incumbent Republican president who had consistently shown his partiality towards 
big corporations and wealthy individuals.  After internal strife within the legislature 
between the Democrats (who support the working classes and the poor) and the 
Republicans, agreement was reached to deliver cash refunds to individuals as well as 
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tax cuts.  Providing ready cash to the poor was deemed to be a quick approach to 
boost immediate spending that would stimulate the economy. 
An important feature of the mortgage relief plan was intended to lower 
borrowing costs for a broad range of Americans, from middle-class families to those 
in danger of losing their homes, though critical aspects had not yet been settled.  The 
objective was to permit the Federal Housing Administration to insure larger loans so 
that more people might qualify for lower-cost mortgages.23 
The fourth approach was the assertive monetary federal funds rate slashing 
carried out by the Federal Reserve.  Contrary to its earlier concern that such a move 
might ignite inflation, the Fed came to accept that the threat of recession was much 
more severe.   The debate will continue among economists in the future as to whether 
there could have been another alternative to forestall inflationary pressures, but at the 
time this appeared to be the correct step to take if the benefits of lower rates could be 
rapidly conveyed to the struggling sub-prime homeowners. 
 
G.  Banking Collapse Averted 
By October 2008 banks were haemorrhaging badly.  The International Monetary 
Fund estimated worldwide losses on mortgage debt emanating from America at US$ 
1.4 trillion, of which US$ 760 billion had been written off by banks and other 
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financial institutions at that that time.   On a global basis, banks alone had suffered 
US$ 600 billion of loan losses.24 
After continuous share market plunges and massive credit-linked write-offs, 
the major global banks were on the verge of collapse.  Therefore on 14 October 2008 
the American government decided to take radical measures and “announced plans to 
invest $250 billion of taxpayers’ money into its banks, half of that into a group of 
nine of the industry’s most celebrated names.”25  This was unprecedented action that 
followed strong Euro zone resolve on 12 October to establish sizeable stabilisation 
funds (Germany € 500 billion, France € 360 billion, the Netherlands € 200 billion).  
Britain pledged £ 37 billion to add capital to its banks.26 
However the bank rescue did not restore credit flows because banks 
maintained that they expected funding to remain expensive, and they would also 
require a capital buffer against charges for potential bad assets.  Banks had been 
saved but they still refrained from lending.  The major criticism raised by Sheila Bair, 
head of the U.S.  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, was the failure of the rescue 
package to address foreclosures.27  This would have to await the arrival of the new 
Obama regime in 2009.  One could form the view that major American and European 
banks, which had just faced possible extinction and only survived due to government 
life support, continued to be mainly concerned with their own profitability rather than 
the welfare of their clients. 
In the meantime the American and British governments acquired equity stakes 
in several of their leading banks and other financial institutions.  The injustice in the 
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view of many observers was that many of the financial institutions that had been 
saved with taxpayers’ money continued to generously reward their fallen leaders and 
managers.  Citibank, Merrill Lynch, and AIG were the notable ones that rewarded 
their top executives with huge bonuses despite the huge financial losses these firms 
had incurred.  Merrill Lynch, which had once been a major Wall Street bank, sold 
itself to Bank of America because it was encountering severe funding difficulty.  
After the acquisition was consummated in December 2008 it was disclosed that that 
the firm would lose US$ 15.3 billion for the fourth quarter alone, and yet its chief 
executive, John Thain, was demanding a personal bonus of US$ 30 to 40 million, 
which was an outrageous claim under the circumstances, so he was compelled to 
resign.28  It later emerged that Merrill’s losses for the year amounted to US$ 27 billion 
and necessitated a government infusion of US$ 20 billion into Bank of America and a 
guarantee for US$ 90 billion of doubtful assets.  Despite these heavy losses Merrill 
still paid out to 700 employees the sum of US$ 3.6 billion in bonuses for 2008.29  In 
another controversial case, the giant insurance company AIG had suffered enormous 
losses of US$ 60 billion in the fourth quarter from the credit default swaps it had 
written and miscalculated.30  It therefore required capital infusion and loans from the 
Fed and the U.S.  Treasury to the tune of US$ 170 billion, which resulted in the 
transfer of 80% ownership to the American government, yet the company still 
authorised bonuses of US$ 165 million that would benefit the individuals in the unit 
that brought all the losses to the formerly highly profitable insurance company.  
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Executive bonus extravagance was rampant among these and other top financial 
institutions despite their recent disgrace. 
The ethical problem does not lie in the concept of bonus payments but in 
rewards despite poor performance and financial losses, especially when the funds 
come from taxpayers who were coerced to save the enterprises.  The chief executive 
of AIG lamely argued that the company had a contractual obligation to pay these 
bonuses in order to retain key employees, but President Obama found this 
unacceptable.31  Insistence on obscene bonus payments in the wake of spectacular 
failure that has brought one’s company to virtual bankruptcy can only be described as 
unabashed greed. 
 
H.  Accomplices in Bubble Architecture 
Creating a financial system wherein average personal indebtedness has risen to 140% 
of assets is inherently inflationary and consumerist.  It encourages a philosophy of 
hedonism and instant gratification.  It suggests to the individual that he or she should 
purchase a home even if he may not be able to afford it now because the price will 
eventually rise and he can later flip it for a profit.  In the meantime, if the nominal 
value of that property increases, he tends to spend increasingly larger amounts on 
luxury goods or agreeable items through his credit cards.  This is a life predicated on 
the wealth effect of home ownership. 
But it is a perilous motivation to live with the expectation that housing prices 
will forever continue on an upward spiral.  And it is morally lax for banks to 
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encourage this form of behaviour, because such action by bankers illustrates a lack of 
concern for the good of individuals.  In promoting these sub-prime loans the lenders 
have operated with a disdain for transparency, because they have not disclosed all the 
potential risks. 
The banks would probably have espoused a utilitarian attitude at the outset 
with the objective of allowing more people to own homes.  The innovation of 
complex mortgage securities facilitated the outflow of more sub-prime loans for 
home purchases but this resulted in a slackening of credit standards.32  The banks 
were not alone because they were operating within the framework advocated by the 
American government of encouraging people to own their own homes.  There were 
subsidies and tax concessions promoting home ownership, which eventually 
ballooned into a gigantic bubble that had to blow up.33  
 
I.  Ethical Deficiency or Selfishness 
In this analysis of the sub-prime crisis it was apparent that the overriding objective of 
the lenders was to maximize profits through generating maximum fees and interest 
earnings from each borrower.  It was obvious that that there was little attempt by most 
lenders to fully educate the prospective homebuyers about the complexities and 
hazards of sub-prime loans.  Furthermore one would consider it imprudent to lend a 
sum of money equal to the purchase price of a property to an individual, who fails to 
qualify for a standard bank loan due to insufficient take-home pay, because the 
probability of his ever being able to repay the loan is extremely low.  One might form 
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the view that granting a mortgage loan to such an individual without any warning of 
the inherent perils was an ethical failure. 
It is quite possible to grant loans to persons who have limited sources of 
income and, with the right education and assistance, enable them to responsibly 
manage the prompt and orderly amortization of said loans.  This has been proven in 
numerous instances of micro-finance,34 where the borrowers’ minimal income or 
paucity of assets should not prevent them from obtaining loans, but it requires 
dedication and genuine caring on the part of the lender, which must spend time with 
the borrowers to fully understand their situation and offer affordable loan facilities.  
This level of commitment is demanding and has rarely been observed in developed 
market economies, although some Australian banks claim to be providers of micro- 
finance.  As role models of micro-finance, Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and its 
founder, Muhammad Yunus, were honoured with the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for 
their efforts in developing social and economic development through micro-credit.35 
                                                
34 It is important to note that micro finance provides only relatively small amounts of credit to 
individuals to enable them to earn a livelihood and, in most cases, several members of the borrower’s 
community act as co-signatories, so there is always a community involvement behind every 
microfinance loan. 
35 Grameen, "Prof. Muhammad Yunus & Grameen Bank Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2006,"  
(2006), http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2 (accessed 30 
July 2009). 
220 
CHAPTER 8.  CONCLUSIONS 
Looking back from the perspective of July 2009 the world has witnessed nearly two 
years of rapidly deteriorating economic conditions that have ravaged all nations.  This 
catastrophe had its origins in the sub-prime crisis that brought misery to millions of 
homeowners, overwhelmed banks and other lenders, and wreaked havoc on financial 
systems.  Chapters 3 and 4 examined the comments by senior executives during the 
interviews, which were then analysed in comparison to the actions of their banks.  
The preliminary conclusions were developed from an examination of ethical practices 
in banking.  The succeeding chapters probed into the origins and the ramifications of 
the sub-prime disaster.  What went wrong?  And how could things go so wrong?  This 
chapter shall present the conclusions about the inherent ethical deficiencies in banks 
that were responsible for the gross problems that led to this modern great recession. 
 
A.  Forgetfulness of Responsibility 
Sadly the current situation blares out the message that banks have forgotten the 
meaning of responsibility, which arises because financial institutions serve an 
essential and central role in all societies.  The roots and inertia of the global financial 
crisis can be traced to the irresponsibility of banks.   
The purpose of banking is to serve the community by enabling its constituents 
to save and protect hard-won earnings, fulfil dreams of home ownership, and achieve 
ambitions of generating wealth.  Banks have also served as key partners for small and 
medium size businesses as well as major companies.  Many people still recall 
neighbourhood banks that operated in their small towns or villages where the bank 
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manager and employees personally knew many of the customers who came in to 
deposit funds and borrow money.  As banks grew in size, they increased the number 
of branches as well as personnel.  With the growth came efforts to consolidate and 
streamline the operations.  What might have started as attempts at efficiency and 
modernization, such as use of computerized credit scoring for loan applications, 
automated teller machines, and the ubiquitous call centres have resulted in a 
diminution of customer interface.  These advances have meant less personal contact 
between the bank representatives and the customers, so therefore current attempts to 
get to know the customers are scripted from a template that bank employees are 
obligated to observe as part of their due diligence and compliance.  Credit card and 
loan applicants, who are encouraged to submit their requests over the phone or online, 
receive instant or quick approvals because prior to the financial crisis banks were 
keen to build up their loan portfolio.  Customer focus has inevitably been lost.  As 
this occurred on a large scale in America, banks ceased to pay attention to the 
personal situation of individuals, who reflect the needs of the community. 
If one looks at modern banking through the eyes of Kant, one would probably 
argue that banks have long ago stopped treating their individual customers as persons 
or ends in themselves but rather as means to the end of maximizing profits, and this is 
an ethical failure.  The American sub-prime crisis visibly illustrates how sub-prime 
mortgage lenders had become so detached and inured to the plight of average 
individuals that they did not even concern themselves with sensible questions such as 
whether the borrowers had jobs and how they expected to repay the loans.  Because 
they were not interested in their customers as persons, these lenders ignored prudent 
practices requiring a maximum loan limit in relation to the property’s appraised 
value, a mandatory minimum down payment, and proof of regular minimum income.  
222 
In forsaking good sense the lenders engaged in predatory techniques and deliberate 
omission of critical risk disclosure so they could generate these loans.  Because 
housing mortgage loans are complicated and the impact of interest rate resetting is not 
readily comprehensible to the average borrower, there should have been extra care 
required of the lenders to ensure adequate financial literacy.  However, the records of 
defaults and foreclosures point out that such care was not exercised in the situation of 
sub-prime housing mortgage lending. 
As depicted in this case study of American sub-prime loans, many of the most 
afflicted borrowers were highly vulnerable due to their low or irregular earnings, 
insufficient savings to make a down payment, and possible financial illiteracy.  Their 
desire was to obtain accommodation for themselves, but a more compassionate bank 
would have provided complimentary financial advice and steered them towards more 
affordable housing, either in terms of rental or government-assisted property.  The 
form of sub-prime lending prevalent in America was irresponsible and harmful in its 
lack of transparency and its failure to safeguard the borrowers from potential loss and 
difficulties.  The need of individuals for accommodation is a manifestation of the 
community’s aspiration, which should be realised in a sustainable manner.   
However, the reckless promotion of sub-prime loans triggered off pervasive 
defaults across America and instigated an avalanche of property foreclosures.  The 
unrelenting forced sales of homes drove down housing prices and made it nearly 
impossible for other mortgagors to sell their assets into a falling market, thus 
precipitating further defaults and foreclosures.  While homeowners were driven out of 
their abodes, numerous neighbourhoods stagnated due to the deterioration of the 
abandoned homes.  The sequence of events evolved into a self-perpetuating cycle of 
ruin.   
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The burgeoning incidence of loan defaults and foreclosures eventually 
impacted on the mortgage-backed securities market that had been funding the huge 
growth of housing loans.  When the vast extent of the sub-prime crisis was 
comprehended, panic spread among financial institutions and credit markets suffered 
a seizure.  What originated as negligent lending and disregard of the customers’ best 
interests ultimately degenerated into a financial crisis. 
Banks perform a vital service for their communities and it is imperative that 
they assume and acknowledge full responsibility for the needs of their customers, 
who are the members of those communities.  The conclusion is that financial 
institutions, particularly sub-prime housing lenders in America, have failed in this key 
role. The deficiency starts when customers no longer rank as the top priority for the 
institutions and this is exacerbated by manpower turnover, increasing automation, and 
unrestrained corporate pursuit of growth and profitability. 
Based on the interviews and available market information until the end of the 
year 2008 it appears, generally speaking, that banks in Australia and Hong Kong have 
not been negligent in their treatment of customers, even though there have been many 
cases of sub-prime or ‘low document’ lending in the local housing market.  These 
sub-prime lenders were non-bank financial institutions that were funding themselves 
through issuance of mortgage-backed securities.  The world’s largest non-bank 
lender, GE Money, had acquired Wizard Home Loans in 2004 and built it up to 
become the fifth largest mortgage lender in Australia but due to the turmoil of the 
global financial crisis GE Money decided to sell Wizard in late 2008 to Aussie Home 
Loans, a mortgage broker that is 33% owned by the Commonwealth Bank of 
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Australia.  GE itself ceased third party mortgages, motor vehicle finance, and small 
business finance.1 
The horrendous bushfires that had started burning through the Victorian rural 
areas on 7 February 2009 destroyed more than 1,800 houses and killed more than 181 
persons by the 12th of February, so this was a real disaster zone leaving thousands of 
homeless people, many of whom had obtained mortgage loans.  In a news report one 
person whose house survived the fires went to the Commonwealth Bank to speak to 
the manager about obtaining relief assistance on his mortgage loan because as a 
carpenter he was then unable to work and his wife could not go to her job since she 
had to look after their daughter due to the closure of schools as a result of the fires.  
He was told that his loan repayment could have a moratorium of three months after 
which he would have to pay the interest in full.2  However, a neighbour of his was 
granted a three-month suspension of principal and interest by Bendigo Bank and told 
not to worry about the interest after that.  These episodes, which demonstrate how 
banks treat individuals during a crisis, reveal the priorities different banks accord 
their customers.   
During the latter months of 2008 till April 2009 the Reserve Bank of Australia 
had been cutting interest rates with the expectation that banks would pass these 
reductions onward to their housing mortgage customers, but it was frustrated that 
most of the major banks refused to do so because they claimed they were 
encountering high interest rates in their offshore borrowing (despite government 
guarantees); in other words, they wanted to ensure that they could maximize their 
                                                
1 Sid Maher, "Ge Money to Cut 335 Staff as Financial Crisis Hits Home," The Australian, 24 October 
2008, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,,24545562-643,00.html?from=public_rss 
(accessed 01 February 2009). 
2Michael Vincent, "Fire Victims' Mortgage Reality Hits Home,"  (ABC News, 2009), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/02/12/2489534.htm (accessed 13 February 2009). 
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profits.  To highlight the irresponsibility of banks, when the Reserve Bank cut interest 
rates by 0.25% in the middle of April 2009, the National Australia Bank (NAB), 
chose to reduce the deposit interest rates it paid to children by 0.25%.  The Australia 
& New Zealand Banking Corporation (ANZ) cut its children’s deposit rates by 
0.50%.3  This is the height of irresponsibility by NAB and ANZ: firstly, to refuse to 
pass on the interest rate reduction from the Reserve Bank to borrowing customers, 
and secondly, to reduce the interest paid on the savings deposits of children, who are 
highly vulnerable and are encouraged to develop good savings habits.  This is a 
blatant example of how major banks exploit their customers who are perceived to be 
docile.  The Reserve Bank had implemented its interest rate adjustments to alleviate 
the burden on mortgagees who were struggling to cope with the harsh economic 
conditions but the banks preferred to keep the benefits for themselves, which was 
clearly selfish.  But reducing interest rates paid to children was very callously wrong 
and unquestionably unethical. 
 
B.  Injustice 
The events leading to the global credit crisis clearly illustrated the lack of fairness on 
the part of bankers, especially as exemplified in the housing loans and collateralised 
mortgage obligations in America, but even as the travails spread throughout the world 
many of the banks displayed a lack of sensitivity to the harm they had caused.  The 
sub-prime mortgage disaster unmistakably displayed the greed of lending institutions 
that were zealously aiming for expansion of their housing loan portfolios and of bank 
                                                
3 Jacob Saulwick, "Banks Cut Rates on Children's Accounts,"  (brisbanetimes.com.au, 2009), 
http://business.brisbanetimes.com.au/business/banks-cut-rates-on-childrens-accounts-20090415-
a7ix.html (accessed 31 July 2009). 
226 
employees keen to receive their fat bonuses.  Since the institutions had ceased to 
relate to the customers, they ignored the financial condition of the borrowers and their 
ability to repay the loans.  In view of the fact that investment banks were bundling 
these mortgages into asset-backed securities and selling them to institutional investors 
hungry for high returns on investment-grade financial instruments, the lenders did not 
worry about repayments on the loans.  The investment bankers were fanatical in 
designing and underwriting these mortgage-backed securities because of the 
enormous bonuses they would receive. 
During the worst moments of the crisis in May 2009 only six banks in the 
world managed to retain their double A rating (AA) among which were the big four 
Australian banks, which were the very ones keen to preserve their profitability and 
therefore reluctant to pass onward any interest rate reduction from the central bank.  
The government’s guarantee on the banks’ debt to enable them to obtain lower cost 
overseas funding also failed to induce the banks to reduce their rates.  One could view 
this as a sign of ethical lapse into selfish greed.   
 
B.  1.  Rational Actor Theories 
During the long boom period that ended in 2007 most financial institutions enjoyed 
hefty profits from lucrative lending, trading, and innovative advisory activities.  The 
case study on the sub-prime crisis and its devastating aftermath pointed to widespread 
abuses resulting in people losing their homes, investors seeing their assets evaporate, 
and institutions unable to fund themselves.  Yet most banks boasted that they were 
good models of corporate governance, usually meaning that they maintained proper 
compliance standards, which had arisen out of common practices, codes of conduct, 
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regulation, and a structure governing societal relationships.  One would conclude that 
the banks were able to pursue their profit objectives while ostensibly satisfying 
regulatory requirements put in place to protect other members of society.  How can 
one identify their motivation and ethical considerations? 
One approach in examining this is the ‘rational actor model’.  The rational 
actor is defined as a denizen of an imaginary world conceived by contractarian 
theories. The rational actor model may also employ a modified utilitarian model of 
the good in a well-intentioned attempt to impute moral-theoretical justification to 
specific action and concepts.  This model is exemplified by the following key 
features: (1) human rationality, (2) rational behaviour demonstrated by preference- or 
value-maximization, (3) business profit-maximization, (4) utility as the measure of 
moral goodness, therefore, (5) ethical business practice is interpreted as striving after 
maximum profits within a structure of progressive though not well-circumscribed 
rules, rights, and obligations.4 
This rational actor model was applied to the interviews with banks and other 
financial institutions in Australia and Hong Kong.  Their statements and annual 
reports certainly highlighted the importance of profits among their priorities.  At the 
same time many of them proclaimed that they practise corporate social responsibility, 
which they regard as concern for their stakeholders.  A number of the bankers 
explicitly claimed that they supported the long-term viability of their clients because 
only by doing so could they themselves be assured of long term profitability.  They 
made a similar assertion with respect to a desire for the long-term sustainability of the 
environment, though some of them did not consider it appropriate or timely to adopt 
                                                
4 Janet McCracken and Bill Shaw, "Virtue Ethics and Contractarianism: Towards a Reconciliation," 
Business Ethics Quarterly 5, no. 2 (1995): p. 297-312. 
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environment protection principles ahead of a commitment by the Australian 
government to such an ideology.5 
The philosophical interpretation of rational action as an explanation for risk 
comes in three levels of abstraction.  In its most extensive form it assumes that human 
beings are capable of acting purposefully by relating choices with results.  People act 
strategically, focusing on objectives, and make decisions to achieve their goals.6 
The second, more advanced form of rational action, which is known as the 
Rational Actor Paradigm (RAP), is a theory that assumes human actions are based on 
individual decisions.  The major assumptions include the following: all actions can be 
distilled into individual choices; individual and institutional decision-makers can 
differentiate between goals and the steps needed to attain them; individuals are driven 
towards their selected targets; rational actors seek to maximise or optimise their 
utilities; people are aware of possible consequences of their actions; people’s 
preferences for results arise out of personal values and expectations; human actions 
can be predicted if individual preferences are revealed.7 
The third level of application of the RAP attempts to explain collective or 
institutional behaviour.  Since RAP theory has postulated that individuals maximise 
their satisfaction or utility by selecting among several options the one choice that 
assures maximum return, the corporate or collective interpretation claims that rational 
action leads to overall satisfaction and socio-economic stability on the further 
assumption of free market competition.  The principal gist is the hypothesis that 
factors controlling individual action are similarly applicable to the analysis of 
                                                
5 The Australian Conservative Prime Minister John Howard, who was defeated in the Federal election 
on 24 November 2007, had refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on the environment, but the first act of 
his Labor Party successor Kevin Rudd was to confirm that he would reverse this position. 
6 O  Renn et al., "The Rational Actor Paradigm in Risk Theories: Analysis and Critique,"  (2000), 
www.kent.ac.uk/scarr/events/finalpapers/renn.pdf, pp. 1-21 (accessed 10 March 2008). 
7 Ibid. 
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corporate behaviour.  In line with this overall postulate the critical assumptions are 
that organizations act like individuals and the ‘invisible hand’ operates as an 
equilibrium mechanism.  The interpretation of RAP in the corporate context assumes 
that all human behaviour amounts to optimisation.8 
In the discussions with the senior bankers in Australia and Hong Kong, 
several elements of the Rational Actor Paradigm were clearly evident.  Firstly, each 
institution was focused on increasing shareholder returns or, in other words, 
augmenting profitability either through sales expansion or cost reduction.  Secondly, 
all managers and employees were similarly committed to this goal because salary and 
bonus compensation schemes were unmistakably linked to their individual 
contribution to sales growth and profit maximization.  Both targets were manifest in 
corporate policies and practices.  Thirdly, all the institutions were conscious of their 
need to comply with governmental regulations despite the realisation that compliance 
could hinder attempts at optimisation. 
There were ubiquitous references to customer service and corporate social 
responsibility.  But each institution noticeably publicized its financial goals and later 
proudly proclaimed the actual results as compared to the targets.  This was entirely 
comprehensible because the financial institutions were publicly listed on the share 
markets and the share price movements reflected analysts’ and investors’ views on 
how successfully the firms had achieved their stated targets.  There was strong 
motivation on the part of top executives as well as other managers to attain their 
goals.  These objectives were typically expressed as profit growth and market share 
expansion, measured quarterly over a one-year period, so the time horizon for the 
corporation is undeniably short-term rather than long-term.   
                                                
8 Ibid. 
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In a similar manner, the board directors and senior executives reviewed the 
performance of the bank managers and staff members annually and rewarded them 
with bonuses for the immediate past without significant provision for future 
consequences of the loans, transactions or services attributed to the individuals.  
Although banks with a sense of responsibility (the majority of participants in the 
study) incorporated non-tangible measures in performance appraisal, such as evidence 
of ethical behaviour and appropriate values, it would appear that most financial 
services firms generously rewarded their managers irrespective of the corporate 
performance.  An analysis of executive compensation for the year 2007 revealed that 
despite massive losses from the sub-prime crisis suffered by major financial 
institutions resulting in the dismissal of several chief executives and other senior 
officers, a good number still received munificent bonuses.  The sacked CEOs walked 
away with massive fortunes.9  In these instances the executives failed their 
shareholders, triggered sizeable losses for investors, and caused countless ordinary 
people to lose their homes, and yet the system still rewarded them.  A New York 
Times editorial complained about “the fact that chiefs at 10 financial-services firms 
made $320 million last year, even as their banks reported mortgage-related losses of 
$55 billion.”10 
The RAP is a useful analytical tool for application to a study of ethics in 
banking because the theory is premised on individuals and groups seeking to 
maximise goals.  Many of the American financial institutions in the case study 
corroborated the hypothesis of optimisation.  Several comments from bank executives 
in the empirical research likewise allude to the importance of profit optimisation, 
                                                
9  Claudia H. Deutsch, "A Brighter Spotlight, yet the Pay Rises," The New York Times, 6 April 2008, 
www.nytimes.com (accessed 8 April 2008). 
10 Editor, "Corporate Croesus," The New York Times, 8 April 2008, www.nytimes.com (accessed 10 
April 2008). 
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while reported acts on non-transmittal of interest rate reductions to customers confirm 
the primacy of profit continuation for banks. 
 
B. 2.  Deficiencies of the Rational Actor Paradigm 
The principal deficiency of the RAP in analysing both individual and collective 
behaviour is the assumption that the actors have sufficient knowledge about the 
possible consequences of their chosen path of action.11  When analysing the history of 
the sub-prime crisis and banking in general, one realises this is obviously not the case 
because banks have periodically encountered problems in various guises.  To take the 
example of the sudden collapse and startling rescue of a leading Wall Street 
investment bank, Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York engineered 
during the course of a weekend its acquisition by a much larger bank, JP Morgan 
Chase, because other financial institutions had abruptly ceased to provide funds to 
Bear.  The takeover price was initially for US$ 2 a share, but was later raised to US$ 
10 a share.  Several critics subsequently commented that the Federal Reserve should 
have called in Bear’s chief executive earlier and proposed lending directly to the bank 
or encouraged him to raise additional capital prior to the rapid turn of events 
necessitating a bailout.  But, when the ill-fated CEO was subsequently questioned on 
what he would have done differently, he said that he did not know at the time or even 
later.12 
Uncertainty about the future presents all banks with risks, which create 
opportunities for the institutions but are also the reason that a regulator such as the 
                                                
11 Renn et al., "The Rational Actor Paradigm in Risk Theories: Analysis and Critique." 
12 Andrew Ross Sorkin, "Jp Morgan Pays $2 a Share for Bear Stearns," The New York Times, 17 March 
2008, www.nytimes.com (accessed 17 March 2008). 
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Hong Kong Monetary Authority is predominantly concerned with the quality of risk 
management at the banks operating in Hong Kong.  There are several definitions of 
risk but the one employed by Rosa is especially relevant: “Risk is a situation or event 
in which something of human value (including humans themselves) has been put at 
stake and where the outcome is uncertain.”13  The critical elements of this definition 
are the involvement of human beings and the uncertainty of consequences.  The 
banking world tends to view risk in certain narrow categories, which usually refer to 
risks confronting the banks such as: financial loss, failure of borrowers to repay, 
failure of institutional counterparties to deliver, liquidity, reputation, insider and 
external fraud, bankruptcy, but there has been scant attention to the plight of the 
marginal individual except as a purchaser of banking products.  The risk management 
of banks is chiefly directed at ensuring profits and positive reception in the stock 
markets.  On the other hand, the regulators are mainly concerned with systemic risk, 
namely that the failure of a large bank could trigger repercussions throughout the 
entire financial system or that loan losses at banks could cause widespread distrust 
and panic, which would quickly evolve into a rampant liquidity crisis.  Both events 
occurred during the financial crash of 2007 – 2009, starting in America but spreading 
globally very quickly. 
 According to Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, 
“Risk management systems – and the models at their core – were supposed to guard 
against outsized losses.  How did we go wrong?”14  He argued that the sophisticated 
mathematical models could not fully encapsulate all the dynamic variables of 
economic reality.  The computers were programmed to lower risk through 
                                                
13 Eugene A. Rosa, "Metatheoretical Foundations for Post-Normal Risk," Journal of Risk Research 1, 
no. 1 (1998). 
14 Alan Greenspan, "We Will Never Have a Perfect Model of Risk," Financial Times 2008, 
www.ft.com (accessed 18 March 2008). 
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diversification, whereby varying types of assets would offset each other’s 
movements, but instead, as Greenspan wrote, “when they fell in unison on and 
following August 9 [2007], huge losses across all risk-classes ensued.”15  This clearly 
demonstrated that even the highly motivated, well-paid econometricians and their 
innovative financial models could not predict the probability of occurrence of a 
financial catastrophe. 
The second major deficiency of the Rational Actor Paradigm is that the actors 
seek to maximize utilities such as money or material goods but not a good such as 
mutual trust, which is the very foundation of banking.  This has been clearly 
illustrated in the breakdown of the inter-bank money markets commencing in August 
2007 and lingering months thereafter.  Jaeger commented that RAP was 
unsatisfactory in  “creating mutual trust among actors, building individual and social 
identity, achieving ontological security, or constructing solidarity among people.”16 
When a sales person at a bank or mortgage lender offers a financial product 
such as a mortgage loan, that agent has self-interest in closing the sale in order to earn 
a commission and a potential bonus.  Although the banks interviewed stated that they 
offered training programmes for all their staff so that they would be attentive to the 
needs of their customers, there is no denial of the fact that employees are financially 
rewarded for sales and profit contributions.  However, several bankers in the study 
asserted that their institutions consciously mandate prudential guidelines such as 
adherence to a maximum loan to valuation ratio and verification of a borrower’s 
ability to repay the loan.  It is only through such principles and discipline that a bank 
can implant the motivation in its employees to genuinely look after their customers’ 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
16 Carlo C. Jaeger et al., Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Action, ed. Ragnar Löfstedt, Risk, Society, and 
Policy (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2001), p. 245. 
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interests.  This is probably the reason that Australia and Hong Kong did not 
experience the sub-prime housing problems afflicting borrowers. 
The third deficiency of the Rational Actor Paradigm is that certain individuals, 
who are key components of the banking system because some of them provide the 
savings while others borrow the funds of the savers, have been discovered to be 
financially illiterate.  Niall Ferguson, an economic historian at Harvard University, 
revealed in his research that a sizeable percentage of the general public in the 
English-speaking world is either ignorant or badly informed about finance.17  The 
Economist wrote about money: 
 
Everybody wants it.  Nobody understands it.  Money is the great taboo.  People 
just won’t talk about it.  And that is what leads to subprime.  Take the greed and 
the financial misrepresentation out of it, and the root of this crisis is massive levels 
of financial illiteracy.18 
 
 
Since individual customers are critical actors in the banking scenario, their lack of 
financial literacy, which has been exposed, would have connoted a lack of 
understanding of the basics of savings accounts and investment plans, not to mention 
the intricacies of home mortgage loans with their myriad front-end fees, compound 
interest rates, and penalty fees.  Ferguson noted that financial illiteracy reveals itself 
in all age ranges, income levels and countries.  Well-educated persons are similarly 
afflicted.  Such being the case, one would conclude that it might not be reasonable to 
apply the RAP analysis to most individual bank customers, who could not fully 
comprehend the ramifications of decisions and loan contracts that bankers were 
compelling them to make.  Most individual clients would have acted irrationally. 
                                                
17 "Getting It Right on the Money," The Economist, 5 April 2008, www.economist.com (accessed 12 
April 2008). 
18 Ibid. 
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If financial illiteracy is a prevalent syndrome, consider the plight of poor 
people who frequently do not even have a bank account because they might not have 
any funds to set aside and do not appreciate the value of savings.  Their 
underprivileged economic condition rendered them unwitting targets for sub-prime 
mortgage loans in America and other countries where financial institutions offer 
similar financing.  Without a doubt such disadvantaged people were not even 
remotely aware of the consequences of taking out sub-prime loans without a 
meaningful down payment and adequate repayment capability. 
 
B. 3.  Misguided Risk Management 
Risks are present in everyday life and all activities.  In the financial sphere depositors 
keep their money in banks because they trust the institutions to safeguard their funds 
from the risk of loss.  If customers wish to earn additional returns on their money, 
competent financial advisors would inquire about their level of risk tolerance so they 
can be offered the appropriate savings or investment product.  If the clients are not 
financially literate or the products are not explained sufficiently, they could well be 
assuming excessive risk. 
Just as an individual must clearly identify his risk profile and select his 
appropriate risk preference, much more so should a bank.  It is important that banks 
produce sufficient income and services for their various stakeholders: dividends for 
the shareholders who provide the capital, fair salaries for the employees who serve 
the customers, interest earnings for the depositors who supply funds for loans, 
revenues for the institutional investors who provide funding in the open market, 
straightforward financing for individuals who wish to purchase homes and use their 
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credit cards for convenience, manageable corporate finance for companies which 
require funds for operations or expansion.  In order to achieve these goals banks have 
to assume numerous risks or else be unable to fulfil their roles.  Risk management can 
be broadly classified under two principal categories: asset management is concerned 
with credit risk, that is, the quality of the loans and investments; liability management 
focuses on liquidity and market risks.  One disturbing conclusion is that in the 
circumstances of the sub-prime crisis countless financial institutions were overly 
enthusiastic about accepting amplified risks in the expectation of greater rewards.   
 
B. 4.  Abandonment of Prudence 
An assessment of the coverage of the crisis leads one to believe that the emphasis of 
the financial institutions was on liability management at the expense of prudent risk 
asset management, which was shown in the active reliance on funding through 
residential mortgage backed securities.  As described in Chapter 6 there was scant 
regard for asset or credit quality because the lenders were mainly interested in writing 
home loans.  From an objective perspective, this runs counter to principles taught in 
rigorous credit training programmes at prudential banks, which would always 
highlight the importance of ascertaining the source and timing of repayment.  
However, it did not matter to the sub-prime lenders whether or not the borrowers 
could repay their obligations, because they presumed they could sell off the mortgage 
loans without recourse through various modes of asset securitisation.  It was precisely 
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this neglect of the individual that eventually ignited the bonfires of the sub-prime 
crisis.19 
Much subsequent economic analysis of the sub-prime crisis and the global 
financial calamity that it unleashed has focused on the mathematical models 
underpinning the risk management of banks.  An implicit assumption in the financial 
modelling of banks and rating agencies was that house prices would gradually 
increase over time.20  Such a postulation underlined the risk asset management at 
nearly all sub-prime lenders, namely that even if the borrowers could not repay the 
loans, they could easily put up the properties for sale or the banks could foreclose and 
gain from a forced sale.  This mode of thinking was inflationary and pervasive.  
Consumers were persuaded that they needed to urgently purchase their own homes 
because prices would keep rising, while the lenders abolished down payment 
requirements, relaxed their underwriting criteria, and offered attractive interest rates 
for the initial two year period.  Prudential standards were abandoned. 
A post mortem by several Federal Reserve economists revealed that loans 
with low documentation on income or assets and those with high leverage displayed 
greater defaults than others.21  The same study described four methods for classifying 
sub-prime loans: (a) borrowers needing repeated reminders and are therefore charged 
higher service fees; (b) lenders concentrating on loans to individuals with defective 
credit records; (c) loans incorporating steeper fees and rates than normal; (d) the loan 
                                                
19 Steve Lohr, "In Modelling Risk, the Human Factor Was Left Out," The New York Times, 5 
November 2008, www.nyt.com (accessed 7 November 2008). 
20 Mardi Dungey, Jerry Dwyer, and Tom Flavin, "Vintage and Credit Rating: What Matters in the Abx 
Data During the Credit Crunch?," in Federal Reserve “Day Ahead” Conference on Financial Markets 
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21 Kristopher Gerardi et al., "Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis," in Brookings Papers on Economic 
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might be a component of an asset-backed security labelled as sub-prime.22  A 
significant factor emerged that prior to 2004 sub-prime loans were usually 
supplemented with considerable equity in the properties.  Loans with low 
documentation and excessive leverage grew from nil in 2001 to nearly 20 percent of 
new transactions in 2006.  The theoretical view was that a borrower with positive 
equity in his home would choose to refinance or sell the property rather than default 
or allow foreclosure.  However, in a situation where housing prices were dropping 
rapidly the highly geared borrowers ended up in negative equity and lost any 
semblance of control over their fate. 
 
B. 5.  Initial Market Reception 
Given the inherent risks of this type of loans, the key question is why investors did 
not foresee the sub-prime mortgage disaster.  The explanation lies in the dexterous 
liability management by the issuers and the investment banks, which were able to 
present the residential mortgage-backed securities in an appealing light.  These 
securities readily satisfied the perceived demands of institutional investors in the 
market on asset quality, decent income, and predictable income stream.   
 
Five basic themes emerge.  The first is that the subprime market was viewed as a 
great success story in 2005.  Second, subprime mortgages were viewed, in some 
sense correctly, as lower risk because of their more stable prepayment behavior.  
Third, analysts were hampered by the absence of episodes of falling prices in their 
data.  Fourth, many analysts anticipated the crisis in a qualitative way, laying out, 
in various ways, a roadmap of what could happen, but never fleshed out the 
                                                
22 Ibid., p. 6. 
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quantitative implications.  Finally, analysts were remarkably optimistic about HPA 
[house price appreciation].23  
 
 
As noted in the earlier discussion of the sub-prime crisis, the rating agencies, 
which were supposed to be independent bodies passing judgment on the investment 
qualities of debt issuers and debt offerings, were coaxed by the banks to propose the 
appropriate combination of assets to bundle into RMBSs or CDOs so these could be 
classified as triple-AAA debt issues.  Presented with such highly rated securities, the 
investors chose to forego their own due diligence and further analysis.  The 
automated credit scoring system used by banks also gave the impression that the 
credit quality of sub-prime borrowers had improved.24 There was likewise the 
perception that the lenders had improved because these were larger institutions.   
Curiously the prepayment risk was viewed as more stable than on traditional 
prime loans, but the reason for this was the high penalty levied on prepaying sub-
prime loans that was presumed to discourage prepayments.  But this penalty would 
not prevent defaults on the loans. 
When the event for which the analysts had assigned low probability, the 
slowdown of house price appreciation, finally occurred, it sparked off defaults and 
foreclosures among millions of homes.   
 
B. 6.  Contagion 
After the sub-prime crisis blew up, the economist Mardi Dungey raised the question: 
“why did a crisis that originated in a relatively small segment of the US financial 
                                                
23 Ibid., p. 26. 
24 Ibid., p. 27. 
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system result in the most severe crisis since 1929?”25  She estimated the global 
equities and government debt markets to be a hundred times bigger than the US sub-
prime market, yet the American mortgage calamity rapidly infected the entire global 
economic structure.  Economists view contagion as the cross-country transmission of 
financial shocks beyond fundamental linkages.   The conference paper of Dungey, 
Dwyer and Flavin finds the causes in the use by banks of special purpose vehicles 
that were off-balance sheet, highly leveraged, and utilised to fund sub-prime 
mortgage loans and other loans.  Because these vehicles were maintained separately 
from the balance sheets of banks they were outside the purview of most banking 
supervisors, except in Spain, which had forbidden the use of such techniques.  
Regulators did not realise the extent of huge leveraged global investments in 
American sub-prime assets because these holdings were mainly carried outside the 
balance sheets of banks.  Once the underlying mortgages started to default, the 
financial contagion spread rapidly across national borders. 
 
C.  Challenges to Integrity 
In reviewing the interviews conducted with senior bankers in Australia and Hong 
Kong it was gratifying to come across individuals who affirmed ethical values 
personally and on behalf of their institutions.  However it was perturbing to learn 
from the senior compliance officer for Australia of a considerable institution that 
prevailing practices in her bank continued to be driven by selfish interest in 
maximizing personal bonuses that clearly outweighed concern for other stakeholders, 
much less the vulnerable members of society.  In a culture where the desire for 
                                                
25 Dungey, Dwyer, and Flavin, "Vintage and Credit Rating: What Matters in the Abx Data During the 
Credit Crunch?."  
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compensation and bonuses coupled with fantasies for greater personal wealth is 
paramount, the identity of the individual as a member of a community is diminished, 
and the integrity of that person is tarnished.  With the progress of time the willingness 
to act morally has been gradually extinguished. 
Other commentators have opined that even in institutions that have put in 
place computerized systems requiring employees to regularly receive training on 
codes of ethical conduct it is reasonably easy for errant staff members to fool the 
system by taking the tests and giving the correct responses without agreeing to any of 
the principles being imparted.  In other words, compulsory training in ethics does not 
necessarily produce ethical bank employees.   
The case study of the sub-prime crisis and the continuing travails of credit 
card customers have demonstrated the deception and the deliberate lack of 
transparency among bankers and other lending institutions.  While the lenders that 
went bankrupt and the senior executives who lost their jobs expressed regret for their 
misfortunes, there was no remorse on their part for the entrapment of many 
susceptible borrowers.  Several lenders went so far as to accuse the hapless borrowers 
for bringing about the disaster upon themselves. 
Amazingly many of the financial institutions in America and Britain, which 
had encountered severe monetary difficulties and needed to receive emergency 
support from their respective central banks, brazenly paid enormous bonuses and 
termination payments to their CEOs and other senior executives.  Even after financial 
failure these firms claimed that they had contractual obligations to pay huge bonuses 
to these executives.  They were essentially rewarding failure! 
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But in this morass of greed and disintegration there is evidence of apparent 
good conduct.  In America the firm, JP Morgan Chase Manhattan Bank, whose 
progenitors include the legendary J. P. Morgan26 and David Rockelfeller,27 revealed 
that it had avoided the excesses of the sub-prime exuberance and thus maintained a 
healthy balance sheet and was therefore called upon by the government to rescue the 
investment bank Bear Stearns and the retail bank Washington Mutual.  The CEO of 
JP Morgan Chase also chose to forego his bonus for the year 2008.  In Australia the 
CEO of the largest investment bank, Macquarie Bank, gave up his bonus and went 
from the highest earner at nearly A$ 29 Million the previous year to A$ 290,000 in 
2008. 
Several of the banks that were interviewed in Australia and Hong Kong 
continued to illustrate transparent behaviour though one of them (as earlier described) 
experienced a problem in its treatment of loans to stockbrokers whereby it had 
ignored the impact on the customers of the stockbrokers and consequently smudged 
its reputation in the process.  The newly installed Chief Executive of the affected 
bank28was especially upset with this unfortunate situation because he is a strong 
advocate of maintaining a good reputation.  His action to immediately conduct an 
investigation and publicly announce its findings is highly commendable as a sign of 
transparency.  The CEO also stressed the necessity of fostering cultural change in his 
organisation in order to infuse ethical values in all personnel. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
26 Noted as an early Wall Street titan. 
27 Well respected for his personal concern for other fellow human beings. 
28 Transcript AU 19. 
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D.  Prognosis for the Future 
 
This thesis has probed into banking attitudes and behaviour in order to gain a better 
insight into the underlying values.  Several deficiencies as well as positive aspects 
have been identified.  The causes of the recent financial crisis and the responses 
thereto by the banking industry and regulators have been analysed.  What prospects 
does this analysis portend?  What values do the banks in the study reveal?       
D. 1.  Ethical Pluralism 
  
In appraising the results of the empirical research it is manifest that bankers rely on 
pluralistic ethical stances in the sense that they are driven by varying ethical 
principles.  All of them exhibit utilitarian attitudes in claiming to offer financial 
opportunities to numerous segments of the population.  Many bankers can be 
portrayed in the context of the rational actor paradigm; they pursue personal gains and 
corporate profits with vigour, insisting that their endeavours will bring overall 
economic prosperity.  At the same time most institutions proudly announce their 
reports of corporate social responsibility.  As this thesis has shown, the motivation 
and practice of social responsibility vary among different financial institutions.  
Several banks assert deontological principles in claiming to advocate good corporate 
governance and legal compliance.  Some institutions speak about the importance of 
protecting their reputation, which can mean both an opportunistic approach to 
maintaining market share and a desire to be seen doing good for customers.  The 
espousal of virtue ethics likewise appears in a handful of banks, which genuinely seek 
to foster a close bond with their respective communities.   
The ethical pluralism of banks reveals itself in their corporate declarations and 
in specific activities.  For instance, one Australian bank that claims to care about its 
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good reputation states that it does not lend to marginal, sub-prime clients, which 
shows that the institution disavows predatory, imprudent lending.  However, this 
likewise means that the same bank may be excluding the economically and socially 
disadvantaged section of society from banking services.   In a similar vein, the bank 
that previously declared that it would keep its call centres in Australia (because it 
wanted its employees to be able to relate to local customers) later outsourced those 
activities to India in order to cut costs.  A banker, who said that moral standards 
should be left in the hands of legislators, complained at the same time that there were 
too many regulations affecting banks.  In other words, there was a reluctance to assert 
ethical beliefs beyond those prescribed in laws, but there was also an aversion to 
regulation.  Everyone accepts that traders and dealers operate according to a culture of 
self-interest that is exceedingly susceptible to fraud; therefore all financial institutions 
put into operation a system of checks and balances, frequent audits, and whistle 
blowers.  This is a scheme based on distrust and the threat of punishment, though 
more enlightened banks strive to cultivate an environment of transparency that leads 
to collegial sharing of information and helps avert dishonest behaviour.  In their 
discourse and actions banks reveal a number of ethical principles.  Due to this 
plurality individual bankers adopt diverse ethical responses to situations confronting 
them, but it is evident that they are fully conscious of morality, even if they have 
never been exposed to the study of ethics. However, moral awareness has not 
prevented some financial institutions from committing injustice and wrongful deeds.  
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D. 2.  Glimmer of Hope 
 
Critical observers can better appreciate the significant weight of entrenched ethical 
values in banks after having witnessed the consequences of ethical failure.  Millions 
of Americans have lost their homes due to irresponsible and unjust lending practices.  
Myriads of credit cardholders all over the world continue to suffer from high interest 
rates and fees that they have not fully comprehended and are now unable to escape.  
Defenceless minority groups and elderly retirees in many nations are still subjected to 
irresponsible lending techniques.  The reluctance of banks to pass on interest rate cuts 
from central banks in America and Australia is a blatant example of corporate greed.  
But there is a spark of hope. 
One may accept the optimistic perspective that the global financial crisis and 
recession persisting till 2009 may have modified the cultural values of society.  
Whereas the leading business schools of top universities in America and the rest of 
the world were producing graduates who were enthusiastic about careers on Wall 
Street and other major banks, recession decimated job opportunities in the finance 
industry and thousands of bankers lost their jobs while many banks failed and needed 
to secure government support.  Several major financial institutions such as Bear 
Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Washington Mutual (a large retail bank) had to be 
absorbed by other banks.  Lehman Brothers, a leading Wall Street bank, was forced to 
declare bankruptcy.  Bank of America and Citigroup, two of the largest global banks, 
had to receive massive capital infusion from the American Treasury in order to 
survive.  Banks all over the world have suffered financial losses and continue to shed 
staff, so there has been a tendency for people in general to become less trusting of 
banks and for young people to be less fanatical about banking careers.  The prevailing 
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attitude toward business education has begun to veer away from a heavy 
concentration on finance and banking. 
In March 2009 an article in the New York Times questioned the relevance of 
M.B.A. degrees granted by graduate business schools, especially when the top 
executives at the helm of some of the most spectacular Wall Street failures have such 
a degree: the CEOs of Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Citigroup.29  There were 
reports of regular cheating among 56% of all M.B.A. students, and there were 
laments that the training was slanted towards maximization of shareholder wealth 
without due consideration about social impact.  Both the cheating and the focus on 
shareholder value indicated a slant towards unrestrained selfishness.  The Times 
article also referred to Henry Mintzberg of McGill University who disparaged the 
case study method that was popularised at Harvard, because he argued that students 
were taught to respond too quickly to case reports without the benefit of reflection on 
their own life experience.  According to Mintzberg, this overemphasis on quick 
decisions instead of assessing all the facts and the consequences produced the first 
American president with an M.B.A., George W. Bush, who was blamed for many 
rash and faulty decisions.30  However, an Economist report in June 2009 noted that 
more than 400 graduating students from the Harvard Business School had taken an 
oath to uphold ethical principles: “serve the greater good, act with the utmost 
integrity, and guard against decisions and behaviour that advance my own narrow 
ambitions, but harm the enterprise and the societies it serves.”31  This is certainly a 
positive development, which could have a ripple effect in education. 
                                                
29 Kelley Holland, "Is It Time to Retrain B-Schools?," The New York Times, 14 March 2009, 
www.nytimes.com (accessed 15 March 2009). 
30 Henry Mintzberg, "Leadership Beyond the Bush Mba,"  (2004), 
www.henrymintzberg.com/pdf/leadershipbush.pdf. 
31 "Forswearing Greed," The Economist, 4 June 2009. 
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The keynote speech at the Harvard function was given by Jamie Dimon, the 
chairman and CEO of JP Morgan Chase, who recounted the accomplishments of 
Chase during the crisis period.  However, the commencement speaker at the Wharton 
School was Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the micro-finance Grameen Bank and 
winner of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize, who spoke of his vision of “social business, 
whose purpose is to address and solve social problems, not to make money for 
investors.”32 
While other experts are banking on gloom and doom, I see the economic 
downturn as a prime time to shake things up in a positive way that will lead to 
permanent social change.  This is a big crisis, but this is also a big opportunity to 
redesign and retool, so we don’t have to go back to the same normalcy.  So in a 
certain way, the crisis is good; it gives us a good opportunity to redesign for the 
better.33 
 
The community banks and credit unions in Australia have been moving in the right 
direction of engagement with communities.  But all banks should exert more effort to 
address the financial needs of the underprivileged.  The programmes by some banks 
to encourage corporate social responsibility and to endorse ethical behaviour training 
are definitely good initial steps, but concrete action must follow.  The affirmation by 
one Australian CEO of the need to foster cultural change in order to breed ethical 
consciousness is especially encouraging.34 
There is hope that people will become less enamoured with the chase for 
money and material goods because of the realisation that these are ephemeral and 
offer no lasting satisfaction or reward.  By August 2009 reports were emerging about 
the reluctance of people to spend and a propensity to use debit cards instead of credit 
cards, that is, reliance on available cash rather than borrowing against expected future 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., excerpt of Mr.  Yunus’ speech. 
34 Transcript, AU 19. 
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income.   The move away from consumerism and dependence on borrowing are 
positive indicators for individuals. 
There is anticipation that ethical values are being cultivated as banks and their 
staff members commit to engagement with their respective communities because in 
the process they truly learn practical wisdom. They need to absorb the critical values 
that have been enunciated, but to become truly virtuous in respect of these values they 
should not only ask themselves what is the right thing to do but also what is the good 
thing to do in each situation.  The right action would be that prescribed in the ethical 
code of conduct of their institution whereas the good act would be one they choose 
based upon reflection on the specific situation and its potential impact on other 
individuals. 
In the entanglement of the lingering financial catastrophe people have seen 
many examples of ethical failure that have made them realise what justice and 
goodness truly mean.  As economies recover, individuals and banks should be able to 
apply the lessons of practical wisdom in their lives.  The onus on all members of 
society is to create the conditions to make this happen. 
 
D. 3.  Implications for Action 
 
In August 2009 the economic reports in Germany, China, and America started to 
sound encouraging and announced that the end of recession was in sight.  These 
optimistic developments confirmed that the drastic economic measures employed by 
the leading central banks in the world had succeeded.  Companies and consumers 
were heartened by the positive news, and there was a general sigh of relief that the 
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crisis would soon be over.  The problem with this early euphoria is that people seem 
to have forgotten the lessons from the crisis. 
There have been confirmed accounts in 2009 of many banks and financial 
institutions returning to the old culture of guaranteed bonuses and generous monetary 
compensation in order to entice perceived high-performers to join the banks or to 
retain their loyalty.  Although performance rewards are certainly appropriate, 
excessive pay packages irrespective of performance are definitely questionable and, in 
most cases, the causes of unrestrained risk-taking and the probable inducements for 
ethical failure.  After all, these enormous bonuses were the fires that ignited the sub-
prime lending in America and encouraged dealing fraud in the global banking world.  
The current revulsion towards extreme compensation for bankers harks back to the 
medieval condemnation of usury and the distrust of the profit motive.  The issue 
underneath the recent censure of huge bonuses is the lack of justice in apparently 
disproportionate rewards.  How can responsibility, fairness, and transparency in the 
financial system be assured?    
The first implication is that values must be continuously strengthened in banks 
through appropriate education of all employees and constant affirmation of moral 
integrity by the leadership.  The temptation for individuals and institutions to grow lax 
and complacent must be combated with resolve.  As prosperity returns, most 
individuals and firms might revert to ‘business as usual’, which can sadly mean 
indifference to moral concerns.  But this need not be the case.  
The second implication is the acknowledgement that banks continue to be 
rational actors in pursuit of their own narrow self-interests, and therefore conflicts of 
interest will persist.  In this respect it is highly important to encourage further 
progressive regulation of banking that will permit the continuing development of 
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financial products that enhance the lives of ordinary people while preventing 
consumer exploitation and corrupt behaviour.   
Banks perform a critical role in society, but regulations should be firmly in 
place in order to ensure that everyone in the community is adequately protected 
against abuses and failures of the banking system.  Innovation by banks must continue 
to be encouraged so they can contribute to the wealth creation of individuals and 
companies but ethical values should be instilled in banks, and safeguards must be 
implanted to guard against unscrupulous behaviour.  The discourse and actions of 
bankers have disclosed their dislike of regulations and their clever manoeuvring to 
surmount legal obstacles.  Influential lobbyists are well paid by banks to attempt to 
sway the opinion of legislators in favour of the finance industry.  In addition, banks 
employ large teams of highly skilled lawyers to either circumvent, or certify 
compliance with, the laws.  The regulators must remain vigilant and not slip into a 
passive mode with the false justification that market forces will correct excesses.  The 
failure of markets has been dramatically proven during severe financial crises and 
countless individuals have suffered as a result.  To guarantee justice in society, ethical 
values should be embedded in banks through leadership and education while 
enlightened regulation encourages moral restraint. 
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Appendix A. 
INTERVIEW WITH BANK CHIEF EXECUTIVES 
(Questions Presented at Interviews) 
 
 
A. DEPOSITS FROM INDIVIDUAL CLIENTS 
 
1. What is the policy on the maximum daily limit that a client can withdraw 
from an ATM or transact through a debit card? 
 
2. Please explain your bank’s policies and guidelines on money laundering 
and corrupt practices of clients. 
 
B. CREDIT CARDS 
 
1. How does the bank establish policies on credit limits for credit card 
customers? 
 
2. Is there a process for early detection of potential financial difficulties 
among customers? 
 
3. Does the bank have procedures for dealing with customers who are 
unable to repay?   
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C. HOUSING LOANS 
 
1. Some countries like Australia have experienced a property bubble that 
was driven by high demand and speculative fervour.  According to 
independent analysts such as those at the London Economist, much of 
this housing boom was fuelled by easy credit from banks competing 
fiercely for a share of the business.  Would you care to comment on this? 
 
2. Housing finance is so readily available, that some homebuyers eventually 
have difficulty meeting their obligations.  What is the policy on advising 
prospective borrowers on prudent limits on the amount of their loans and 
manageable levels of debt amortisation? 
 
3. Are there provisions to assist customers who default on their obligations? 
 
 
D. CORPORATE FINANCE 
 
1. In financing acquisitions, expansion, or new projects, do the loan officers 
discuss the ethical impact with the customer?  Do they discuss with 
corporate or other institutional clients possible eventualities such as 
worker displacement or obsolescence or possible failure of the 
contemplated projects?  If the potential fallout from such financing could 
be so large, would your bank be willing to forego the financing 
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opportunity? 
 
2. Does your bank have policies against companies that cause 
environmental harm, or participate in corrupt practices, or condone the 
exploitation of workers, children and women?  
 
 
E. BANK GROWTH AND EXPANSION 
 
1. Do you favour expansion through mergers and acquisition or organic 
growth? 
 
2. Do you believe that your bank is better able to serve its customers 
through growth? 
 
3. Do you believe that employee redundancy is avoidable and desirable?  
 
4. Do you believe that mergers and acquisitions enhance the bank’s 
shareholder value? 
 
F. FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND SECURITIES TRADING 
 
1. Please explain how your bank currently instils integrity and prevents 
conflicts of interest and fraud in the trading room. 
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2. Would you have a suggestion on how this could be improved? 
 
 
G. CODE OF CONDUCT 
 
1. How would you describe the values of your bank? 
 
2. Please describe the process that enabled your bank to affirm these 
values? 
 
3. How do you ensure that these values are shared throughout the 
organisation? 
 
4. Do you believe that the Code of Conduct developed by the Bankers 
Association satisfactorily embodies these values? 
 
 
H. TRUST RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND  REGULATORS 
 
1. What do you see as the key principles of banking regulations? 
 
2. Describe the role of corporate governance in your bank?  Does it focus 
only on compliance? 
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3. How effective is industry self-regulation? 
 
4. Can you quantify the costs and benefits of government regulation vs.  
self-regulation? 
 
5. How would you characterise the level of trust on the part of regulators 
towards the banks? 
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 Appendix B.   
 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON BANK PRACTICES 
(Questions Presented at Interviews) 
 
A.  DEPOSITS FROM INDIVIDUAL CLIENTS 
 
1. Please describe how the bank’s marketing strategy for attracting 
deposits places the customer service ahead of mere profitability and 
greater volume.   
 
2. Does the bank set standard restrictions for customers on the maximum 
amount of withdrawal per day for debit card and ATM transactions?  
Do these consider the amount of available funds that the customers have 
on deposit?   
 
3. How thoroughly do customer representatives advise potential and 
existing clients on the options available and the related benefits and 
costs?  Do they give full advice on maximum withdrawals per day and 
minimum balances that must be maintained?   
 
4. Do bank representatives fully explain the contents of the relevant 
brochures? 
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5. Is the compensation of the customer representatives and relevant 
managers linked to volume and income targets? 
 
 
B. CREDIT CARDS / PERSONAL LOANS 
 
1. Please describe the marketing strategy for attracting new credit card 
customers / borrowers.    
 
What is the profile of the targeted customer? 
 
2. What is the emphasis in the advertising campaign? 
 
3. Please explain how the credit standards filter out irresponsible borrowers.   
 
4. Do bank representatives advise customers on prudent use of their credit 
cards? 
 
5. Is the compensation scheme for credit card staff and managers linked to 
performance in this segment? 
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C. HOUSING LOANS 
 
1. What is the marketing strategy?  Are there target classes of customers? 
 
2. How are the loan criteria established?  Is additional borrowing permitted 
on the same security if the property value rises?  
 
3. Do loan officers advise clients on the suitability of loans in relation to 
their repayment capability? 
 
4. Is the compensation scheme of bank staff in this segment linked to 
volume and income targets? 
 
 
D. CORPORATE FINANCE   
       
1.   Please comment on the credit policy guidelines in relation to ethical 
considerations. 
 
2.   Are there specific industries designated as unsuitable for financing due to 
economic, community, environmental, or ethical reasons?  
 
 3. Do loan officers advise clients on the suitability of the requested 
financing in relation to repayment capability?   
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4.   Please comment on the guidelines for the treatment of past due loans. 
 
5.   Please comment on the linkage between compensation and performance, 
in terms of volume and income contribution for the individual loan 
officers. 
 
 
E. FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND SECURITIES TRADING 
 
1. How do the bank’s internal regulations avoid conflicts of interest and 
fraud in the trading room? 
 
2. Is there a correlation between the compensation of traders and dealers 
and their performance in terms of volume and income?  Please comment 
on the ethical implications in this situation.   
 
 
F. DIRECT INVESTMENTS / PRIVATE EQUITY  
 
1. Does the bank, on its own or through a subsidiary, participate in private 
equity or direct investment? 
 
2. What are the bank’s investment guidelines on industry and project 
preferences? 
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3. Please describe the ethical considerations contained in the investment 
policy. 
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Appendix C.   
INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS 
(retained by the author but excerpts can be made available on request) 
 
AU = Australian Interview 
HK = Hong Kong Interview 
 
AU1.doc 
AU2.doc 
AU3.doc 
AU4.doc 
AU5.doc 
AU6.doc 
AU7.doc 
AU8.doc 
AU9.doc 
AU10.doc 
AU11.doc 
AU12.doc 
AU13.doc 
AU14.doc 
AU15.doc 
AU16.doc 
AU17.doc 
AU18.doc 
AU19.doc 
HK1.doc 
HK2.doc 
HK3.doc 
HK4.doc 
HK5.doc 
HK6.doc 
HK7.doc 
HK8.doc 
HK9.doc 
HK10.doc 
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Zusammenfassung 
Bankiers nehmen eine zentrale Rolle und Bedeutung in der Wirtschaft und 
somit in allen Gesellschaften ein.  
 
 
I. Philosophische Perspektiven zur Bankpraxis 
Die globale Rezession von 2007 bis 2009 wurde durch die Subprime-Krise, für 
welche die Banken verantwortlich waren, beschleunigt. Diese Katastrophe 
verbreitete sich wie ein Lauffeuer, da Banken eine zentrale und unentbehrliche 
Rolle in allen Finanzsystemen und Gesellschaften spielen. Jeder braucht und 
nutzt die Dienste von Banken. 
Die Grundlage des Bankwesens ist Vertrauen. Kunden gehen zu 
Banken, um Ersparnisse oder überschüssiges Geld, das sie momentan nicht 
benötigen, einzuzahlen, da sie Geldinstituten bei dem Schutz ihres Vermögens 
vertrauen. Andere Kunden vertrauen darauf, dass Banken sie beraten und 
ihnen damit helfen, ihre finanziellen Bedarfe zu erfüllen. Deswegen wenden 
sie sich bei Darlehen an die Geldinstitute. Als essentielle Mitglieder der 
Gemeinschaft haben diese dem Rest der Gesellschaft gegenüber moralische 
Verpflichtungen. Diese Dissertation untersucht das ethische Grundgerüst, 
welches die Geschäftspolitik und Maßnahmen bei Banken leitet. Was sind die 
Werte, die das Handeln von Bankiers motivieren? 
Einige philosophische Sichtweisen werden in ihrer früheren Abfassung 
analysiert, um ihre ursprüngliche Interpretation und darauf folgende 
Entwicklung in zeitgenössischen Theorien der Geschäftsmoral zu ermitteln. 
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Seit Aristoteles bestehen deontologisch begründete Pflichten und Verbote fort 
– insbesondere das Verbot des „Wuchers“ oder der Zahlung von Zinsen und 
Gewinnen. Obwohl Widerstand gegen Zinsen jahrzehntelang mit der 
Unterstützung von Thomas von Aquin und der scharfen Kritik der Kirchen 
bestehen blieb, wurde generell akzeptiert, dass Juden die Tätigkeit des 
Geldverleihs ausübten (wie in Shakespeares Beschreibung des Shylock in „Der 
Kaufmann von Venedig“). Diese Einschränkung wurde schließlich durch die 
Lehren Calvins aufgehoben, der nichtsdestotrotz davor warnte, übermäßige 
Zinsen von den Schuldnern zu verlangen. 
Die Debatte über den moralischen Aspekt von Profiten hat sich seit der 
Antike bis in die Gegenwart fortgesetzt. Interessanterweise zitieren moderne 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftler und Bankiers Adam Smiths Worte der 
„unsichtbaren Hand“ in dem „Wohlstand der Nationen“ als ihr Motto für 
freien Wirtschaftskapitalismus. Dies begründen sie damit, dass die 
„unsichtbare Hand“ sie dabei leiten würde, das bessere Wohl einer 
Gesellschaft zu produzieren, wenn jeder primär nach seinem Gewinn strebe. 
Allerdings war Smith, wie die Wirtschaftshistorikerin Emma Rothschild 
herausstellt, vornehmlich ein Moralphilosoph. Seine „Theorie der ethischen 
Gefühle“ behauptete konsequent, dass jeder verhindern sollte, Unzufriedenheit 
hervorzurufen oder anderen Schaden zuzufügen. Er erklärte, dass 
Gerechtigkeit als eine Pflicht keine Ausnahmen erlaube. 
In der Diskussion des Profitmotivs stellte der Philosoph Antony Flew 
klar, dass Selbstinteresse nicht mit Gier gleichgesetzt werden solle. Es sei in 
dem Selbstinteresse eines jeden, regelmäßig seine Mahlzeiten einzunehmen. 
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Jedoch sei es egoistisch und habgierig, sich zusätzlich zu seinem eigenen 
Abendessen das eines anderen zu nehmen. Letzteres sei falsch. 
Der ethische Ansatz des Utilitarismus oder Konsequentialismus, 
welcher ursprünglich von Bentham und Mills entwickelt wurde, berechnet den 
maximalen Nutzen beziehungsweise das maximale Glück, das erreicht werden 
kann, nachdem die negativen Folgen abgezogen wurden. Diese Geisteshaltung 
ist in den meisten Banken weit verbreitet, wo die momentane Denkweise die 
zu sein scheint, dass ihre Kunden umso glücklicher wären, je mehr 
Bankprodukte an sie verkauft würden. 
Utilitaristen hatten zuvor nicht erklärt, warum wir moralisch sein 
sollten oder was unsere Verpflichtungen wären. Kant dagegen demonstrierte, 
dass sich moralische Pflichten uns gegenüber aus Vernunftgründen als absolut 
zeigen könnten. Der Kantische Kategorische Imperativ für jedes menschliche 
Wesen ist von keinerlei Bedingung abhängig und wird dadurch zu einem 
allgemein gültigen Gesetz. Eine äußerst wichtige Maxime ist die, dass wir 
Personen als Zweck, nicht als Mittel behandeln sollten. Gemäß dem Grundsatz 
der Autonomie stellt jedes rationale Wesen seine allgemein gültigen Gesetze 
auf und ist diesen auch untergeordnet. In dem idealen Königreich der Zwecke 
ist es der Wille eines rational denkenden Wesens, allgemein gültige Gesetze zu 
schaffen, da es selbst einen Zweck darstellt. 
Der Kategorische Imperativ ist in der Ethik des Bankwesens äußerst 
relevant. Als Demonstration des universellen Modells verwies der 
Unternehmensethiker Norman Bowie auf das nahezu blinde Vertrauen auf 
Verträge in der Welt des Bankwesens. Sollte eine Maxime, die eine 
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Vertragsverletzung zulässt, als ein allgemein gültiges Gesetz gebilligt werden, 
würde dies das Ende von Verträgen und den Zusammenbruch des Bankwesens 
bedeuten. Als Kategorischer Imperativ hat eine Bank die moralische Pflicht, 
Verträge zu achten. Einige entscheidende Maxime, die für Banken zwingend 
sind, umfassen Folgende: immer ehrlich zu handeln, jedem gegenüber fair zu 
sein, und die Menschlichkeit eines jeden zu respektieren. 
Des Weiteren erwähnte Bowie, dass bloße Enthaltung von Zwang und 
Betrügerei unangebracht sei, da dies negative Freiheit darstelle. Positive 
Freiheit sei damit verbunden, die rationalen und moralischen Kapazitäten eines 
Menschen zu entwickeln. Indem Banken die Menschlichkeit von Personen 
respektieren, sollten sie es zu ihrer Pflicht machen, die rationalen und 
moralischen Kapazitäten ihrer Angestellten zu entwickeln und zu verbessern. 
Diese würden im Gegenzug dazu motiviert werden, sich all ihren Kunden 
gegenüber in ähnlicher Weise zu verhalten. Mit Hilfe dieses Prozesses können 
Banken die Menschlichkeit in jedem von uns respektieren. 
Die Philosophin Onora O’Neill setzte einen wichtigen praktischen 
Maßstab für die Behandlung von anderen als Personen bezüglich der Frage, ob 
sie ihre tatsächliche Zustimmung zu Handlungen, die sich als moralisch 
bedeutend auf sie auswirken, geben. Oft treten Probleme auf, wenn die Bank 
durch Vertragsklauseln ihre eigenen Ziele durchsetzt, ohne dass der 
Vertragspartner dies versteht. Eine beträchtliche Anzahl von Bankkunden, 
besonders diejenigen, die auf Grund von wirtschaftlichen, sozialen oder 
Altersfaktoren verletzlich sind, sind nicht in der Lage ihre hundertprozentige 
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Zustimmung zu vielen Verträgen, die bei Transaktionen in der Bank nötig 
sind, zu geben. 
Kants Einfluss weitete sich auf Sozialvertragstheorien aus, die anfangs 
die Legitimität von Regierungen erklären wollten. Diese geht auf die 
Zustimmung der Regierten zurück, welche in einem Gesellschaftsvertrag 
formuliert wurde, der die Grundlage moralischer Normen ist. Die 
Schlüsselelemente sind die anfängliche hypothetische Position, wenn 
gegenseitiges Einverständnis zwischen Untertanen und Herrschern erreicht 
wurde, und die Darstellung der Parteien dieses Paktes hinsichtlich ihrer 
Beweggründe und Neigungen dazu, eine Übereinstimmung zu erlangen. 
Obwohl Kontraktarianismus seine größte Auswirkung auf die politische 
Philosophie hat, lässt er sich gut für eine Analyse ethischen Verhaltens im 
Bankwesen einsetzen, da Banken eine unerlässliche Funktion in jeder 
Gesellschaft haben. Deswegen arbeiten diese mit sowohl expliziten als auch 
impliziten Verträgen gegenüber allen Stakeholdern, welche sich aus Kunden, 
Angestellten, Aktionären, und der Gemeinschaft zusammensetzen. 
Von Anfang an bestand in der Wirtschaft des Bankwesens immer eine 
Beziehung zwischen ungleichen Parteien – mächtige Banken auf der einen 
Seite, und Kunden, die finanzielle Dienstleistungen benötigen, auf der 
anderen. Deshalb wurden Aufsichtsbehörden an diesem Vertragsverhältnis 
beteiligt, um die Interessen der einzelnen Einzahler und Kreditnehmer zu 
schützen. Diese Behörden haben entweder ein striktes Regelsystem oder 
handeln nach Richtlinien in einem informellen Beratungsprozess. 
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David Gauthier, ein Vertreter des Kontraktarianismus, spricht sich für 
moralische Einschränkung aus. Er erkennt an, dass der homo oeconomicus 
normalerweise ein System von offener Nutzenmaximierung annimmt. Wenn 
wir ihn jedoch als rationale Kreatur sehen, müssen wir stattdessen erwarten, 
dass er Einschränkungen zustimmt. Wenn man akzeptiert, dass Moralität 
rational ist, so ist die Anerkennung von Grenzen der Optimierung die einzige 
Option. Aus Gauthiers Sicht entsteht Moralität aus Misserfolg des Marktes; in 
einer idealistischen laissez-faire-Politik wären moralische Einschränkungen 
nicht nötig. 
Eine weitere Entwicklung der Sozialvertragstheorie ist als 
Kontraktualismus bekannt. Ein Vertreter des Kontraktarianismus strebt 
danach, seine eigenen Interessen beim Umgang mit anderen zu maximieren. 
Ein Vertreter des Kontraktualismus hingegen verfolgt seine eigenen Ziele auf 
eine Art und Weise, die er anderen gegenüber, die ihre eigenen Ziele 
anstreben, rechtfertigen kann. Er versucht, moralische Doktrinen zu 
identifizieren, die alle rationalen Agenten unter bestimmten Bedingungen 
akzeptieren würden. 
John Rawls spricht von Gerechtigkeit als Fairness, die zum Einen 
jedem fundamentale Rechte und Freiheiten gewährt, ohne in jemandes 
Freiheiten einzugreifen. Zum Anderen stellt sie sicher, dass die Verteilung von 
Wohlstand und Einkommen sowohl den Freiheiten gleicher Staatsbürgerschaft 
als auch Chancengleichheit entspricht. 
Laut Thomas Scanlon sei sich das menschliche Individuum seiner 
persönlichen Umstände bewusst, aber habe anstelle von Selbstinteresse einen 
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inneren Zwang, sich selbst jedem anderen gegenüber rechtfertigen zu müssen. 
Es besteht ein grundlegender moralischer Impuls hinter dem menschlichen 
Bedürfnis, sich anderen gegenüber zu rechtfertigen. Dieser Impuls führt zu der 
Suche nach moralischen Prinzipien, die wir und andere Menschen zu Recht 
akzeptieren können – Prinzipien, die ausdrücken, was wir einander schulden. 
Eine Komponente von dem, was wir anderen schulden, ist die Unterstützung 
ihrer Interessen. 
Der Methodik des Sozialvertrags haben sich Wirtschaftsethiker, von 
denen Tom Donaldson der Erste war, angenommen. Er schrieb, dass nur 
Kontraktarianismus als praktisches Konzept in der Unternehmensethik dienen 
könne, während andere philosophische Ethiktheorien für eine Anwendung zu 
allgemein seien. Donaldson und Dunfee modifizierten dieses Konzept in die 
Integrative Sozialvertragstheorie, welche von einer begrenzten moralischen 
Rationalität und der Wertschätzung einer moralischen Kultur als wesentlichem 
Bestandteil eines guten und produktiven Lebens ausging.  
Einige Philosophen behaupten, dass ethische Theorien und davon 
abgeleitete Verhaltensregeln keine große Hilfe auf der praktischen Ebene 
seien, dass universelle Kenntnis darüber, was richtig ist, begrenzten Wert 
hätte, und dass die Aristotelische Phronesis oder praktische Weisheit die 
essentielle Tugend sei, da sie dem menschlichen Wesen immanent sei und von 
Natur aus entstehe, ohne die Anwendung ethischer Regeln. Nach diesem 
Ansatz kommt dem Charakter der Person eine zentrale Rolle für die ethische 
Theorie zu. Basierend auf empirischer Forschung, kam man zu der 
Schlussfolgerung, dass Unternehmen praktische Weisheit unter Angestellten 
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entwickeln sollten. Letztere sollten ethische Regeln in Frage stellen und 
reflektieren, damit sie gutes Handeln begreifen und Verantwortung für das 
Fällen moralischer Entscheidungen übernehmen würden. Praktische Weisheit 
muss in jemandes Wunsch nach moralischer Vortrefflichkeit begründet sein. 
Dieser Mensch sollte Integrität hoch schätzen und eine Veranlagung dafür 
haben, Verantwortung für das Gute in Situationen zu übernehmen. 
Der Finanzethiker John Boatright erwähnte, dass ein Hauptgrund für 
unethisches Verhalten bei finanziellen Vermittlern der Interessenkonflikt sei, 
wenn Banken und ihre Angestellten ihre eigenen Interessen vor die ihrer 
Kunden stellen. Er stellte fest, dass bei finanziellen Dienstleistungen Vertrauen 
entscheidend ist. Die empirische Recherche in dieser Dissertation und die 
Fallstudie der Subprime-Krise bestätigen sicherlich die Beständigkeit von 
Interessenkonflikten in Banken und die häufigen ethischen Verstöße. 
Der Philosoph Robert Solomon behauptete, dass Vertrauen ein 
andauernder Prozess sei, welcher eine wechselseitige Beziehung darstelle, in 
der Parteien durch Vertrauen verwandelt würden. Er kritisierte die 
Geschäftsgepflogenheit, in der Verträge für die Vertrauensgrundlage gehalten 
werden, da diese ziemlich häufig einen Mangel an Vertrauen aufwiesen. 
Bei dem Versuch, die ethische Stütze von Banken zu ermitteln, kam 
man zu der Erkenntnis, dass pluralistische ethische Motive in dem 
tatsächlichen Denken und in den Praktiken von Bankiers wirksam sein 
könnten. Die empirische Forschung und die Fallstudie werden verschiedene 
ethische Anliegen hervorheben, von denen viele mit den unterschiedlichen 
Theorien, die diskutiert wurden, übereinstimmen. Dies impliziert, dass ein 
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ethisches Grundgerüst vorhanden ist, welches sogar bei Variationen in der 
metaethischen Position relativ stabil ist. Auf Grund dessen wird ein System 
bestehend aus drei Werten vorgeschlagen, welches essentiell für eine Bank ist, 
die wirklich und wahrhaftig für ethisches Verhalten eintritt: Verantwortung, 
Fairness, und Ehrlichkeit. 
 
 
II. Die Vorstellung von Ethik im Bankwesen: 
Selbstwahrnehmungen und Kritik 
Nach Auseinandersetzung mit der Thematik, in welcher Beziehung die 
dominanten ethischen Theorien zu dem Bereich des Bankwesens stehen, 
untersucht die Dissertation, wie Bankiers ihre Handlungen sehen. Die 
empirische Forschung setzte sich aus persönlichen Gesprächen mit 
Geschäftsführern der größeren Banken, Aufsichtsbehörden, und 
Bankgemeinschaften in Hong Kong und Australien zusammen. Diese 
Regionen wurden wegen der notwendigen Einschränkung des 
Forschungsgebietes gewählt: sowohl Hong Kong als auch Australien sind in 
einer Studie des Weltwirtschaftsforums unter die besten Finanzzentren der 
Welt eingeordnet worden. Die ausgewählten Banken waren die führenden 
Geldinstitute, die einen großen Anteil der Einzahlungen und Kredite besitzen, 
und somit repräsentativ für die Sichtweisen des Bankwesens. Die Interviews 
konzentrierten sich auf finanzielle Produkte, die mit Kundenkontakt verbunden 
sind und mögliche Interessenkonflikte mit sich bringen. Zu diesen Produkten 
zählen Kleinkundeneinlagen, Kreditkarten und persönliche Kredite, 
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Hypothekendarlehen für Häuser, Unternehmensfinanzen, und Devisenverkehr 
und Wertpapierhandel. 
Die Interviews begannen mit Kleinkundeneinlagen, da diese von fast 
jedem, der Dienstleistungen von Banken in Anspruch nimmt, genutzt werden. 
Diese Einlagen sind für Banken auch ausschlaggebend, da sie die billigste 
Finanzierungsquelle darstellen. Sie sind das wichtigste Produkt, das Vertrauen 
seitens der Kunden benötigt. Löst sich wegen einer Finanzkrise oder Nachricht 
von möglichen Bankproblemen das Vertrauen der Menschen in Luft auf, 
wollen sie ihre Einlagen so schnell wie möglich von den betroffenen Banken 
abheben und verursachen einen bank run (Ansturm auf eine Bank). Die 
Menschen in Hong Kong haben diese Krise, nachdem sie bereits einigen 
wirtschaftlichen Problemen zum Opfer gefallen waren, überstanden und sind 
reifer geworden. Ein Spitzenbankier bestätigte, dass viele gelernt hätten, die 
Natur von Risiken zu verstehen, und daher sehr vorsichtig bei ihrer Wahl von 
Banken seien. 
Der Generaldirektor einer australischen Bank behauptete, seine Bank 
konkurriere nicht auf der Preisbasis, sondern vielmehr, indem sie den 
Kundenkomfort betone. Dadurch gebe sie ihnen das Gefühl, gut bedient zu 
werden. Die Strategie dieser Bank beinhaltete, ihre call center rund um die 
Uhr in Betrieb zu haben, mehr Filialen und Geldautomaten zu errichten, 
Öffnungszeiten der Filialen in Einkaufszentren zu verlängern, und Produkte zu 
vereinfachen. Nichtsdestotrotz berichtete die Zeitung im Jahr 2009, dass diese 
Bank ihre call center zur Kosteneinsparung nach Indien verlegt hätte. Dies 
geschah, obwohl zur Zeit des Interviews darauf bestanden wurde, dass die 
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Bank all ihre call center in Australien behalten würde, um die Kunden besser 
bedienen zu können. Mit anderen Worten: die Rhetorik entsprach nicht der 
Gewinnmotivation. 
Drei Aspekte bezüglich der Kontenführung zeigten nach Ansicht 
meiner Gesprächspartner potentiell fehlendes Interesse der Bankkunden. Der 
erste Aspekt hatte mit der Eröffnung von Depots zu tun, die aus einer 
Mischung von zinsbringendem Festgeld und laufenden Konten bestand. 
Üblicherweise werden den Kunden dicke Broschüren ausgehändigt, die die 
Produktmerkmale erklären; die meisten gewöhnlichen Bankkunden würden 
dieses Informationsmaterial wahrscheinlich nicht verstehen. Die 
Aushändigung der Broschüren stellt jedoch eine Einhaltung der Vorschriften 
dar und entbindet die Banken jeglicher weiterer gesetzlicher Verantwortung. 
Der zweite Aspekt betraf die Höhe der Geldsumme, die man an einem Tag 
abheben oder mit seiner EC-Karte ausgeben kann. Die australische Bedingung 
war viel einschränkender als die in Hong Kong; vermutlich wegen der 
Tatsache, dass die Bemühungen, ihre Kunden kennenzulernen, in letzterer 
Region die Banken vertrauensvoller ihren Kunden gegenüber machten. Der 
dritte Aspekt befasste sich mit der Installation von Geldautomaten in 
Spielcasinos und an Pferderennbahnen durch manche Banken. Kunden zu 
erlauben, sich in derartigen Situationen leicht Bargeld zu beschaffen, 
ignorierte, dass gewisse Leute spielsüchtig waren und leichter Zugang zu 
Bankautomaten ihren Zustand verschlimmerte. Jeder soeben beschriebene Fall 
zeugte kaum von Respekt für die Menschlichkeit in Kunden. Sogar bei dem 
Basisprodukt der Geldeinlage gab es in Banken Anzeichen von minimalem 
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Mitgefühl für die einzelnen Kunden. Trotz allem gab es einige gemeinschafts-
orientierte Banken, die sich wirklich mit ihren Stakeholdern identifizierten und 
von diesen im Gegenzug in hohem Maße respektiert wurden. 
Bei der Untersuchung des Produktgebietes von Kreditkarten wurden 
einige Probleme beobachtet. Erstens wurde von vielen Fällen der 
unverantwortlichen Bereitstellung von Kreditkarten berichtet, insbesondere 
gegenüber Studenten, die womöglich nicht imstande gewesen wären, die 
ausstehenden Beträge am Fälligkeitsdatum zurückzuzahlen. Zweitens bestand 
ein Mangel an Mitteilung und Transparenz der hohen Zinssätze, die berechnet 
werden, wenn fällige Beträge nicht vollständig zurückgezahlt werden, und auf 
künftige Tilgungsraten gelegt werden. Obwohl die Raten und Gebühren in den 
Broschüren genau erklärt wurden, konnten viele die Konsequenzen nicht 
begreifen und abschätzen. Drittens waren Bankverkaufsangestellte 
typischerweise übereifrig dabei, Kreditkarten an den Mann zu bringen, da sie 
an ihre Verkaufszahlen gekoppelte Leistungszulagen erhielten. Viertens 
verwendeten die meisten Banken eine automatisierte Beurteilung der 
Kreditwürdigkeit bei der Bewilligung von Kreditkartenanträgen, sodass in der 
Regel wenig persönlicher Kontakt mit den Kunden und kein Bestreben, ihre 
finanziellen Bedürfnisse zu verstehen, vorhanden waren. Schließlich gab es 
Probleme von Kunden, die Kreditkarten von mehreren Finanzinstitutionen 
erhielten und infolgedessen übermäßige Schulden anhäuften, die sie später 
nicht bezahlen konnten. Somit haben sich Kreditkarten zu depersonalisierten 
Produkten entwickelt, was bedeutet, dass Kreditkarteninhaber zum Mittel der 
Erwirtschaftung von mehr Gewinn für die Banken werden. 
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Hypothekendarlehen für Häuser sind äußerst wichtig – zum Einen, da 
alle Menschen eine Unterkunft benötigen und die meisten von ihnen davon 
träumen, ein eigenes Haus zu besitzen. Folglich stellt ein Hypothekendarlehen 
den größten Bestandteil von Haushaltsschulden dar. Zum Anderen kommt 
diesen Darlehen starke Bedeutung zu, da deren Gesamtsumme ebenso den 
größten Teil an Vermögenswerten des Bankwesens bildet. Jemand, der ein 
Eigenheim kaufen will, muss sich an eine Bank oder einen Geldverleiher 
wenden, um die Finanzierung sicherzustellen, deren Laufzeiten und 
Bedingungen sich auf die finanzielle Situation und Lebensqualität dieser 
Person auswirken. Eine Hypothek auf ein Eigenheim ist normalerweise die 
größte Geldschuld, die jemand im Laufe seines Lebens aufnimmt. 
Auf Grund der Größenordnung eines Hypothekendarlehens im 
Verhältnis zu jemandes Einkommen und Vermögen und zu der langwierigen 
Leihfrist haben konservative Banken und Aufsichtsbehörden traditionell wohl 
überlegte Richtlinien zur Darlehensvergabe herausgegeben. In Hong Kong 
beinhaltete dies einen Beleihungssatz (LVR – loan value ratio) von 70 % und 
eine Schuldendienstquote von 50 %. Das bedeutete, dass die Bank nur bis zu 
70 % des geschätzten Wertes der zu erwerbenden Immobilie verleihen würde 
(der Kreditnehmer müsste für die Differenz sein liquides Eigenkapital 
einbringen), und dass das Nettogehalt des Kreditnehmers mindestens der 
Hälfte der monatlichen Darlehensrückzahlung entsprechen sollte. Die 
Richtlinien waren dafür vorgesehen, sicherzustellen, dass Kreditnehmer 
unerwartete finanzielle Rückschläge bewältigen konnten. Sie würden 
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einerseits das Banksystem absichern, andererseits die Kunden schützen, indem 
sie von leichtsinniger Kreditaufnahme abgebracht werden würden. 
Wirtschaftskrisen begleitet von einem schweren Einbruch der 
Immobilienpreise trafen Hong Kong mit aller Kraft, was die 
Hypothekendarlehen in eine Unterbilanz drückte (der Wert der Darlehen 
überstieg den Marktpreis der Immobilien). Als die Zinsraten anstiegen und die 
Menschen in finanzielle Schwierigkeiten gerieten, kam es zu mehr 
Zahlungsverzügen. Anstatt jedoch die Darlehen zu kündigen oder die 
Kreditnehmer dazu zu zwingen, ihre Eigenheime bei fallenden Preisen zu 
verkaufen, entschieden sich die Banken dafür, die Rückzahlungsfristen zu 
verlängern und die fälligen Beträge nachzulassen. Mit anderen Worten: die 
Banken zeigten ihren Kunden gegenüber Vertrauen. Ihre Handlungen 
bewiesen, dass sie die Leute nicht zu Schaden kommen lassen wollten. Nach 
den Krisen sorgte die Aufsichtsbehörde mit Nachdruck dafür, dass sich strikt 
an die Richtlinien zur Darlehens- und Kreditvergabe gehalten wird. Dies hatte 
sich als vernünftig erwiesen.  
Wettbewerb in der australischen Finanzwirtschaft brachte neue 
Geldgeber ins Spiel. Sie finanzierten sich nicht durch Kleinkundeneinlagen, 
sondern durch forderungsbesicherte Wertpapiere (asset-backed securities) im 
Großhandelsmarkt. Verstärkte Konkurrenz hatte zur Folge, dass sich der 
Beleihungssatz bei australischen Banken von 80 % auf 95 – 100 % erhöhte. 
Des Weiteren wurden die Regelungen zur Kreditvergabe derart gelockert, dass 
sie Darlehen mit minimaler Kontrolle ähnelte – Darlehensgeber überprüften 
weder den Betrag noch die Einkommensquellen der Darlehensnehmer. Diese 
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ähnelten den Subprime-Darlehen, die sich in den USA immer weiter 
verbreiteten. Obwohl solche Methoden das Kreditwesen für mehr Menschen 
zugänglich machten, lag das Problem darin, dass die Darlehensgeber die mit 
den Krediten verbundenen Risiken nicht vollkommen aufdeckten oder die 
Darlehensnehmer vor negativen Konsequenzen warnten. Während einige 
Banken ihren Kunden gegenüber sozial eingestellt blieben, ignorierte die 
Subprime-Darlehensvergabe die Möglichkeit des Schadens, der leichtsinnigen 
Darlehensnehmern zugefügt werden könnte. Solche Methoden der 
Wohnungsbaudarlehen symbolisieren einen unverantwortlichen 
utilitaristischen Denkansatz. Ein ehemaliger Geschäftsführer einer großen 
australischen Bank erklärte, dass sich Darlehensnehmer unbedingt 
vollkommen der Konsequenzen ihrer finanziellen Handlungen bewusst sein 
müssten, und dass Banken nicht für die Endergebnisse der Entscheidungen 
ihrer Kunden verantwortlich seien. 
Auf dem Gebiet der Unternehmensfinanzierung, wo Banken größeren 
Firmen finanzielle Dienstleistungen bereitstellen, nehmen ethische 
Angelegenheiten eine andere Dimension an, jedoch mit folgenschweren 
Auswirkungen auf die gesamte Gesellschaft. Im traditionellen Bankwesen 
wurde von den so genannten Beziehungsmanagern, denen bestimmte 
Wirtschaftszweige und Firmenkonten zugewiesen wurden, erwartet, dass sie 
umfassend mit ihren jeweiligen Konten, was die Geschäftspläne, Strategien, 
und Finanzierungsbedürfnisse betraf, vertraut waren, damit die Banken diese 
Anliegen besser betreuen konnten. Die Lage änderte sich mit der Einführung 
der Securitisation, da Unternehmen direkt zu den Märkten gehen konnten, um 
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Fremd- und Eigenkapital durch Risikoübernahme und Beratungsdienste von 
Anlagebanken zu erhöhen. Manche Bankiers reden sich damit heraus, dass sie 
auf Grund der Tatsache, dass es Beziehungsmanagement als Verfahren nicht 
mehr gibt, wodurch die Banken in engem Kontakt zu ihren 
Unternehmenskunden standen, nicht länger effizient ihre Aktivitäten 
kontrollieren konnten. Damit bestätigen diese Bankiers, dass sie nicht in der 
Lage sind, die Aufsicht über das ethische Verhalten ihrer Kunden zu 
übernehmen, besonders da dies mit der Umwelt, Arbeitsstandards, 
Menschenrechten, und Gesundheitsstandards in Zusammenhang steht. 
Positiv ist, dass gewisse Banken sich dazu bekennen, entschiedene 
Befürworter und Unterzeichner ethischer Normen der Nachhaltigkeit zu sein, 
die in einigen Vereinbarungen wie den Equator Principles, dem United 
Nations Global Compact, und der Erklärung des United Nations 
Environmental Programme aufgestellt waren. Diese Banken versichern, keine 
Finanzierung für jegliche Projekte, die die Umwelt zerstören oder gegen 
ethische Prinzipien verstoßen, bereitzustellen.  
Negativ ist, dass eine Reihe von Banken behauptet, es sei nicht ihre 
Aufgabe, anderen Unternehmen oder Ländern eigenständige Werte 
aufzuzwingen. Sie ist der Meinung, demokratische Gesellschaften hätten 
Repräsentanten gewählt, um Gesetze zu erlassen. Diese reflektierten die Sitten 
und Werte einer Gesellschaft, weshalb es wichtig sei, Gesetzesbefolgung 
sicherzustellen. Diese Forschungsarbeit erkannte, dass einige Banken trotz 
öffentlicher Erklärungen, in denen ethische Normen hervorgehoben wurden, 
mit dieser Denkweise operieren. Diese Banken arbeiten auf der Grundlage, 
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dass die Finanzierung von Unternehmen in allen Zuständigkeitsbereichen 
akzeptabel ist, solange ihre Aktivitäten nicht als illegal gesehen werden. 
Der Bereich des Devisen- und Wertpapierhandels erlebte schwere 
Interessenkonflikten und Fälle von Betrug, da der Aufbau des 
Prämienausgleichs immer Vergütungen, die durch Profite entstanden, in den 
Vordergrund stellte. Deshalb bestehen eine starke Neigung zur 
Einkommensmaximierung und höchste Risikobereitschaft. Um Versuchungen, 
mit denen Händler konfrontiert werden, entgegenzuwirken, haben Banken ein 
Kontrollsystem entwickelt, das sich auf Aufgabentrennung, interne und 
externe Wirtschaftsprüfungen, und Informantenprogramme stützt. Allerdings 
können Kontrollen sabotiert werden, wenn keine Wertekultur und Transparenz 
vorhanden sind. Die Dissertation setzt sich mit einem Betrugsfall im 
Devisenhandel auseinander, in den eine größere australische Bank verwickelt 
war, wo Unternehmenskultur Offenheit und Kommunikation verhinderte. Ein 
weiterer Vorfall, der analysiert wurde, war ein beträchtlicher Verlust in einer 
großen europäischen Bank, wo ein Händler seine Grenzen dermaßen 
überschritt, dass das Kapital der Bank erheblich gemindert wurde. Der 
Schuldige wurde nicht durch Geld, sondern durch die Verlockung des Ruhms 
motiviert. Das Problem in beiden Fällen war ohne Frage Unehrlichkeit und das 
Nichtvorhandensein ethischer Werte in den Banken. 
Jede Bank tritt für einen Verhaltenskodex  ein, der eine Bestätigung der 
Werte durch ihren Vorstand und ihre Geschäftsführung bezüglich der Werte 
der Bank und des Verhaltens jedes ihrer Angestellten darstellt. Weitere 
Bezeichnungen, die verwendet werden, sind Ethischer Verhaltenskodex, 
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Grundsätze und Werte, oder Unternehmensregeln. Geschäftsprinzipien 
könnten einen hervorragenden Kundendienst, effektive und leistungsstarke 
Arbeitsabläufe, eine solide Kapitalpolitik, und eine bedachte Strategie der 
Darlehensvergabe beinhalten. Manche würdigen die große Bedeutung der 
Loyalität der Angestellten, das Engagement bei der Pflege von 
Kundenbeziehungen und Teamarbeit. Manche Banken legen auch die höchsten 
persönlichen Maßstäbe der Integrität, Verpflichtung zur Wahrheit und fairem 
Handel, Verpflichtung zu Qualität und Kompetenz, der Förderung guter 
Umweltpraktiken und nachhaltiger Entwicklung, und Verpflichtung zur 
Gemeinschaft an. 
Einige Banken geben an, dass sich ihr Ruf auf der Wahrung dieser 
Grundsätze und Werte gründe, und dass alle Handlungen der Beamten und 
Angestellten dem offiziell erklärten Kodex entsprechen sollten. Diese Bankiers 
behaupten, dass Führung ausschlaggebend dafür sei, den Ton an der Spitze 
anzugeben, und dass der Charakter jedes Angestellten essentiell sei. Daher sei 
es äußerst wichtig, sich dessen durch Leumundsprüfungen zur Zeit der 
Einstellung zu vergewissern. Wenn die Führungsetage erst einmal mit gutem 
Beispiel vorangeht, welchem daraufhin die gesamte Organisation nachstrebt, 
wird es einfacher, jemanden ausfindig zu machen, der von diesem Weg 
abweicht. 
Einige Banken haben Vorgehensweisen eingeführt, um einzuschätzen, 
wie ihre Angestellten die Verhaltensregeln einhalten. Bei einer größeren 
australischen Bank beispielsweise muss jeder Angestellte während des 
Halbjahres- und Jahresberichts über seine Leistung erfolgreich zwei Schranken 
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passieren. Die erste Schranke prüft Verhalten und Regelbefolgung, während 
die zweite das Einkommen und die Gewinnbeisteuerung des Angestellten 
bemisst. Der Verhaltensrichtwert kann drei mögliche farbkodierte Resultate 
hervorbringen: grün bedeutet, dass sich der Angestellte gemäß der 
gewünschten Erwartungen verhält; bernsteinfarben weist darauf hin, dass es 
Verbesserungsbereiche gibt; rot kennzeichnet jemanden, der deutlich gegen 
die Regeln verstößt. 
Eine Personalabfindung besteht aus barem Gehalt, einem kurzfristigen 
Anreiz in Form eines jährlichen Bonus, und einem langfristigen Anreiz. Mit 
einer roten Auswertung ist ein Angestellter nicht zu einem Bonus berechtigt; 
jemand mit bernsteinfarbener Auswertung wird mit einer erheblichen 
Minderung von 50 % des möglichen Jahresbonus bestraft. Folglich arbeitet 
dieses System wie ein Knüppel. Es motiviert Menschen, bestimmte Dinge zu 
tun, um Bestrafung zu vermeiden. Somit begünstigt es Verhalten, das bei den 
Leuten nicht herausgebildet gewesen ist. Der Einsatz einer Drohung hat 
Grenzen, weil es immer Wege gibt, sie zu umgehen. 
Viele Banken, besonders in Australien, bemessen sich nach zwei 
wichtigen Kriterien, die Bestandteile ihres Verhaltenskodex sind: 
Kundenzufriedenheit und Meinungsumfragen unter den Angestellten (EOS – 
employee opinion surveys). Die Meinungsumfrage versucht, abzuschätzen, 
was ein Angestellter über die Organisation, für die er arbeitet, denkt. Im Jahr 
2006 wurde lediglich eine der vier großen australischen Banken hoch mit 60 % 
eingestuft. Dies zeigte, dass die meisten Angestellten zufrieden oder sehr 
zufrieden waren und gerne in dieser Bank arbeiteten. Die anderen schnitten 
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arm ab: eine spezielle Bank erzielte den miserablen Wert von 32 %. Man 
könnte daraus schließen, dass manche der unzufriedenen Angestellten 
desinteressiert und andere potentielle Saboteure sind. Der Wert wies darauf 
hin, dass einem beachtlichen Teil der Angestellten ihre Stelle oder die Kunden 
gleichgültig waren. 
Die daraus folgende Maßnahme ist Kundenzufriedenstellung, was die 
Bewertung von Banken betrifft. Für gewöhnlich meinten nur 20 %, dass sie 
mit den vier großen Banken zufrieden seien. Wie ein leitender 
Kontrollbeamter beobachtete, umfasst das Szenario unglückliche Kunden, die 
die Bank für mehr Geschäfte ins Visier nimmt, welche wiederum von 
Menschen verkauft werden, die unglücklich darüber sind, in dieser Bank zu 
arbeiten. Die Angestellten empfinden, dass ihre Bedürfnisse nicht verstanden 
werden, da sie unter enormem Leistungsdruck für die Bank stehen, ohne 
zwangsläufig die Bedürfnisse der Kunden zu befriedigen. Dies ist ein Umfeld, 
das ethische Konflikte erzeugt. 
Zusätzlich zu einem Verhaltenskodex, der von den einzelnen Banken 
verkündet wurde, haben Hong Kong und Australien je einen Kodex für 
Tätigkeiten im Bankwesen (COBP – Code of Banking Practice), der von den 
jeweiligen Bankwesensverbänden herausgegeben wurde. Der Regulierer in 
Hong Kong verlangt von allen Banken, dass sie eine jährliche Selbstbewertung 
ihrer Einhaltung des COBP durchführen.  In Australien wurde ein 
eigenständiges Komitee gegründet, um sicherzustellen, dass sich Banken an 
die Grundsätze der bewährten Verfahrensweise, die im Kodex angeordnet 
sind, halten. 
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Die Währungsbehörde in Hong Kong (HKMA – Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority) – der offizielle Regulierer der Regierung – verlangt von 
Geldinstituten gezielt, dass sie sich für eine gesunde moralische Kultur in 
ihren Organisationen einsetzen und eine Reihe von ethischen Regeln und 
Werten entwickeln sollen, an die sich ihre Belegschaft zu halten hat. Die 
HKMA erkennt ein tief verwurzeltes Dilemma zwischen dem öffentlichen 
Interesse bei der Sicherung einer effektiven finanziellen Vermittlung, die das 
allgemeine Wohlbefinden der Gemeinschaft fördert, und dem privaten 
Interesse finanzieller Zwischenhändler bei der Profitmaximierung. Obwohl 
Bankiers sich über das, was sie als übertriebene Regulierung sehen, beklagen, 
loben sie die Regulierungsbehörde Hong Kongs als eine der aufgeklärtesten 
der Welt,  mit einer starken Führungsebene an der Spitze. 
Auf Grund der finanziellen Liberalisierung in den 1980ern erlebte 
Australien eine Überreaktion regionaler Banken in der Form von 
überschwänglicher leichtsinniger Darlehensvergabe und stürmischen 
Versuchen, einen Marktanteil zu ergreifen. Dies endete schließlich in 
schweren Verlusten für manche großen Banken und allen Banken, die 
Eigentum der Bundesstaaten (nicht der Bundesregierung) waren. Die 
Darlehensverluste von Banken der Unternehmensfinanzierung in den 1980ern 
trieben sie in den 1990ern in das Kleinkundengeschäft. Deregulierung brachte 
aggressiven Wettbewerb in den Markt für Immobilienfinanzierung und 
Kreditkarten. 
1996 ernannte die australische Regierung eine Gruppe, welche die 
Ergebnisse der Deregulierung seit den 1980ern auswerten sollte. Ein Jahr 
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später empfahl diese Gruppe eine wesentliche Umorganisierung der 
finanziellen Regulierung. Während die Reserve Bank die Verantwortung für 
Finanzpolitik und die Erhaltung der Stabilität des Finanzsystems einbehielt, 
wurde die praktische Aufsicht der Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(australische Aufsichtsbehörde der Regulierung) zugeteilt. Marktverhalten und 
Offenlegung wurden der Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(australische Wertpapier- und Kapitalanlagenkommission) zugewiesen, der 
auch die Verantwortung für die Durchsetzung des Unternehmensgesetzes 
(Corporation Law) und Kundenschutz im Finanzsystem aufgetragen wurden. 
Man stellte fest, dass der Hauptgrund für die Regulierung Marktversagen ist. 
Der nächste Vorstandschef der Aufsichtsbehörde merkte an, dass alle Märkte 
versagten und Privatunternehmen nur erfolgreich wären, wenn Regulierung 
Marktversagen korrigiere. 
Vor Durchführung einer Analyse der Subprime-Krise kam man zu 
bestimmten vorläufigen Ergebnissen zur ethischen Grundhaltung im 
Bankwesen. Erstens hat es eine Verantwortungsminderung in Banken gegeben, 
die auf die Depersonalisation von Kundenbeziehungen zurückzuführen ist. 
Dies deutet darauf hin, dass Banken Kunden weniger als Ziel an sich 
behandeln, sondern als Zweck zur Profiterzeugung. Zweitens ist als Folge 
einiger Faktoren der Wert der Fairness unter Bankiers verringert worden. 
Einer dieser Faktoren ist die Einstellung unter Bankiers, dass all das, was nicht 
für illegal gehalten wird, erlaubt ist. So gesehen wäre es nicht illegal aber 
unverantwortlich und unmoralisch, jemandem, der Schwierigkeiten bei der 
Rückzahlung haben könnte, Geld zu leihen. Ein wesentlicher mitwirkender 
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Faktor ist die kulturelle Evolution in Geldinstituten, wo finanzielle 
Belohnungen Priorität gegenüber Prinzipien des Gemeinschaftsdienstes und 
der Kundenzufriedenheit einnehmen. Die Grundhaltung von Banken 
gegenüber Risikomanagement strebt danach, ihre Interessen, nicht die der 
Kunden, zu schützen. Da finanzielle Erträge mit erhöhtem Risiko wachsen, 
versuchen Banken diese abzumildern, damit sie einen attraktiven Gewinn 
erzielen können. Nichtsdestotrotz versuchen derartige Systeme des 
Risikomanagements nicht, die Interessen der einzelnen Kunden zu schützen. 
Drittens hat es einen Mangel an Transparenz gegeben, was in einer 
Unstimmigkeit zwischen öffentlich erklärten Ethikgrundsätzen und 
tatsächlicher Geschäftsgepflogenheit offensichtlich geworden ist. Die 
Begründung liegt in ineffektiven Ethikprogrammen und der fehlerhaften 
Unternehmenskultur. 
 
 302 
III. Brutale Realitäten und Kritik an der Ethik im 
Bankwesen 
Die Dissertation beschäftigt sich auch mit einer Fallstudie der amerikanischen 
Subprime-Krise und der globalen Rezession, die sie auslöste. Das angebliche 
utilitaristische Grundprinzip war, bessere finanzielle Möglichkeiten und 
Flexibilität für nicht-kreditwürdige Menschen zur Verfügung zu stellen, die 
ansonsten nicht in der Lage gewesen wären, ihr Eigenheim zu kaufen. Banken 
förderten unnachgiebig diese Subprime-Darlehen, da sie als 
forderungsbesicherte Wertpapiere neu verpackt werden würden, die eifrig von 
kapitalkräftigen institutionellen Investoren wie Ostasien und erdölfördernden 
Ländern begehrt wurden, die hochwertige Investitionen mit guten Erträgen 
beanspruchten. Die Behörden zur Beurteilung der Bonität, die attraktive 
Honorare von den Anlagebanken bezahlt bekamen, waren mitschuldig an der 
Beratung der Banken, wie sie die Wertpapiere strukturieren sollten, um eine 
ausgezeichnete Bewertung zu erhalten; dies war ein offener Interessenkonflikt. 
Wegen des Wunsches, Darlehensvermögen zu erzeugen, gab es kaum oder 
überhaupt keinen Versuch, die finanzielle Leistungsfähigkeit der 
Darlehensnehmer zu prüfen. Auf Grund der nichtigen Transparenz bei der 
Warnung vor möglichen Risiken wurden die Darlehensnehmer von den 
verlockend niedrigen Anfangsraten verführt, welche nach zwei Jahren 
drastisch anstiegen. Infolgedessen vermehrten sich Kreditausfälle und Banken 
zwangsvollstreckten Häuser. Als Immobilienpreise in eine teuflische 
Abwärtsspirale stürzten, mussten Millionen von Menschen ihre Häuser 
zwangsräumen. Dies mögen unerwartete Konsequenzen gewesen sein, jedoch 
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gab es einige Jahre vor dem Absturz Warnungen, da viele Varianten von 
Subprime-Immobiliendarlehen zu rücksichtslosen Darlehensvergaben 
verkommen waren. Die Subprime-Darlehen können nur als ungerecht und 
unfair gewertet werden. 
Da Subprime-Immobiliendarlehen entscheidende Bestandteile von 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs – besicherte Schuldverschreibungen) 
waren, in deren Besitz zahlreiche Investoren und fast alle Geldinstitute waren, 
erzeugten die zunehmenden Zwangsvollstreckungen eine Herabstufung der 
Sicherheiten und entfachten einen rasenden Ausverkauf von CDOs. Als die 
Banken verspätet zu der Realität verringerter Werte ihrer Hypothekendarlehen 
und Sicherheiten aufwachten, waren sie gezwungen, diese Vermögenswerte 
abzuschreiben und Verluste anzuerkennen. Als Hypothekendarlehen langsam 
in Zahlungsrückstand gerieten, waren Banken nicht länger bereit, 
hypothekarische Sicherheiten als Kreditsicherheit zu akzeptieren und stellten 
die Darlehensvergabe ein. Sie häuften liquide Mittel an und zogen sich wegen 
Misstrauen gegenüber anderen Banken aus dem Inter-Banken-Markt zurück. 
Dies bewirkte ein Abdrehen des Zapfhahns und eine Sperrung des 
Liquiditätsflusses in das weltweite Finanzsystem. 
Die Kreditknappheit erhöhte die Zinsraten. Die ersten, die stark 
getroffen wurden, waren die Subprime-Darlehensnehmer, wodurch 
Kreditausfälle weiter ausuferten. Allerdings waren erstklassige einzelne 
Schuldner und Unternehmensschuldner ebenso schlimm durch die akute 
globale Zahlungsunfähigkeit beeinträchtigt. Im August 2007 vereinten sich 
deshalb zentrale Banken weltweit in gemeinsamem Bestreben, Geldmittel in 
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ihre jeweiligen Finanzsysteme zu spritzen. Die wiederholte Geldspritze 
brachte verbesserte Liquidität, jedoch blieben die Zinsraten hoch, da die 
Banken ihre Kreditregeln verschärften. 
Panik ergriff die weltweiten Aktienmärkte wegen Rezessionsängsten, 
einem Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit, und einem Rückgang der 
Konsumausgaben. Die Produktion schrumpfte, da die Nachfrage gefallen war, 
und Hersteller keine Unternehmensfinanzierung erzielen konnten. Nach einem 
jahrzehntelangen Festhalten am ideologischen Glauben an freien 
Marktkapitalismus und minimalistisches Einschreiten der Regierung gestanden 
sich amerikanische Entscheidungsträger allmählich den Ernst der finanziellen 
Katastrophe ein. Bis Oktober 2008 erlitten Banken schwere Verluste. Der 
Internationale Währungsfond schätzte weltweite Hypothekenschuldverluste, 
die von den USA ausgingen, auf US$ 1,4 Billion. Nach kontinuierlichen 
Börsenstürzen auf dem Aktienmarkt und massiven Darlehensverlusten waren 
die größeren Banken am Rande eines Zusammenbruchs. Einige führende 
finanzielle Einrichtungen (Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Northern Rock) 
hatten bereits versagt. Deswegen verkündete die amerikanische und britische 
Regierung, dass sie Aktienpakete in ihren zentralen Geldinstituten, die von 
großen Schwierigkeiten heimgesucht wurden, erwerben würden. (In 
geringerem Maße folgten Deutschland, die Niederlande, und Belgien diesem 
Beispiel.) Dies wurde damit gerechtfertigt, dass die Megabanken, welche die 
Citigroup, Bank of America, Royal Bank of Scotland (und viele andere) 
einschlossen, zu groß waren, um zu scheitern. Deren Ende hätte die Wirtschaft 
der gesamten Welt zerstört. Der Zusammenbruch des globalen Bankwesens 
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wurde schließlich nach hartem Eingreifen durch zentrale Banken weltweit 
abgewendet. Die einzigen wahren Nutznießer jedoch waren die überlebenden 
Banken und ihre Geschäftsführer. Die Steuerzahler mussten für ihre Rettung 
zahlen. 
Während der Nachwirkungen war der schlimmste Aspekt die Tatsache, 
dass die Mehrheit der sich abmühenden Subprime-Darlehensnehmer noch 
immer darauf wartete, von den belastenden Darlehen, welche ihnen die 
Darlehensgeber untergeschoben hatten, befreit zu werden. Die Partner und 
Manager der Banken erhielten weiterhin ihre hohen Prämien, während die 
ursprünglichen Opfer der Krise von der erdrückenden Darlehensrückzahlung 
getroffen waren oder ihr Eigenheim verloren hatten. 
 
 
IV. Fazit 
Banken leisten ihren Gemeinden einen unverzichtbaren Dienst. Es ist 
zwingend erforderlich, dass sie volle Verantwortung für die Bedürfnisse ihrer 
Kunden übernehmen und anerkennen. Die erste Schlussfolgerung ist die, dass 
Geldinstitute, insbesondere Subprime-Hypothekendarlehensgeber in den USA, 
unverantwortlich geworden sind und in dieser Schlüsselrolle versagten. 
Missstände treten dann auf, wenn die Kunden nicht mehr länger den Rang der 
höchsten Priorität für die Institutionen einnehmen, was wiederum durch 
Fluktuation von Angestellten, zunehmende Automatisierung, und 
uneingeschränktes Streben nach Wachstum und Rentabilität verschärft wird. 
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Wie die Ereignisse, die zu der weltweiten Kreditkrise führten deutlich 
darstellten, ist die zweite Schlussfolgerung ein Mangel an Fairness oder 
Gerechtigkeit seitens der Bankiers, besonders wie es bei den 
Wohnungsbaudarlehen und besicherten Hypothekenverpflichtungen in den 
USA veranschaulicht wurde. Das Subprime-Hypothekendesaster stellte 
unmissverständlich die Geldgier der Darlehensgeber, die eifrig auf eine 
Erweiterung ihrer Wertpapierbestände an Wohnungsbaudarlehen abzielten, 
und der Bankangestellten, die auf ihre hohen Prämien aus waren, zur Schau. 
Seitdem sich die Institutionen nicht mehr mit ihren Kunden identifiziert hatten, 
ignorierten sie die Fähigkeit der Kreditaufnahme und finanzielle Kompetenz 
der Kunden. 
Die Fallstudie zu der Subprime-Krise deutete auf weitreichende 
Regelverstöße, die darin resultierten, dass Menschen ihr Haus verloren, 
Investoren ihre Vermögen wertlos werden sahen, und Institutionen einander 
misstrauten. Dennoch prahlten die meisten Banken, dass sie gute Vorbilder für 
Unternehmensführung seien. Wie brachten die Banken ihr Streben nach 
Profitzielen mit Ordnungsauflagen, die eingesetzt wurden, um andere 
Gesellschaftsmitglieder zu schützen, in Einklang? Wie kann man ihre 
Motivation und ethischen Überlegungen identifizieren? 
Ein Denkansatz, um dies zu untersuchen, ist das Rational Actor Model. 
Dieses Modell kann versuchen, sich auf ein modifiziertes utilitaristisches 
Modell des Guten zur moraltheoretischen Rechtfertigung von Handlungen zu 
stützen. Das Modell wird durch die folgenden Merkmale erläutert: 
menschliche Vernunft, rationales Verhalten dargestellt durch 
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Präferenzmaximierung, geschäftliche Profitmaximierung, und Nutzen als 
Maßstab für moralische Tugend. Deswegen wird ethische 
Geschäftsgepflogenheit als das Streben nach maximalem Profit innerhalb eines 
Konstruktes fortschrittlicher, obgleich nicht gut abgegrenzter Regeln, Rechte, 
und Pflichten interpretiert. 
Die philosophische Interpretation rationalen Handelns als eine 
Erklärung für Risikoübernahme erscheint in drei Abstraktionsebenen. In ihrer 
umfangreichsten Form geht sie davon aus, dass Menschen fähig sind, 
zielstrebig zu handeln, indem sie Entscheidungen mit Ergebnissen in 
Beziehung setzen. Die zweite, fortgeschrittenere Theorie rationalen Handelns, 
bekannt als das Rational Actor Paradigm (RAP), vermutet, dass menschliche 
Handlungen auf einzelnen Entscheidungen basieren. Die wesentlichen Thesen 
sind Folgende: einzelne und institutionelle Entscheidungsträger können 
zwischen Zielen und den Schritten, die zu deren Erlangung nötig sind, 
differenzieren; man wird von seinen gewählten Zielobjekten angezogen; 
rationale Akteure sind darauf aus, ihre Nutzen zu maximieren; man ist sich der 
möglichen Konsequenzen seiner Handlungen bewusst; jemandes Präferenzen 
entstehen aus persönlichen Werten und Erwartungen; menschliche 
Handlungen können vorhergesehen werden, wenn individuelle Präferenzen 
aufgedeckt werden. Die dritte Anwendungsebene des RAP behauptet, dass 
unternehmerisches rationales Handeln zu allumfassender Zufriedenheit und 
sozioökonomischer Stabilität in der Annahme eines freien Marktwettbewerbes 
führt. 
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Die empirische Forschung zu Banken in Australien und Hong Kong 
lieferte Nachweise dafür, dass die Banken oft de facto nach dem Rational 
Actor Paradigm handeln. Erstens war jede Institution darauf fokussiert, die 
Erträge von Aktionären zu erhöhen. Zweitens waren alle Manager und 
Angestellten diesem Ziel auf ähnliche Weise verpflichtet, da ihre Entlohnung 
in direktem Zusammenhang mit dem einzelnen Beitrag zur Profitmaximierung 
stand. Drittens waren sich alle Banken der Notwendigkeit bewusst, sich trotz 
der Erkenntnis, dass Regelbefolgung eine Optimierung beschränken könnte, an 
die Regierungsvorschriften zu halten. 
Das RAP ist ein nützliches analytisches Werkzeug, um Ethik im 
Bankwesen zu untersuchen, da die Theorie auf Einzelpersonen und Gruppen 
basiert, die danach streben, Ziele zu maximieren. Die meisten amerikanischen 
Firmen in der Subprime-Fallstudie bestätigten die Hypothese der Optimierung. 
Die wesentliche Schwäche des RAP ist die Annahme, dass Akteure 
ausreichendes Wissen über die möglichen Konsequenzen ihrer gewählten 
Handlungswege besitzen, was jedoch im Bankwesen offensichtlich nicht der 
Fall ist. Ungewissheit über die Zukunft konfrontiert alle Banken mit Risiken, 
die Möglichkeiten schaffen, aber auch der Grund dafür sind, dass sich eine 
vernünftige Regierungsbehörde mit der Qualität des Risikomanagements bei 
Banken befasst. Risiko kann definiert werden als eine Situation oder ein 
Ereignis, wo etwas von menschlichem Wert aufs Spiel gesetzt wurde und wo 
der Ausgang ungewiss ist. 
Die zweite Schwäche des RAP ist die Tatsache, dass Akteure nicht 
danach streben, ein Gut wie das von gegenseitigem Vertrauen, was die 
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Grundlage des Bankwesens ist, sondern Nutzen wie Geld oder materielle 
Güter zu maximieren. Dass gewisse Menschen, insbesondere im englisch-
sprachigen Teil der Welt, kein finanzielles Wissen besitzen, ist die dritte 
Schwäche. Dieses Problem zeigt sich in allen Altersgruppen, 
Einkommensebenen, Ländern, und Bildungsabschlüssen. Das bedeutet, dass 
die meisten Leute die Auswirkungen von Entscheidungen und 
Darlehensverträgen, zu denen sie Bankiers verpflichtet hatten, nicht 
hundertprozentig verstehen konnten. 
Das Rational Actor Paradigm bietet Anhaltspunkte dafür, warum 
Banken keine Eigeninitiative darin zeigen, Kunden bei einem besseren 
Risikomanagement zu unterstützen, und warum die Banken bei ihrem eigenen 
Risikomanagement auf Vernunft verzichtet haben. Dass Hauspreise mit der 
Zeit allmählich steigen würden, war eine stillschweigende Vermutung bei der 
finanziellen Modellierung von amerikanischen Banken und 
Bewertungsbehörden. Die Denkweise aller Subprime-Darlehensgeber war die, 
dass sie, auch wenn Darlehensnehmer die Hypothekendarlehen nicht 
zurückzahlen konnten, die Immobilien problemlos zum Verkauf anbieten 
könnten, oder dass die Banken diese zwangsvollstrecken lassen und einen 
Gewinn aus dem erzwungenen Verkauf machen könnten. Es bestand kein 
Interesse am Darlehensnehmer als Person.  
Eine Schlussfolgerung hieraus ist, dass Banken sich weiterhin mit 
Herausforderungen für die Integrität konfrontiert sehen. In einer Kultur, wo 
der Wunsch nach mehr Wohlstand überragend ist, wird die Identität des 
Einzelnen als Gemeinschaftsmitglied verkleinert, und die Integrität dieser 
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Person getrübt. Mit der Zeit ist der Wille, moralisch zu handeln, allmählich 
ausgelöscht worden. Selbst in Institutionen, die obligatorisches Ethiktraining 
verlangen, wurde berichtet, dass  Angestellte das System täuschen können, 
indem sie an Prüfungen teilnehmen und die richtigen Antworten geben, ohne 
jeglichen vermittelten Grundsätzen zuzustimmen. Die Horrorgeschichten der 
Subprime-Krise und Notlage von Kreditkartenbesitzern haben die Täuschung 
und den bewussten Mangel an Transparenz unter Darlehensgebern 
demonstriert.  
Es ist offenkundig, dass die ethische Grundhaltung im Bankwesen in 
ihrem Ursprung pluralistisch ist. Utilitarismus ist in den Ansprüchen, 
zahlreichen Bevölkerungsabschnitten finanzielle Möglichkeiten anzubieten, 
offensichtlich. Viele Bankiers können im Kontext des Rational Actor 
Paradigm abgebildet werden; sie gehen persönlichen Bereicherungen und 
Unternehmensgewinnen mit Eifer nach und beharren darauf, dass ihre 
Anstrengungen wirtschaftlichen Erfolg für die Gesamtheit bringen würden. 
Zur gleichen Zeit melden die meisten Institutionen stolz ihre Berichte über 
unternehmerische soziale Verantwortung. Allerdings unterscheiden sich die 
Motivation und Ausübung sozialer Verantwortung unter verschiedenen 
Geldinstituten. Manche Banken verfechten deontologische Grundsätze, 
während andere von der Wichtigkeit, ihren Ruf zu schützen, sprechen. Das 
kann sowohl als eine opportunistische Herangehensweise, Marktanteil zu 
bewahren, gedeutet werden als auch als Wunsch, seinen eigenen Ruf durch 
öffentliche Taten zu verbessern.  Das Verfechten von Tugendethik tritt 
ebenfalls bei einer Handvoll Banken auf, die aufrichtig ein enges Band zu 
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ihren jeweiligen Gemeinden pflegen. Auf Grund dieser Vielzahl haben 
einzelne Bankiers diverse ethische Antworten für Situationen, mit denen sie 
konfrontiert werden, parat, aber sind sich zweifellos bewusst, dass sie 
moralischen Regeln unterliegen. Nichtsdestotrotz hat moralisches Bewusstsein 
manche Geldinstitute nicht davon abgehalten, Ungerechtigkeit und 
unrechtmäßige Taten zu begehen. 
Trotz des weitreichenden ethischen Versagens unter Geldinstituten gibt 
es einen Funken Hoffnung. Es besteht generell eine Neigung der Menschen, 
Banken weniger Vertrauen entgegenzubringen, und es gibt Berichte eines 
Abwendens von Verbraucherherrschaft und Kreditabhängigkeit. Es besteht 
Hoffnung, dass ethische Werte durch das Engagement von Banken und ihrer 
Angestellten mit ihren jeweiligen Gemeinden gepflegt werden, da sie dabei 
wirklich praktische Weisheit erlernen. 
Werte müssen in Banken konstant durch angemessene Erziehung aller 
Angestellten und stetige Bekräftigung moralischer Führung durch die 
Führungsetage gestärkt werden. Ebenso von größter Wichtigkeit ist es, weitere 
fortschrittliche Regulierung des Bankwesens zu fördern, die eine fortlaufende 
Entwicklung von Finanzprodukten unterstützt, welche das Leben der 
gewöhnlichen Menschen verbessern und gleichzeitig Ausbeutung und 
Korruption verhindern. 
Um Gerechtigkeit in der Gesellschaft zu garantieren, sollten ethische 
Werte in Banken durch Führung und Erziehung verankert werden, während 
aufgeklärte Regulierung moralische Verbote bestärkt. 
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